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Gill v. Whitford
16-1161
Ruling Below: Whitford v. Gill, 218 F.Supp.3d 837 (W.D.Wis., 2016)
Democratic voters filed § 1983 action against members of Wisconsin Elections Commission,
claiming that redistricting plan drafted and enacted by Republican-controlled Wisconsin
legislature was unconstitutional partisan gerrymander that systematically diluted voting strength
of Democratic voters statewide based on their political beliefs, in violation of Equal Protection
Clause and First Amendment rights of association and free speech, by two gerrymandering
techniques known as “cracking,” or dividing party's supporters among multiple districts so they
fell short of majority in each one, and “packing,” or concentrating one party's backers in few
districts that they won by overwhelming margins. The District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin held that the plan was intended to burden representational rights of Democratic voters
throughout decennial period; the plan had its intended discriminatory effect; the discriminatory
effect was not justified such that plan constituted unconstitutional political gerrymander; and the
Democratic voters had standing.
Question Presented: Whether the district court violated Vieth v. Jubelirer when it held that it
had the authority to entertain a statewide challenge to Wisconsin's redistricting plan, instead of
requiring a district-by-district analysis;
Whether the district court violated Vieth when it held that Wisconsin's redistricting plan was an
impermissible partisan gerrymander, even though it was undisputed that the plan complies with
traditional redistricting principles;
Whether the district court violated Vieth by adopting a watered-down version of the partisangerrymandering test employed by the plurality in Davis v. Bandemer;
Whether the defendants are entitled, at a minimum, to present additional evidence showing that
they would have prevailed under the district court's test, which the court announced only after
the record had closed;
Whether partisan-gerrymandering claims are justiciable.

William WHITFORD, Roger Anclaim, Emily Bunting, Mary Lunne Donohue, Helen
Harris, Wayne Jensen, Wendy Sue Johnson, Janet Mitchell, Allison Seaton, James Seaton,
Jerome Wallace and Donald Winter, Plaintiffs,
v.
Beverly R. GILL, Julie M. Glancey, Ann S. Jacobs, Steve King, Don Millis, and Mark L.
Thomsen, Defendants.
United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin
Decided on November 21, 2016
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[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

gerrymandering by vesting this power in a
neutral body designed specifically to perform
that delicate function, the people of
Wisconsin have so far chosen to rely on its
legislature to reapportion its districts after the
decennial census. They have vested
responsibility in the bicameral legislature
composed of the Wisconsin State Senate and
the Wisconsin State Assembly. Wis. Const.
art. IV, §§ 1, 3. According to Wisconsin law,
“[t]he state is divided into 33 senate districts,
each composed of 3 assembly districts. Each
senate district shall be entitled to elect one
member of the senate. Each assembly district
shall be entitled to elect one representative to
the assembly.”

The plaintiffs have brought this action
alleging that Act 43, the redistricting plan
enacted by the Wisconsin Legislature in
2011, constitutes an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander. Specifically, they maintain that
the Republican-controlled legislature drafted
and enacted a redistricting plan that
systematically dilutes the voting strength of
Democratic voters statewide. We find that
Act 43 was intended to burden the
representational rights of Democratic voters
throughout the decennial period by impeding
their ability to translate their votes into
legislative seats. Moreover, as demonstrated
by the results of the 2012 and 2014 elections,
among other evidence, we conclude that Act
43 has had its intended effect. Finally, we
find that the discriminatory effect is not
explained by the political geography of
Wisconsin nor is it justified by a legitimate
state interest. Consequently, Act 43
constitutes an unconstitutional political
gerrymander. This opinion constitutes our
findings of fact and conclusions of law
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a)(1).

1. The State's constitutional and statutory
framework

The Wisconsin Constitution directs the
Wisconsin legislature, “[a]t its first session
after each enumeration made by the authority
of the United States,” to “apportion and
district anew the members of the senate and
assembly, according to the number of
inhabitants.” The Wisconsin Constitution
also imposes specific requirements for
reapportionment plans. Assembly districts
are “to be bounded by county, precinct, town
or ward lines, to consist of contiguous
territory and be in as compact form as
practicable.” With respect to political
subdivisions, a prior federal district court
observed that, “[a]lthough avoiding the
division of counties is no longer an inviolable
principle, respect for the prerogatives of the
Wisconsin Constitution dictate that wards
and municipalities be kept whole where
possible.” The Wisconsin Constitution
further requires that “no assembly district
shall be divided in the formation of a senate
district.”

Reapportionment of state legislative districts
is a responsibility constitutionally vested in
the state government. Although some states
have chosen to avoid the problem of partisan

In addition to the state constitutional
requirements, the Wisconsin legislature must
comply with federal law when redistricting.
In particular, state legislatures must ensure

I
BACKGROUND
We begin our consideration of the plaintiffs'
claims by examining Wisconsin's statutory
requirements for redistricting as well as its
recent redistricting history.
A. Reapportionment in Wisconsin
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A bill must then “be presented to the
governor,” who can sign or veto the bill.

that districts are approximately equal in
population, so that they do not violate the
“one-person, one-vote” principle embedded
in the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. ( “[T]he Equal
Protection Clause requires that the seats in
both houses of a bicameral state legislature
must be apportioned on a population basis.”);
(holding “that an apportionment plan with a
maximum population deviation under 10%”
is presumptively constitutional, while a
population deviation larger than 10% must be
justified by the state). Further, states also
must comply with § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, which focuses on preserving the
voting power of minority groups.

The caucus system plays a significant role in
the legislative process. Caucus meetings are
held in the morning prior to the legislative
session to vet legislation internally before a
vote on the floor. Professor William
Whitford, a named plaintiff and retired
professor of law from the University of
Wisconsin, testified that important “debate
and discussion,” as well as the “vote[ ] that
matters,” occur within the caucus meetings.
“Once the party caucuses come to a majority
result, the other members of the party are
expected to follow the party line ....” Thus, it
is “extremely difficult” to pass legislation
through a bipartisan coalition.

Redistricting laws in Wisconsin are enacted,
in large measure, in the same manner as other
legislation, specifically, by way of bills
originating in either house of the legislature.
Tad Ottman, aide to the Senate Majority
Leader, explained in some detail this
legislative process:

2. The modern history of reapportionment
in Wisconsin
In the wake of the 1980 census, the plan that
had been enacted in 1972 could no longer
satisfy the constitutional requirement of
“one-person one-vote.” In response to these
changes in population, a redistricting plan
was drafted and enacted by the Wisconsin
legislature, which had a Democratic majority,
but it was vetoed by the Republican
governor. Consequently, a federal district
court was asked to devise a remedy. Upon
reviewing several plans submitted by
legislators and interest groups, the court
“reluctantly concluded” that it could “be
more
faithful
to
the
goals
of
reapportionment” by drafting its own plan. In
doing so, the court focused on ensuring
population equality, avoiding the dilution of
racial minority voting strength, and keeping
communities of interest together. This
“AFL–CIO Plan” remained in effect for one
election in 1982. As a result of that election,
the Democratic Party held control of both
houses of the Wisconsin legislature and also
gained the governor's office. The legislature
passed, and the governor signed, a new

[L]egislators will work either on their own or
with drafters or with a small group of people
to develop legislation. Usually it's developed
among members of your own party, if not just
the individual legislator. They create a
proposal with the assistance of the
Legislative Reference Bureau. At that point,
the bill is often, but not always, circulated
among other legislators to see if anybody else
would want to sign on ....
The bill is then circulated. At some point it is
introduced.... And then once they are
introduced, they are assigned to a committee.
The committee chairman or chairwoman can
choose to hold a public hearing on that piece
of legislation. Most of the time a public
hearing is held.... And then that legislation is
forwarded to the full body, either the Senate
or the Assembly, for debate and then it is
passed over to the other House where a
similar process occurs.
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apportionment plan that lasted for the rest of
the decennial period.

taking the 1992 reapportionment plan as a
template and adjusting it for population
deviations.” In making these changes, the
court attempted to “maintain[ ] municipal
boundaries and unit[e] communities of
interest.” The “Baumgart Plan” was in effect
from 2002 until 2010.

Following the 1990 election, the Wisconsin
government again was divided between two
political parties. The Democratic Party
controlled both houses of the Wisconsin
legislature while the governor was a
Republican. “For that or other reasons, no bill
to reapportion the legislature had been
enacted into law” by January 1992, leading
several Republican legislators to challenge
the existing apportionment plan “as
unconstitutional and violative of the Voting
Rights Act.” As a result, the federal court was
asked to draft a new plan.

B. Drafting of Act 43
In 2010, for the first time in over forty years,
the voters of Wisconsin elected a Republican
majority in the Assembly, a Republican
majority in the Senate, and a Republican
Governor. This uniformity in control led the
Republican leadership to conclude that a
legislatively enacted redistricting plan was
possible.

In an attempt to play a more limited role in
the redistricting process, the court “asked the
parties at the outset whether they had any
objection ... to [the court's] selecting the best
of the submitted plans rather than trying to
create [its] own plan.” Upon receiving these
submissions, however, the court determined
that the plans bore “the marks of their
partisan origins.” It therefore used parts of
one Republican plan and one Democratic
plan. The court plan preserved the strengths
of the partisan plans, “primarily population
equality and contiguity and compactness,”
while “avoid[ing] their weaknesses.” The
plan remained in effect through the 2000
election.

In January 2011, Scott Fitzgerald, Wisconsin
Senate Majority Leader, and Jeff Fitzgerald,
Speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly, retained
attorney Eric McLeod and the law firm of
Michael Best & Friedrich, LLP, to assist with
the reapportionment of the state legislative
districts. The firm supervised the work of Tad
Ottman, staff member to Senate Majority
Leader Fitzgerald; Adam Foltz, staff member
to Speaker Fitzgerald; and Joseph Handrick,
a consultant with the law firm Reinhart
Boerner Van Deuren s.c., in planning,
drafting, and negotiating the new districting
plan. Ottman, Foltz, and later Handrick,
worked in a room located in the offices of
Michael Best & Friedrich, which they
referred to as the “map room.”

Following the 2000 census, a divided
Wisconsin legislature again was unable to
agree upon a redistricting plan. In an ensuing
law suit, the federal district court determined
that “the existing Wisconsin Assembly and
Senate districts,” which had not been redrawn
since 1992, were “violative of the ‘one
person, one vote’ standard.” A new plan was
therefore necessary. The court considered
sixteen plans that had been submitted by
legislators and other interest groups, but
“found various unredeemable flaws” in all of
them. The court therefore drew a plan “in the
most neutral way it could conceive—by

Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick also received
assistance from Professor Ronald Keith
Gaddie, a professor of political science at the
University of Oklahoma. Michael Best &
Friedrich had retained Professor Gaddie “as
an independent advisor on the appropriate
racial and/or political make-up of legislative
and congressional districts in Wisconsin.”
Professor Gaddie described his job as
“devis[ing] measures and consult[ing] ...
about
measures”
of
partisanship,
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compactness, “the integrity of counties, the
integrity of city boundaries, the so-called
good government principles of redistricting.”
“Where [he] ... spent most of [his] time was
trying to disentangle the performance of the
majority/minority districts in Milwaukee
County.”

color that you wanted that Assembly district
to be. It's sort of like a color-by-number
exercise. ...
You also determine what other layers that
you want to look at on the screen. There were
a number of different overlays that you have,
anywhere from existing Senate and
Assembly districts, ... count[y] boundaries,
municipal boundaries, ward boundaries all
the way down to census block boundaries. As
a practical matter what you tried to do is you
would zoom in the region of your screen to
the area that you're looking at to the smallest
amount that you could see and then have kind
of the fewest layers displayed that you would
need because the more information that you
were requiring it to display slows down the
computer speed a lot and makes it really slow
to render.

A “significant part” of his work was
“building a regression model to be able to test
the partisan makeup and performance of
districts as they might be configured in
different ways.” As explained by one of the
plaintiffs' experts, Professor Kenneth Mayer,
“[r]egression is a technique where we can
seek to explain a dependent variable, the
variable that we're trying to account for....
[W]e attempt to explain the values that a
dependent variable take[s] with what are
called independent variables or underlying
causal variables.” In this instance, Professor
Gaddie's dependent variable was the baseline
partisanship of a unit of geography, which
then could be aggregated into different
configurations of Assembly districts. In this
way, Professor Gaddie was able to assess the
partisanship of the Assembly maps that the
drafters passed on to him for analysis.
Professor Mayer testified that “the political
science literature is essentially unanimous”
that the approach taken by Professor Gaddie
is “the appropriate method,” and Professor
Mayer used the same methodology to
construct his Demonstration Plan.

....
And then what you would do is there were a
couple different ways that you could add
population to the district.
Ottman further explained that, in more
populated areas, the drafters worked more at
the ward level: “So you would have the wards
displayed and you would literally draw a
circle, click on it, and it would assign it to the
map and fill it in.” “In other parts of the state
... you might do that at the county level
because it's so sparsely populated so you'd
grab three or four counties at [a] time.”

Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick began drafting
the map that would become Act 43 in April
2011, after they received census data from the
Legislative Technology Services Bureau
(“LTSB”). The LTSB also had provided them
with computers loaded with the redistricting
software, autoBound. Ottman described in
detail how the software was used:

When the drafters would increase the area
size of the districts that they were drawing,
autoBound
provided
demographic
information for the area that the drafter had
included, such as the number of people in the
district, the deviation from the ideal
population, voting-age population, and
different minority group populations. It also
allowed the user to include “customized ...
demographic data.”

[Y]ou would open up a plan that you'd been
working on or label a new plan and assign it
the Assembly district that you wanted to
work with and then you could also pick a
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One piece of “customized demographic data”
employed by the drafters was a composite
partisan score. From the time that Ottman,
Foltz, and Handrick received the census data
from the LTSB, they worked to develop a
composite partisan score that accurately
reflected the political make-up of the
population units. Having this measure was
necessary so that, when they aggregated
those units into new districts, they could
assess the partisan make-up of the new
district they had drawn. On April 19, 2011,
they developed a composite of “all statewide
races from [20]04 to 2010” that “seem[ed] to
work well.” They sent this composite
measure to Professor Gaddie, who tested it
against his regression model. Professor
Gaddie confirmed to Handrick that “the
partisanship proxy you are using (all races) is
an almost perfect proxy for the open seat
vote, and the best proxy you'll come up with.”
Once Professor Gaddie confirmed the
usefulness of their composite measure,
Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick could “assess
the partisan impact of the map[s] that [they]
drew.”

throughout the drafting process. When the
drafters had created a statewide map with
which they were satisfied, they would export
the district-by-district partisanship scores
from autoBound into a spreadsheet for that
“finalized” “statewide” plan.
The drafters used their composite score to
evaluate the statewide maps that they had
drawn based on the level of partisan
advantage that they provided to Republicans.
In many instances, the names of the maps
reflected the level of partisan advantage
achieved by the districting plan; for instance,
there are maps labeled “Assertive” and
“Aggressive.”
Foltz
testified
that
“aggressive” in this context meant “probably
that [the map] was a more aggressive map
with regard to GOP leaning.”
The drafters created spreadsheets which
collected the partisan scores, by district, for
each of the statewide map alternatives. Each
spreadsheet included a corresponding table
comparing the partisan performance of the
draft plan to the prior map drawn by the
Baumgart court, which they called the
“Current
Map.”
These
performance
comparisons were made on the following
criteria: “Safe” Republican seats, “Lean”
Republican seats, “Swing” seats, “Safe”
Democratic seats, and “Lean” Democratic
seats.

Although Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick
worked in the same room at Michael Best &
Friedrich, they worked independently on
their own maps. They drew several statewide
maps, and even more regional maps from
which the legislative leadership eventually
would choose. As they drew the maps, they
would ensure that the districts were “closeto-ideal population.” They did an “eyeball
test” for “compactness and contiguousness.”
They “looked at ... what the core of the
existing district was compared to the new
district,” “looked at municipalities that were
split,” whether the new district had changed
Senate districts, and “where incumbents
lived.”

The process of drafting and evaluating these
alternative district maps spanned several
months. In early April 2011, the drafters
produced a document comparing the partisan
performance of the Current Map to two early
draft maps: Joe's Basemap Basic and Joe's
Basemap Assertive. Under the Current Map,
the drafters anticipated that the Republicans
would win 49 Assembly seats. This number
increased to 52 under the Joe's Basemap
Basic map and to 56 under the Joe's Basemap
Assertive map. The number of safe and
leaning Republican seats increased from 40
under the Current Map to 45 under the Joe's

The drafters were attentive to traditional
districting criteria like population equality,
compactness,
and
municipal
splits
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Basemap Basic map and 49 under the Joe's
Basemap Assertive map; the number of
swing seats decreased from 19 to 14 to 12.42
The number of safe and leaning Democratic
seats, however, remained roughly the same
under all three maps, hovering between 38
and 40.

particular map under all likely electoral
scenarios. On one occasion, Senator
Fitzgerald came to the map room, and
Professor Gaddie showed him one of the
large printouts of the “S” curves and
“basically explain[ed] how to interpret”
them.

The drafters prepared and evaluated the
partisan performance of at least another six
statewide alternative maps. Each of these
maps improved upon the anticipated proRepublican advantage generated in the initial
two draft plans. The total number of safe and
leaning Republican seats now ranged
between 51 and 54, and the number of swing
seats was decreased to between 6 and 11. The
number of safe and leaning Democratic seats
again remained about the same under each
draft map, ranging between 37 and 39.

Not long after Professor Gaddie had
performed his analyses, the Republican
legislative leadership contacted the drafters
and indicated that they wanted to be prepared
to act on a redistricting plan. Over several
days in early June, the drafters presented a
selection of regional maps drawn from their
statewide drafts, approximately three to four
per region, to the Republican leadership.
Along with these regional alternatives, the
leadership “saw the partisan scores for the
maps that [the drafters] presented to them in
those alternatives.” Foltz testified during his
deposition that, although he could not recall
a particular example, he was sure that he was
asked by the leadership about the partisan
performance of the various regional options.

The drafters sent their completed draft maps
to Professor Gaddie for further analysis. For
each map, Professor Gaddie created an “S”
curve—a “visual aide[ ] to demonstrate the
partisan structure of Wisconsin politics.”
These “S” curves show how each map would
operate within an array of electoral outcomes.

Following this meeting, the drafters
amalgamated the regional alternatives chosen
by the leadership. Foltz testified that “the
draft map called team map emerged as a
result of the ... leadership's choices at those
meetings.” Under the Team Map, which was
also referred to as the “Final Map,” the
Republicans could expect to win 59
Assembly seats, with 38 safe Republican
seats, 14 leaning Republican, 10 swing, 4
leaning Democratic, and 33 safe Democratic
seats. In a document bearing the heading
“Tale of the Tape,” the drafters, among other
things, compared the partisan performance of
the Team Map directly to the Current Map on
each of these criteria. They highlighted
specifically that under the Current Map, 49
seats are “50% or better” for Republicans, but
under the Team Map, “59 Assembly seats are
50% or better.”

The “S” curves give a visual depiction of how
each party's vote share (on the x axis),
ranging from 40% to 60%, relates to the
number of Assembly seats that party likely
will secure (on the y axis). Democratic seats
are depicted by shades of blue, and
Republican seats by shades of red. To
produce the “S” curves, Professor Gaddie
first used his regression analysis to calculate
the expected partisan vote shares for each
new district. He then shifted the vote share of
each district ten points in either direction,
from 40% to 60%, and assigned a color to
districts that “tend[ed]” towards, or were
“safe” seats, for that party. The “S” curves—
at least some of which were printed in large
format and kept in the map room—allowed a
non-statistician, by mere visual inspection, to
assess the partisan performance of a
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The Team Map underwent even more intense
partisan scrutiny in a document identified as
“summary.xlsx.” The drafters divided the
new Team Map districts into six categories of
partisan performance, listing beside each
district its “new incumbent” and its
Republican vote share under the Current Map
and the Team Map. The drafters considered
five districts to be “Statistical Pick Up[s],”
meaning they were currently held by a
Democratic incumbent but likely to become
Republican; they grouped fourteen districts
under the heading “GOP seats strengthened a
lot”; they designated eleven districts “GOP
seats strengthened a little”; they labeled three
districts as “GOP seats weakened a little”;
they considered another three GOP districts
“likely lost”; and, finally, they identified four
districts where the Democrats were
“weakened.” The drafters also listed the
twenty Republican Assembly members who,
under the Team Map, could be considered
“GOP Donors to the Team”: “Incumbents
with numbers above 55% that donate[d] to
the team.” These representatives stood in
contrast to “GOP non-donors,” who were
Republican incumbents with “over 55% who
d[id] not donate points.”

provided a “[c]omparison of [k]ey [r]aces” in
the new district compared to the old.
Specifically, the memorandum detailed what
percentage of the population in the old and
new districts voted for Republican candidates
in representative statewide and national
elections held since 2004. This information
also was provided in terms of raw votes. The
memoranda did not provide the individual
legislators with any information about
contiguity, compactness, or core population.

The Team Map was then sent to Professor
Gaddie, who conducted an “S” curve
analysis. The Team Map demonstrated that
Republicans would maintain a majority under
any likely voting scenario; indeed, they
would maintain a 54 seat majority while
garnering only 48% of the statewide vote.
The Democrats, by contrast, would need 54%
of the statewide vote to capture a majority.

On July 11, 2011, the redistricting plan was
introduced by the Committee on Senate
Organization. On July 13, 2011, a public
hearing was held, during which Ottman and
Foltz presented the plan and fielded
questions. The Senate and Assembly passed
the bill on July 19, 2011, and July 20, 2011,
respectively. The Governor signed the bill,
and it was published as Wisconsin Act 43 on
August 23, 2011.

Ottman engaged in a similar process with
Republican members of the State Senate. For
each meeting, he created a talking-points
memo that included information about
population, where changes in the district's
population had occurred, and the geography
of the new district. These also contained
information on how the re-configured district
had voted in national and statewide elections.
Ottman also made a presentation to the
Republican caucus. His notes for that
meeting state: “The maps we pass will
determine who's here 10 years from now,”
and “[w]e have an opportunity and an
obligation to draw these maps that
Republicans haven't had in decades.”

Once the map had been finalized, Foltz
presented each Republican member of the
Assembly with information on his or her new
district. The memos prepared for the
Assembly members informed them whether
the district number had changed, whether
adjustment to the district population was
necessary based on the census numbers, and

C. Prior Court Challenges to Act 43
Even before Act 43 was passed, two actions
were brought challenging the plan on
constitutional and statutory grounds,
including under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. The court consolidated the
actions for decision and concluded that the
379

plan did not violate the “one-person, onevote” principle, nor did it violate the Equal
Protection Clause by “disenfranchise[ing]”
voters who were moved to a new Senate
district and were unable to vote for their state
senator for another two years. However, the
court did find that the plaintiffs were entitled
to relief on their claim that Act 43 violated
the Voting Rights Act by diluting the voting
power of Latino voters in Milwaukee County,
and it ordered the State to redraw these
districts. The remainder of Act 43, however,
remained intact and governed the 2012 and
2014 Assembly elections.

According to the plaintiffs, in drafting Act
43, the Republicans employed two
gerrymandering techniques: “cracking”—
“dividing a party's supporters among
multiple districts so that they fall short of a
majority in each one”—and “packing”—
“concentrating one party's backers in a few
districts that they win by overwhelming
margins,” in order to dilute the votes of
Democrats statewide. This “cracking and
packing result[ed] in ‘wasted’ votes: votes
cast either for a losing candidate (in the case
of cracking) or for a winning candidate but in
excess of what he or she needs to prevail (in
the case of packing).” They therefore urge the
court to adopt a new measure for assessing
the discriminatory effect of political
gerrymanders—the efficiency gap (or “EG”).
“The efficiency gap is the difference between
the parties' respective wasted votes in an
election, divided by the total number of votes
cast.” When two parties waste votes at an
identical rate, a plan's EG is equal to zero. An
EG in favor of one party, however, means
that the party wasted votes at a lower rate
than the opposing party. It is in this sense that
the EG arguably is a measure of efficiency:
Because the party with a favorable EG
wasted fewer votes than its opponent, it was
able to translate, with greater ease, its share
of the total votes cast in the election into
legislative seats. In short, the complaint
alleges that Act 43 purposely distributed the
predicted Republican vote share with greater
efficiency so that it translated into a greater
number of seats, while purposely distributing
the Democratic vote share with less
efficiency so that it would translate into fewer
seats.

In 2012, the Republican Party received
48.6% of the two-party statewide vote share
for Assembly candidates and won 60 of the
99 seats in the Wisconsin Assembly. In 2014,
the Republican Party received 52% of the
two-party statewide vote share and won 63
assembly seats.
II
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Allegations of the Complaint
We now turn to the dispute before this court.
Plaintiffs William Whitford, Roger Anclam,
Emily Bunting, Mary Lynne Donohue, Helen
Harris, Wayne Jensen, Wendy Sue Johnson,
Janet Mitchell, James Seaton, Allison Seaton,
Jerome Wallace, and Don Winter are United
States citizens registered to vote in
Wisconsin. They reside in various counties
and
legislative
districts
throughout
Wisconsin. All of them are “supporters of the
Democratic party and of Democratic
candidates and they almost always vote for
Democratic candidates in Wisconsin
elections.” Defendants are Beverly R. Gill,
Julie M. Glancey, Ann S. Jacobs, Steve King,
Don Millis, and Mark L. Thomsen, each in
his or her official capacity as a member of the
Wisconsin Elections Commission.

The plaintiffs' complaint incorporated the EG
into a proposed three-part test for partisan
gerrymandering. First, plaintiffs would have
to establish that a State had an intent to
gerrymander for partisan advantage. Second,
the plaintiffs would need to prove a partisan
effect, by proving that the EG for a plan
380

exceeds a certain numerical threshold (which
the plaintiffs proposed, based on historical
analysis, to be 7%). If a plan exceeds that
threshold, the plaintiffs asserted that it should
be presumptively unconstitutional. Third,
and finally, the plaintiffs placed the burden
on the defendants to rebut the presumption by
showing that the plan “is the necessary result
of a legitimate state policy, or inevitable
given the state's underlying political
geography.” If the state is unable to rebut the
presumption,
then
the
plan
is
unconstitutional.

EG was directly analogous to the
proportional-representation standard rejected
by the Supreme Court in Vieth v. Jubelirer,
541 U.S. 267, 287–88, 124 S.Ct. 1769, 158
L.Ed.2d 546 (2004). Second, the defendants
argued that the EG failed to account for the
impact of traditional districting criteria like
contiguity and compactness. Finally, the
defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked
the standing to challenge Act 43 on a
statewide basis, and instead could only
challenge their individual districts.
In an order dated December 17, 2015, we
denied defendants' motion to dismiss. We
first noted that the claim was justiciable, and
that, “[u]ntil a majority of the Supreme Court
rules otherwise, lower courts must continue
to search for a judicially manageable
standard.” We acknowledged the defendants'
argument that the EG was analogous to a
proportionality standard, but noted that the
plaintiffs' experts disagreed with the
defendants' contention and that factfinding
therefore was needed. We concluded that “[a]
determination whether plaintiffs' proposed
standard is judicially manageable relies at
least in part on the validity of plaintiffs'
expert opinions” and that a more developed
record would be necessary to resolve that
question. Finally, we concluded that the
plaintiffs had standing, explaining that
“[b]ecause plaintiffs' alleged injury in this
case relates to their statewide representation,
it follows that they should be permitted to
bring a statewide claim.” We noted, however,
that the defendants were “free to raise this
issue again on a more developed record.”

The plaintiffs alleged that they had satisfied
all of these elements. According to the
complaint, Act 43 “was drafted and enacted
with the specific intent to maximize the
electoral advantage of Republicans and harm
Democrats to the greatest possible extent.”
Additionally, Act 43 “produced a proRepublican efficiency gap of 13% in 2012
and 10% in 2014.” They further claimed that
this EG is unjustified because one of their
experts, Professor Mayer, had crafted a
“Demonstration Plan” with “an efficiency
gap of just 2% in 2012,” which “perform[ed]
at least as well as [Act 43] on every other
relevant metric.”
For these reasons, plaintiffs claimed that Act
43 “treats voters unequally, diluting their
voting power based on their political beliefs,
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of equal protection,” and
“unreasonably
burdens
their
First
Amendment rights of association and free
speech.” They requested a declaration that
Act 43 is unconstitutional, an injunction
prohibiting further elections under the map,
and the drawing of a new redistricting map.

C. Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants subsequently filed a motion for
summary judgment, raising new challenges
to the plaintiffs' claims. In the motion, the
defendants argued that the EG metric was
overinclusive and captured several plans—
including court-drawn plans in Wisconsin—
that were not drawn with any partisan intent.

B. Motion to Dismiss
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on
August 18, 2015, which contended that the
court could not grant relief for three primary
reasons. First, the defendants argued that the
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shift the burdens of production or proof.” In
particular, we left open the question of the
requisite level of intent and directed the
plaintiffs to “be prepared to present the
strongest evidence that they have on this
issue ... in order to meet even the most
demanding intent requirement.” We therefore
set the case for trial.

Furthermore Democratic voters tended to live
in cities, which created a “natural packing”
effect and distorted the EG.
The defendants acknowledged the plaintiffs'
argument that a requirement of partisan intent
could remedy this over-inclusivity problem,
but noted that the intent element was not
sufficiently demanding. The defendants
contended that “[a]s long as redistricting is
done by a legislature, it should not be very
difficult to prove that the likely political
consequences of the reapportionment were
intended.” The intent element proposed by
the plaintiffs was, therefore, “meaningless,”
and the Supreme Court's decision in Vieth
already had ruled out the more demanding
standard of “predominant intent.”

D. Witnesses Testifying at Trial
During the four-day trial, from May 24, 2016,
through May 28, 2016, the parties presented
their cases through eight witnesses. Some of
the testimony of the witnesses involved in the
passage of Act 43 has been set forth above,
so it is not necessary to summarize it again
here. An overview of the remaining
testimony is set forth below.

The defendants levied two additional
criticisms of the plaintiffs' test. First, they
noted that the plaintiffs' “Demonstration
Plan” was based on a counterfactual scenario
and therefore failed to address concerns
raised by some Justices about a standard
which dealt with a “hypothetical state of
affairs.” Second, they alleged that the EG is
highly sensitive to “vote-switchers” in swing
districts. Had voters in close (or competitive)
elections voted for the other party, and had a
few candidates of the other party won those
seats, then the EG might be dramatically
different. In their view, a plan that included
such competitive districts could be found
unconstitutional under the plaintiffs'
proposed standard.

1. William Whitford
First to testify was William Whitford, one of
the plaintiffs in this litigation and a resident
of the 76th Assembly District. Professor
Whitford testified to his long-time affiliation
with the Democratic Party. He related that he
consistently has voted for Democratic
candidates, has made donations to
Democratic Assembly candidates outside of
his own district, has raised money on their
behalf, and has donated to the Assembly
Democratic
Campaign
Committee.
According to Professor Whitford, given
Wisconsin's caucus system, “[t]he only
practical way to accomplish [his] policy
objectives is to get a majority of the
Democrats in the Assembly and the Senate,”
which is “virtually impossible under this
apportionment [plan].”

We denied the motion for summary
judgment. We explained that judgment “as a
matter of law would be premature because
there [we]re factual disputes regarding the
validity
of
plaintiffs'
proposed
measurement.” We also noted that there was
conflicting evidence on the “natural packing”
of Democrats in Wisconsin. We further
observed that the defendants' arguments
might serve as “a suggestion to alter the
threshold of the plaintiffs' test and, perhaps,

2. Ronald Keith Gaddie
Professor Gaddie was deposed by the
plaintiffs on March 9, 2016, and a video of
that deposition was admitted into evidence
and played at trial. As explained in some
detail above, Professor Gaddie testified that
he was retained by Michael Best & Friedrich
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on April 11, 2011, to “serv[e] as an
independent advisor on the appropriate racial
and/or political make-up of legislative and
congressional districts in Wisconsin.” In
particular, Professor Gaddie took “the
electoral data ... and constructed a regression
analysis ... in order to create an estimate of
the vote performance of every district.” He
explained that this analysis “could be used to
create a set of visual aids to demonstrate the
partisan structure of Wisconsin politics.”

the drafters' spreadsheets were distorted and
differed from the estimates reached by
Professor Gaddie in his “S” curves. Foltz
testified that he had not noticed this
discrepancy at the time of drafting. He
explained that, at the time, he “didn't spend a
whole lot of time with” Professor Gaddie so
he “[did]n't really understand the nuts and
bolts” of the “S” curves.

As noted above, Professor Gaddie's
regression analysis was employed to confirm
the validity of the composite measure
developed by Foltz, Ottman, and Handrick.
Professor Gaddie also used his regression
analysis to assess each of the drafters'
proposed maps and to create “S” curves to
illustrate how the Republican seat share
would change based on changes in the party's
statewide vote share. In Professor Gaddie's
words, the “S” curves were “designed to tease
out a potential estimated vote for the
legislator in the district and then allow you to
also look at that and say, okay, what if the
Democrats have a good year? What if the
Republicans have a good year? How does it
shift?” At least some of the “S” curves were
printed and kept in the map room at Michael
Best & Friedrich; in print form, the “S”
curves were large enough to “cover half th[e]
table.”

Ottman testified to his involvement in the
drafting and passage of Act 43.

4. Tad Ottman

5. Kenneth Mayer

3. Adam Foltz

Kenneth Mayer, a professor of political
science at the University of Wisconsin,
served as an expert witness for the plaintiffs.
His ultimate goal was to design an alternative
districting plan to Act 43 “that had an
efficiency gap as low to zero as I could get it”
while also complying with traditional
districting criteria to the same extent as Act
43. He first created a regression model that
estimated partisanship for each geographic
area, so that he could compare his plan to Act
43. To ensure the model was accurate,
Professor Mayer compared the predictions
made by his regression model to the actual
results in 2012. Once he was confident in his
model, Professor Mayer “used a GIS
redistricting program called Maptitude ... to
... complete the task of actually drawing the
Assembly district map.”

Foltz worked as a legislative aide for Speaker
Fitzgerald and served as one of the primary
drafters of Act 43. One additional aspect of
Foltz's testimony at trial, however, is worthy
of note. His testimony revealed a
shortcoming in the drafters' composite
partisan measure. Specifically, the composite
score likely was skewed to show a greater
Republican advantage because of an error in
the data for the 2006 Governor's race (one of
the components of the composite score). As a
result of this error, the partisan estimates in

Professor
Mayer's
alternative
“Demonstration Plan” yields a 2.2% EG in
favor of the Republicans, compared to an
11.69% EG yielded by Act 43. According to
Professor Mayer, “[o]n all constitutional
requirements, the Demonstration Plan is
comparable to Act 43.” On crossexamination, however, the defendants
pointed out that Professor Mayer did not take
account of incumbents when drawing the
plan. As a result, his plan paired a greater
number of incumbents than Act 43, including
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one pairing in a majority-minority district.
Further, Professor Mayer had not drawn any
Senate districts, and therefore had not taken
account of disenfranchisement.

practicability of the EG. He conducted a
survey of 786 state legislative elections
(under 206 different districting plans) in the
United States between 1972 and the present
day, in order to ascertain whether there was a
baseline EG which should “trigger scrutiny”
and also to compare Act 43 to other
redistricting plans.

In addition to discussing the Demonstration
Plan, Professor Mayer responded to points
made by the defendants' experts in their
reports. Specifically, Professor Mayer
testified that he had conducted a sensitivity
analysis to address concerns about the effect
of
“wave”
elections—elections
that
dramatically favor one party—on the EG
calculations for both the Demonstration Plan
and Act 43. He first looked over the last
twenty years of elections in Wisconsin and
found the greatest and smallest statewide
vote shares for each party. Using these vote
shares as the likely electoral spectrum, he
performed a swing analysis where the
Democrats received an additional 3% of the
statewide vote (compared to their 2012 share)
and the Republicans received an additional
5% of the statewide vote (again compared to
their 2012 share) “to see what effect that
would have on [his] efficiency gap
calculations for the Demonstration Plan.”
Professor Mayer's analysis revealed that the
Demonstration Plan's EG remained below
4%, regardless of the swing. Act 43's EG,
however, increased during a Democratic
swing but significantly decreased during a
Republican swing. Professor Mayer noted
that this is because “we've swung the
Republican vote percentage up to 54 percent”
but “[t]he number of [Republican] seats
doesn't change.” In Professor Mayer's view,
the result “is a confirmation that the bias in
Act 43 is about the maximum that you can
get.”

Professor Jackman sought to determine how
much the EG varied from election year to
election year, and whether a districting plan
had any impact on that EG. Professor
Jackman presented a “scatterplot,” which
graphed the relationship between the EG in
the first election year of a redistricting plan
(set forth on the x axis) and the average EG
over the lifetime of the plan (set forth on the
y axis). He found a “relatively strong
predictive relationship,” meaning that a high
EG in the first year of a redistricting plan
likely means that the EG will remain high for
the lifetime of the plan.
Based on his research, Professor Jackman
proposed that an EG of 7% or higher should
be legally significant:
“I arrived at 7 percent because that seemed to
be a reasonable threshold for saying yes, if
the first election under a plan produces an
efficiency gap score at least that big, then you
can be confident now that you've seen not just
a one-off, but something that's going to
persist over the life of the plan as a signal
of—a reliable signal as to the set of efficiency
gap scores and the average efficiency gap
score you might see if the plan were allowed
to run.”
In other words, an EG of 7% in favor of one
party in the first election year of a plan almost
certainly means that the EG will favor that
same party in each subsequent election year
under that plan.

6. Simon Jackman
Simon Jackman, a professor of political
science and statistics at Stanford University,
also served as an expert witness for the
plaintiffs. Professor Jackman primarily
testified about
the
reliability and

Professor Jackman noted that the EGs for the
2012 and 2014 races in Wisconsin—13% and
10%, respectively—were particularly high by
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historical levels. The EG in 2012 was,
according to Professor Jackman, “among the
largest scores we've seen anywhere” and “in
the top 3 percent in terms of magnitude.” Act
43's average EG ranked fifth out of the 206
plans that Professor Jackman surveyed. He
testified that he was “virtually certain” that
“Act 43 will exhibit a large and durable
advantage in favor of Republicans over the
rest of the decade.”

distance between heavily Republican wards.
From this analysis, Mr. Trende concluded
that it has “become[ ] progressively harder to
draw ... Democratic districts elsewhere in the
state,” which in his view explained at least
some of the EG. However, he did not
determine exactly how much of the EG was
attributable to geography.

7. Sean Trende

Nicholas Goedert, a visiting professor of
political science at Lafayette College, was
retained by the defendants to offer opinions
on using the EG to measure partisan
gerrymandering.

8. Nicholas Goedert

Sean Trende, Senior Elections Analyst for the
website RealClearPolitics, served as an
expert witness for the defendants. Mr. Trende
primarily testified on the political geography
of Wisconsin and its potential effect on the
EG.

Professor Goedert's main objection to the EG
was its perceived volatility. In Professor
Goedert's view, “wave elections are the
norm,” meaning that “much more often than
not one party wins by 5 percent or more” of
the vote. Therefore, relying on an EG from
one election year, which might have taken
place during a close election, might not be
reliable. Professor Goedert opined that, “at a
very minimum, ... you need to have some sort
of robust sensitivity testing that would be
codified if you were going to use the
efficiency gap in any way.”

Mr. Trende explained that, as a general
matter, political geography of the United
States currently favors Republicans. In his
view, the Democratic coalition has
contracted geographically and is now
concentrated heavily in urban areas. This
concentration, in turn, has hurt the
Democratic Party in congressional elections,
which tend to favor parties with wider
geographic reach.
Mr. Trende also testified to the political
geography of Wisconsin itself, which he
analyzed using a measure called the “partisan
index” (“PI”). The purpose of the PI is “to
determine the partisan lean of political units,”
in order to “compare results across
elections.” Mr. Trende explained that the
county and ward PI values within Wisconsin
have shifted such that the Democratic Party's
influence was strengthening in areas “that
already leaned Democratic,” but was
contracting geographically.

Professor Goedert also raised a series of
policy concerns. First, he pointed out that the
EG measure arguably rests on a “2-to-1”
vote-to-seats ratio and therefore a certain
standard of proportionality. He also noted
that there are “normatively good reasons why
a state might cho[ose] to draw a map in a
certain way and even under these
normatively good reasons we could and
actually do observe very high efficien[cy]
gaps.” For example, Professor Goedert noted
that some states may wish to create a more
proportional
system
or
encourage
competitive elections. In his view, states
might be discouraged from pursuing these
policy goals if the court adopted the EG as the
standard for partisan gerrymandering.

Mr. Trende then applied his PI analysis to
Wisconsin's wards in what he referred to as a
“nearest neighbor” analysis, which assessed
the median distance between heavily
Democratic wards compared to the median
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We express our appreciation to both parties
for their thorough and informative
presentation, and now turn to the legal
principles that must guide our analysis of the
case.

E. Post–Trial Briefing
Both parties filed post-trial briefs, which
summarized their views of the case in light of
the evidence presented at trial. The plaintiffs
contended that they satisfied their proposed
three-part test by proving discriminatory
intent, discriminatory effect, and an absence
of a justification for that effect. On intent, the
plaintiffs focused in particular on the
alternative maps that the drafters rejected, the
“S” curves drawn by Professor Gaddie, and
memos written by Foltz and Ottman. On
effect, the plaintiffs stressed that the EG was
not only likely to favor Republicans for the
lifetime of the plan, but that it also was likely
to stay relatively high. The plaintiffs also
highlighted the sensitivity testing that had
been conducted by Professors Jackman and
Mayer. On justification, the plaintiffs pointed
out that the previous Assembly maps in
Wisconsin, the alternative plans drafted by
the defendants, and Professor Mayer's
Demonstration Plan all exhibited lower EGs
while arguably complying as well with
traditional districting criteria.

III
THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The plaintiffs' claim is that Act 43 violates
their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
because it discriminates against Democratic
voters by diminishing the strength of their
votes in comparison to their Republican
counterparts.
We note, as a prefatory matter, that we have
acknowledged, throughout this litigation, that
the plaintiffs' standing to maintain a cause of
action is a threshold issue. Indeed, in our
disposition of the defendants' motion to
dismiss, we addressed extensively standing
and “conclude[d] that plaintiffs' alleged
injury [wa]s sufficiently concrete and
particularized under current law to satisfy
Lujan with respect to a statewide challenge to
the districting plan.” “We reach[ed] the same
conclusion with respect to [Lujan's] second
and third elements of standing, which are
causation and redressability.” We noted,
though, that the “defendants [we]re free to
raise this issue again on a more developed
record.”

In response, the defendants contended that “a
plan that complies with all neutral districting
criteria, and whose efficiency gap is
consistent with prior court-drawn plans”
cannot be unconstitutional. The defendants
noted that Act 43's districts were congruent,
compact, and fairly equal in population.
Further, much of the secrecy surrounding Act
43's enactment was consistent with how bills
typically are enacted in Wisconsin. The
defendants also pointed to evidence that the
political geography in Wisconsin favors
Republicans, which they contend explains
the trend in EGs towards that party over the
past two decades. In the defendants' view,
this evidence also illustrates the unreliability
of the EG. The defendants concluded that the
plaintiffs had not presented enough of a
reason for a court to intervene in the
redistricting process.

Lujan explains that, because the elements of
standing “are not mere pleading requirements
but rather an indispensable part of the
plaintiff's case, each element must be
supported in the same way as any other
matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden
of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of
evidence required at the successive stages of
the litigation.” Our assessment of the
evidence, as well as our elucidation of the
political gerrymandering cause of action,
therefore will inform our standing analysis.
Consequently, we postpone a plenary
discussion of standing until we fully have set
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forth the evidence as well as the
constitutional standard. As a precursor,
however, we conclude that the plaintiffs have
established a concrete and particularized
injury: “[a]s a result of the statewide partisan
gerrymandering, Democrats do not have the
same opportunity provided to Republicans to
elect representatives of their choice to the
Assembly. As a result, the electoral influence
of plaintiffs and other Democratic voters
statewide has been unfairly [and]
disproportionately ... reduced” for the life of
Act 43.155 Additionally, the plaintiffs have
shown causation: Act 43 was designed with
the purpose of solidifying Republican control
of the legislature for the decennial period and,
indeed, has had that effect. Finally, the
plaintiffs have established that their injury is
redressable: adopting a different statewide
districting map would redress the
constitutional violation by removing the
state-imposed impediment on Democratic
voters.

the navigational signs are not yet well-placed,
we must decide the case before us and satisfy
our “duty ... to say what the law is,” or at least
what we believe it to be.
We begin by examining the cases that set
forth the constitutional principles which later
informed
the
Court's
political
gerrymandering decisions.
A. The Foundational Case Law
1.
Over half a century ago, the Supreme Court
recognized that the constitutionality of
legislative apportionments is governed by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Reynolds was not a political
gerrymandering case, but addressed
allegations that an outdated apportionment
scheme resulted in “serious discrimination
with respect to the allocation of legislative
representation” in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court spoke to the importance and
nature of the right to vote in terms that also
inform our consideration of the plaintiffs'
claims.

In resolving the plaintiffs' claim, we face a
significant analytical problem. Although the
Supreme Court's political gerrymandering
cases establish that “an excessive injection of
politics is unlawful,” (emphasis removed),
the Court has not come to rest on a single,
judicially manageable or discernible test for
determining when the line between
“acceptable” and “excessive” has been
crossed. Indeed, a signature feature of these
cases is that no single opinion has garnered a
majority of the Court.

The Court first observed that the right to vote
“is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society. Especially since the right
to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other
basic civil and political rights, any alleged
infringement of the right of citizens to vote
must be carefully and meticulously
scrutinized.” The Court explained that
“[m]ost citizens” exercise their “inalienable
right to full and effective participation in the
political process” by voting for their elected
representatives.
“Full
and
effective
participation by all citizens in state
government requires, therefore, that each
citizen have an equally effective voice in the
election of members of his state legislature.”
Moreover, the concept of equal protection
has been traditionally viewed as requiring the

But the absence of a well-trodden path does
not relieve us of the obligation to render a
decision. True, we cannot anticipate that the
Court will alter course from the decisional
law, however sparse, that currently exists.
Nor can we cobble together the opinions of
the various Justices who have written on the
matter and call the resulting amalgam
binding
precedent.
Nevertheless,
understanding that we are in an area where
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uniform treatment of persons standing in the
same relation to the governmental action
questioned or challenged. With respect to the
allocation of legislative representation, all
voters, as citizens of a State, stand in the same
relation regardless of where they live.

multimember districts, where citizens reside
in a comparatively larger district and vote for
multiple representatives. Voters alleged that
these multimember districts were “defective
because county-wide voting in multi-district
counties could, as a matter of mathematics,
result in the nullification of the unanimous
choice of the voters of a district.” The district
court granted summary judgment to the
plaintiffs, finding that the statute was
unconstitutional on its face.

The Court explained, however, that the
requirement of equal treatment was not
limited to where a voter resided. Instead,
“[a]ny
suggested
criteria
for
the
differentiation of citizens are insufficient to
justify any discrimination, as to the weight of
their votes, unless relevant to the permissible
purposes of legislative apportionment.”
(emphasis added). The Court therefore
concluded that,

The Supreme Court disagreed that such
districts were unconstitutional per se, and it
declined to strike the plan. The Court
acknowledged, however, that “[i]t might well
be that, designedly or otherwise, a multimember constituency apportionment scheme,
under the circumstances of a particular case,
would operate to minimize or cancel out the
voting strength of racial or political elements
of the voting population.” The Court,
therefore, remanded for factfinding to
determine whether the plaintiffs could meet
this burden.

“[s]ince the achieving of fair and effective
representation for all citizens is concededly
the basic aim of legislative apportionment, ...
the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the
opportunity for equal participation by all
voters in the election of state legislators.
Diluting the weight of votes because of place
of residence impairs basic constitutional
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just
as much as invidious discriminations based
upon factors such as race or economic
status.”

Following Fortson, the Court has held that
multimember
districts
violate
the
Constitution when the plaintiffs have
produced evidence that an election was “not
equally open to participation by the group in
question—that its members had less
opportunity than did other residents in the
district to participate in the political
processes and to elect legislators of their
choice.”

Reynolds therefore establishes that, in
electing state representatives, the votes of
citizens must be weighted equally. If an
apportionment scheme violates the principle
of one-person, one-vote, it must be justified
on the basis of other, permissible, legislative
considerations.

Later cases refined the methodology by
which courts evaluate claims of vote dilution.
In Rogers v. Lodge, Burke County, Georgia,
employed an at-large system of elections to
determine its Board of Commissioners, rather
than dividing the county into districts and
allowing each district to choose a
commissioner. African–American citizens in
that county brought an action in which they
alleged that the county's system of at-large
elections violated their First, Thirteenth,

2.
The Court soon had the opportunity to apply
the principles set forth in Reynolds to
allegations of vote-dilution brought by racial
minorities. In Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S.
433, 85 S.Ct. 498, 13 L.Ed.2d 401 (1965), the
Court considered the constitutionality of an
apportionment scheme which included
traditional single-member districts and
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Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment rights
by diluting their voting power. The district
court held that, although the at-large electoral
system was neutral in origin, it was being
maintained for invidious purposes and
therefore ordered the county to be divided
into districts for purposes of electing
commissioners.

Equal Protection concerns arise when
apportionment plans “minimize or cancel out
the voting strength” either of racial minorities
or, as we have here, “political elements of the
voting population.” Moreover, they instruct
that vote-dilution cases are governed by the
same standards as other equal-protection
claims, namely the plaintiffs must establish
both a discriminatory intent and a
discriminatory effect.

The Supreme Court affirmed. It explained
that districts violate the Equal Protection
Clause when “ ‘conceived or operated as
purposeful devices to further racial
discrimination’ by minimizing, cancelling
out or diluting the voting strength of”
minority populations. These cases “are thus
subject to the standard of proof generally
applicable to Equal Protection Clause cases,”
specifically the “ ‘quality of a law claimed to
be racially discriminatory must ultimately be
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.’ ”
Discriminatory intent, however, “need not be
proved by direct evidence,” but may be “
‘inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts.’ ”

B. Present Supreme Court Precedent
1.
The Court drew heavily from the Fortson line
of cases in resolving the political
gerrymandering claim asserted in Gaffney v.
Cummings. In Gaffney, the Connecticut
Apportionment Board created a redistricting
plan designed to yield Democratic and
Republican seats in proportion to the
statewide vote. A three-judge district court
invalidated the plan on the ground that the
deviations from equality of population in
both houses were not “justified by any
sufficient
state
interest,”
“[m]ore
particularly, ... that the policy of partisan
political structuring ... cannot be approved as
a legitimate reason for violating the
requirement of numerical equality of
population in districting.”

Applying this standard, the Court “decline[d]
to overturn the essential finding of the
District Court ... that the at-large system ...
ha[d] been maintained for the purpose of
denying blacks equal access to the political
processes in the county.” Evidence of
discriminatory purpose included the fact that
no African American ever had been elected
despite “overwhelming evidence of bloc
voting along racial lines.” There also was
evidence of historical discrimination in the
form of literacy tests, poll taxes, and school
segregation; of a disparity in socio-economic
status that “result[ed] in part from the
lingering effects of past discrimination,”; and
of county elected officials' unresponsiveness
and insensitivity to African-American
constituents.

The Supreme Court reversed. In its analysis,
the Supreme Court acknowledged that
“[s]tate legislative districts may be equal or
substantially equal in population and still be
vulnerable
under
the
Fourteenth
Amendment”; it stated:
A districting plan may create multimember
districts perfectly acceptable under equal
population standards, but invidiously
discriminatory because they are employed
“to minimize or cancel out the voting strength
of racial or political elements of the voting
population.” We must, therefore, respond to
appellees' claims in this case that even if
acceptable
populationwise,
the

Although focused on racially discriminatory
apportionment schemes, Fortson and
subsequent vote-dilution cases establish that
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Apportionment Board's plan was invidiously
discriminatory because a “political fairness
principle” was followed in making up the
districts in both the House and Senate.

proportional representation in the legislative
halls of the State.”
In sum, the Court reiterated that its concern
was invidious discrimination by the State;
absent the plaintiffs' establishing an intent to
dilute the strength of a particular group or
party, the Equal Protection Clause was not
offended.

The Court, however, was “unconvinced” that
the plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court observed that Connecticut's
Apportionment Board had sought to “achieve
a rough approximation of the statewide
political strengths of the Democratic and
Republican parties,” by implementing a
“political fairness” plan. (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court saw no
constitutional impediment to the State's
considering partisan interests in this way.

2.
The Court next addressed partisan
gerrymandering in Davis v. Bandemer.
Because Bandemer was the first case in
which a party directly raised, and the Court
squarely addressed, a claim that a legislative
redistricting plan invidiously discriminated
against members of a political party, we treat
it in some depth.

The Court made clear, however, that the
drawing of legislative districts along political
lines “is not wholly exempt from judicial
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Relying on its vote-dilution cases, it gave as
an example “multimember districts [that]
may be vulnerable” to constitutional
challenges “if racial or political groups have
been fenced out of the political process and
their voting strength invidiously minimized.”
“Beyond this,” the Court continued, it had
“not ventured far or attempted the impossible
task of extirpating politics from what are the
essentially political processes of the
sovereign States.”

In Bandemer, Indiana Democrats challenged
the 1981 state reapportionment plan passed
by a Republican-controlled legislature.
Specifically, they alleged that the plan was
intended to disadvantage Democrats in
electing representatives of their choosing, in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause
under the Fourteenth Amendment. In
November 1982, before the case went to trial,
elections were held under the new plan. The
district court had “sustained an equal
protection challenge to Indiana's 1981 state
apportionment on the basis that the law
unconstitutionally diluted the votes of
Indiana Democrats,” but the Supreme Court
reversed. A majority of the Court first
concluded that the issue before the Court, like
those in the one-person, one-vote cases and
in the vote-dilution cases, “is one of
representation” and “decline[d] to hold that
such claims [we]re never justiciable.” “As
Gaffney demonstrates,” the Court continued,
the fact that a “claim is submitted by a
political group, rather than a racial group,
does not distinguish it in terms of
justiciability.” That the complaining group
does not share an “immutable” characteristic

In closing, however, the Court was careful to
distinguish the plan before it, which
employed political classifications for
benign—even salutary—purposes, with
plans that did not have proportional
representation as their aim:
“[N]either we nor the district courts have a
constitutional warrant to invalidate a state
plan, otherwise within tolerable population
limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize
or eliminate the political strength of any
group or party, but to recognize it and,
through districting, provide a rough sort of
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or otherwise “has not been subject to the
same historical stigma may be relevant to the
manner in which the case is adjudicated, but
these differences do not justify a refusal to
entertain such a case.”

that excluded groups ha[d] ‘less opportunity
to participate in the political processes and to
elect candidates of their choice.’ ” It
emphasized
that
“unconstitutional
discrimination occurs only when the electoral
system is arranged in a manner that will
consistently degrade a voter's or a group of
voters' influence on the political process as a
whole”:

Turning to the standard to be applied, a
majority of the Court agreed that the
“plaintiffs were required to prove both
intentional discrimination against an
identifiable political group and an actual
discriminatory effect on that group.” A
majority of the Court also believed that the
first requirement—intentional discrimination
against an identifiable group—had been met.
Indeed, it observed that, “[a]s long as
redistricting is done by a legislature, it should
not be very difficult to prove that the likely
political
consequences
of
the
reapportionment were intended.”

“[A]n equal protection violation may be
found only where the electoral system
substantially disadvantages certain voters in
their opportunity to influence the political
process effectively. In this context, such a
finding of unconstitutionality must be
supported by evidence of continued
frustration of the will of a majority of the
voters or effective denial to a minority of
voters of a fair chance to influence the
political process.”

The plurality, however, rejected “the District
Court's legal and factual bases for concluding
that the 1981 Act visited a sufficiently
adverse
effect
on
the
appellees'
constitutionally protected rights to make out
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” It
was not the case that “any apportionment
scheme that purposely prevents proportional
representation is unconstitutional.” Indeed,
the plurality noted that precedent “clearly
foreclose[d] any claim that the Constitution
requires proportional representation or that
legislatures in reapportioning must draw
district lines to come as near as possible to
allocating seats to the contending parties in
proportion to what their anticipated statewide
vote will be.”

Applying this standard to the facts before
them, the plurality concluded that “this
threshold condition” had not been met. It
observed that the district court had relied
“primarily on the results of the 1982
elections” in which Democratic candidates
had garnered “51.9% of the votes cast
statewide,” but secured only 43 seats. Id.
Republicans, however, had received only
“48.1% ... yet, of the 100 seats to be filled,
Republican candidates won 57.” “Relying on
a single election to prove unconstitutional
discrimination,”
however,
was
“unsatisfactory.” The plurality specifically
noted a lack of evidence that (1) the 1981 Act
prevented the Democrats from “secur[ing] ...
sufficient vote[s] to take control of the
assembly”; (2) “the 1981 reapportionment
would consign the Democrats to a minority
status in the Assembly throughout the
1980's”; or (3) “the Democrats would have no
hope of doing any better in the
reapportionment that would occur after the
1990 census.” “Without findings of this
nature,” the plurality stated, “the District

Moreover, the plurality held “that a particular
apportionment scheme makes it more
difficult for a particular group in a particular
district to elect the representatives of its
choice” also did “not render that scheme
constitutionally infirm. In reaching this
conclusion, it noted that the Court had
refused to approve the use of multimember
districts “[o]nly where there [wa]s evidence
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Court erred in concluding that the 1981 Act
violated the Equal Protection Clause.”

a citizen. The fact that an individual lives
here or there is not a legitimate reason for
overweighting or diluting the efficacy of his
vote.”

The plurality then addressed a few aspects of
Justice Powell's opinion. “[T]he crux of [his]
analysis” was that—“at least in some cases—
the intentional drawing of district boundaries
for partisan ends and for no other reason
violates the Equal Protection Clause.” It
disagreed that “the specific intention of
disadvantaging one political party's election
prospects,” standing alone, established a
constitutional violation. Instead, invidious
intent must be coupled with evidence that
“the redistricting d[id] in fact disadvantage [a
party] at the polls,” and the disadvantage
must be more than “a mere lack of
proportionate results in one election.” The
plurality, however, acknowledged that
“election results” were “relevant to a
showing of the effects required to prove a
political gerrymandering claim under our
view. And the district configurations may be
combined with vote projections to predict
future election results,” which also would be
relevant to showing discriminatory effects.

Justice O'Connor also viewed political
gerrymandering as distinct from racial
gerrymandering. She explained that, “where
a racial minority group is characterized by
‘the traditional indicia of suspectness' and is
vulnerable to exclusion from the political
process, individual voters who belong to that
group enjoy some measure of protection
against intentional dilution of their group
voting strength by means of racial
gerrymandering.”
“[M]embers of the Democratic and
Republican Parties,” however, did not
constitute “a discrete and insular group
vulnerable to exclusion from the political
process by some dominant group: these
political parties are the dominant groups, and
the Court has offered no reason to believe that
they are incapable of fending for themselves
through the political process.”
In an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, Justice Powell, joined by
Justice Stevens, concluded that a redistricting
plan violated the Constitution when it served
“no purpose other than to favor one
segment—whether racial, ethnic, religious,
economic, or political—that may occupy a
position of strength at a particular time, or to
disadvantage a politically weak segment of
the community.” He believed that this
conclusion followed from the principles
articulated in Reynolds, namely “that equal
protection encompasses a guarantee of equal
representation, requiring a State to seek to
achieve through redistricting ‘fair and
effective representation for all citizens.’ ” He
further explained that

The plurality recognized that its own test
“may be difficult of application.”
“Nevertheless,” it concluded, the test
“recognizes the delicacy of intruding on this
most political of legislative functions and is
at the same time consistent with our prior
cases regarding individual multimember
districts, which have formulated a parallel
standard.”
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, concurred in
the judgment, but wrote separately. Justice
O'Connor took issue with the plurality's
reliance on both the “one-person, one-vote”
principle and the Court's vote-dilution cases.
In her view, Reynolds makes plain that the
one person, one vote principle safeguards the
individual's right to vote, not the interests of
political groups: “To the extent that a citizen's
right to vote is debased, he is that much less

“[t]he concept of “representation”
necessarily applies to groups: groups of
voters elect representatives, individual voters
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do not. Gross population disparities violate
the mandate of equal representation by
denying voters residing in heavily populated
districts, as a group, the opportunity to elect
the number of representatives to which their
voting strength otherwise would entitle them.
While population disparities do dilute the
weight
of
individual
votes,
their
discriminatory effect is felt only when those
individual votes are combined. Thus, the fact
that individual voters in heavily populated
districts are free to cast their ballot has no
bearing on a claim of malapportionment.”

writing for a plurality, began with a critique
of the standard articulated in Bandemer:
Over the dissent of three Justices, the Court
held in Davis v. Bandemer that, since it was
“not persuaded that there are no judicially
discernible and manageable standards by
which political gerrymander cases are to be
decided,” such cases were justiciable....
There was no majority on that point. Four of
the Justices finding justiciability believed
that the standard was one thing; two believed
it was something else. The lower courts have
lived with that assurance of a standard (or
more precisely, lack of assurance that there is
no standard), coupled with that inability to
specify a standard, for the past 18 years.

Applying these standards, Justice Powell
believed that the “case present[ed] a
paradigm example of unconstitutional
discrimination against the members of a
political party that happened to be out of
power” and would have found that Indiana's
redistricting plan violated the Equal
Protection Clause.

In the plurality's view, “[e]ighteen years of
judicial effort with virtually nothing to show
for it justif[ied] ... revisiting the question
whether the standard promised by Bandemer
exists.” It concluded that “no judicially
discernible and manageable standards for
adjudicating political gerrymandering claims
have emerged. Lacking [such standards],” it
concluded, “political gerrymandering claims
are nonjusticiable and ... Bandemer was
wrongly decided.”

Although history would establish that the
plurality correctly predicted that its test for
political gerrymandering was, in fact,
“difficult of application,” Bandemer
nevertheless provides some meaningful
guidance. First, the Court's one-person, onevote and vote-dilution cases provide the
foundation for evaluating claims of political
gerrymandering. Second, that a “claim is
submitted by a political group rather than a
racial group, does not distinguish it in terms
of justiciability.” And, third, a successful
political gerrymandering claim must include
a showing of both discriminatory intent and
discriminatory effect.

The plurality turned first to the shortcomings
of the test proposed by the plaintiffs:
To satisfy appellants' intent standard, a
plaintiff must “show that the mapmakers
acted with a predominant intent to achieve
partisan advantage,” which can be shown “by
direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence
that other neutral and legitimate redistricting
criteria were subordinated to the goal of
achieving partisan advantage.” ... As
compared with the Bandemer plurality's test
of mere intent to disadvantage the plaintiff's
group, this proposal seemingly makes the
standard more difficult to meet—but only at
the expense of making the standard more
indeterminate.

3.
The Court revisited the issue of political
gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer. In
Vieth, the Court addressed an action filed by
Democratic voters in Pennsylvania that
challenged the state legislature's new
congressional districting plan. Justice Scalia,
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The plurality determined that, in a statewide
plan, there was no principled way to discern
predominant intent.

readily determined factors—where the
plaintiff lives, how many voters are in his
district, and how many voters are in other
districts; whereas requiring judges to decide
whether a districting system will produce a
statewide majority for a majority party casts
them forth upon a sea of imponderables, and
asks them to make determinations that not
even election experts can agree upon.”

The test also included an “effects” prong:
“The requisite effect is established when ‘(1)
the plaintiffs show that the districts
systematically “pack” and “crack” the rival
party's voters, and (2) the court's examination
of the “totality of circumstances” confirms
that the map can thwart the plaintiffs' ability
to translate a majority of votes into a majority
of seats.’ ” According to the plurality, this
aspect of the test also was not judicially
discernible because there is no constitutional
right to proportional representation: the
Constitution “guarantees equal protection of
the law to persons, not equal representation
in government to equivalently sized groups.”
Nor, in the plurality's opinion, was the
proposed test judicially manageable because
there was no reliable method to establish “a
party's majority status” or for “ensur[ing] that
party wins a majority of seats—unless we
radically revise the States' traditional
structure for elections.”

Turning first to Justice Stevens's view, the
plurality agreed that “severe partisan
gerrymanders” were “incompatib[le] ... with
democratic principles.” It could not agree,
however, that political gerrymandering
should be treated equivalently to racial
gerrymandering. In the plurality's view, “[a]
purpose to discriminate on the basis of race
receives the strictest scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, while a similar purpose to
discriminate on the basis of politics does
not.” The plurality was unpersuaded by
Justice Stevens's reference to political
patronage cases, contending that “the
underlying rights, and consequently
constitutional harms, are not comparable.”

The plurality then critiqued the standards
proposed by the dissenting Justices. Contrary
to the view held by other members of the
Court, the plurality did not believe that the
“one-person, one-vote cases” had any
“bearing upon this question,” either “in
principle” or “in practicality.”

The plurality also rejected Justice Souter's
multi-factor test, which was “loosely based in
form on [the Court's] Title VII cases.”
According to the plurality, this test was
“doomed to failure” because “[n]o test—yea,
not even a five-part test—can possibly be
successful unless one knows what he is
testing for. In the present context, the test
ought to identify deprivation of that minimal
degree of representation or influence to
which a political group is constitutionally
entitled.” Although Justice Souter “vaguely
describe[d] the harm he is concerned with as
vote dilution, a term which usually implies
some actual effect on the weight of a vote,”
no element of his test measured this effect.
Consequently, the plurality was unsure of
“the precise constitutional deprivation his test
[wa]s designed to identify and prevent.”

“Not in principle, because to say that each
individual must have an equal say in the
selection of representatives, and hence that a
majority of individuals must have a majority
say, is not at all to say that each discernible
group, whether farmers or urban dwellers or
political parties, must have representation
equivalent to its numbers. And not in
practicality, because the easily administrable
standard of population equality adopted by
Wesberry and Reynolds enables judges to
decide whether a violation has occurred (and
to remedy it) essentially on the basis of three
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Addressing Justice Breyer's dissent, the
plurality agreed “that our Constitution sought
to create a basically democratic form of
government,” but found that this was “a long
and impassable distance away from the
conclusion that the Judiciary may assess
whether a group (somehow defined) has
achieved a level of political power (somehow
defined) commensurate with that to which
they would be entitled absent unjustified
political machinations (whatever that
means).”

way unrelated to any legitimate legislative
objective.”
In this case, Justice Kennedy explained, the
plaintiffs had not overcome the dual hurdles
of discernibility and manageability:
“The fairness principle appellants propose
is that a majority of voters in the
Commonwealth should be able to elect a
majority
of
the
Commonwealth's
congressional delegation. There is no
authority for this precept. Even if the novelty
of the proposed principle were accompanied
by a convincing rationale for its adoption,
there is no obvious way to draw a satisfactory
standard from it for measuring an alleged
burden on representational rights. The
plurality demonstrates the shortcomings of
the other standards that have been considered
to date.”

The plurality concluded, therefore, that the
Equal Protection Clause did not “provide[ ] a
judicially enforceable limit on the political
considerations that the States and Congress
may take into account when districting.”
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment.
He agreed that “[a] decision ordering the
correction of all election district lines drawn
for partisan reasons would commit federal
and state courts to unprecedented
intervention in the American political
process.” “The Court,” he stated, was
“correct to refrain from directing this
substantial intrusion into the Nation's
political life.” Furthermore, “[w]hile
agreeing with the plurality that the complaint
the appellants filed in the District Court must
be dismissed, and while understanding that
great caution is necessary when approaching
this subject, [he] would not foreclose all
possibility of judicial relief if some limited
and precise rationale were found to correct an
established violation of the Constitution in
some redistricting cases.”
Justice Kennedy believed that

However, Justice Kennedy was not willing to
go so far as the plurality and hold partisan
gerrymanders nonjusticiable. Although
agreeing that there were “weighty arguments
for holding cases like these to be
nonjusticiable” and acknowledging that
“those arguments may prevail in the long
run,” it was Justice Kennedy's view that “the
arguments [we]re not so compelling that they
require us now to bar all future claims of
injury from a partisan gerrymander.”
According to Justice Kennedy, the Court's
“willingness to enter the political thicket of
the apportionment process with respect to
one-person, one-vote claims ma[de] it
particularly difficult to justify a categorical
refusal to entertain claims against this other
type of gerrymandering.”

“[a] determination that a gerrymander
violates the law must rest on something more
than the conclusion that political
classifications were applied. It must rest
instead on a conclusion that the
classifications, though generally permissible,
were applied in an invidious manner or in a

Justice Kennedy noted specifically that, in
the end, it may be the First Amendment, not
the Equal Protection Clause, which provides
the framework within which political
gerrymandering claims should be analyzed.
“After all,” he explained, “these allegations
involve the First Amendment interest of not
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burdening or penalizing citizens because of
their participation in the electoral process,
their voting history, their association with a
political party, or their expression of political
views. Under general First Amendment
principles those burdens in other contexts are
unconstitutional absent a compelling
government interest.” Moreover, a “
‘[r]epresentative
democracy
...
is
unimaginable without the ability of citizens
to band together in promoting among the
electorate candidates who espouse their
political views.’ ” According to Justice
Kennedy, these precedents demonstrate that

analysis allows a pragmatic or functional
assessment that accords some latitude to the
States.”
Justice Stevens dissented. Drawing both on
the Court's racial gerrymandering cases, and
the Court's political patronage cases, Justice
Stevens believed that the plaintiffs had
standing, presented a redressable claim, and
were entitled to relief. Specifically, he
observed that “political belief and association
constitute the core of those activities
protected by the First Amendment” and that
government employment decisions that
burden these interests are subject to strict
scrutiny. “Thus,” he continued, “unless party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for
the position in question, government officials
may not base a decision to hire, promote,
transfer, recall, discharge, or retaliate against
an employee, or to terminate a contract, on
the individual's partisan affiliation or
speech.” Justice Stevens concluded that “[i]t
follows” therefore “that political affiliation is
not an appropriate standard for excluding
voters from a congressional district.”

“First Amendment concerns arise where a
State enacts a law that has the purpose and
effect of subjecting a group of voters or their
party to disfavored treatment by reason of
their views. In the context of partisan
gerrymandering, that means that First
Amendment concerns arise where an
apportionment has the purpose and effect of
burdening a group of voters' representational
rights.”
Justice Kennedy disagreed with the plurality
that application of a First Amendment
standard would render invalid “all
consideration of political interests in an
apportionment.” He explained:

Justice Souter wrote a dissenting opinion,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, which rested on
the “one-person, one-vote” principle.
According to Justice Souter:

“The inquiry is not whether political
classifications were used. The inquiry instead
is whether political classifications were used
to burden a group's representational rights. If
a court were to find that a State did impose
burdens and restrictions on groups or persons
by reason of their views, there would likely
be a First Amendment violation, unless the
State shows some compelling interest.”

“Creating unequally populous districts is
not, however, the only way to skew political
results by setting district lines. The choice to
draw a district line one way, not another,
always carries some consequence for politics,
save in a mythical State with voters of every
political identity distributed in an absolutely
gray uniformity. The spectrum of opportunity
runs from cracking a group into impotent
fractions, to packing its members into one
district for the sake of marginalizing them in
another. However equal districts may be in
population as a formal matter, the
consequence of a vote cast can be minimized
or maximized, and if unfairness is
sufficiently demonstrable, the guarantee of

Because “[t]he First Amendment analysis
concentrates on whether the legislation
burdens the representational rights of the
complaining party's voters for reasons of
ideology, beliefs, or political association,”
Justice Kennedy suggested that “[t]he
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Consequently, “gerrymandering that leads to
entrenchment amounts to an abuse that
violates the Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause.”

equal protection condemns it as a denial of
substantial equality.”
Justice Souter acknowledged the Court's
prior struggles in articulating a workable test
for political gerrymandering. Accordingly,
he suggested preserving the holding in
Bandemer that political gerrymandering was
justiciable, but “otherwise start[ing] anew.”
Specifically, he suggested using a burdenshifting test similar to that in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93
S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), “calling
for a plaintiff to satisfy elements of a prima
facie cause of action, at which point the State
would have the opportunity not only to rebut
the evidence supporting the plaintiff's case,
but to offer an affirmative justification for the
districting choices, even assuming the proof
of the plaintiff's allegations.”

Although the test articulated in Bandemer
proved unworkable, Vieth has placed district
courts in an even greater quandary. For all its
shortcomings, the Bandemer decision at least
set forth a test for district courts to apply. In
Vieth, however, the members of the Court
were unanimous only in their willingness to
jettison the test set forth in Bandemer. We
conclude, therefore, that the specific test for
political gerrymandering set forth in
Bandemer no longer is good law. Moreover,
any attempt to craft a new test ought to avoid
those shortcomings in the Bandemer test
specifically identified by the members of the
Court.

Justice Breyer, also in dissent, opined that
“the workable democracy that the
Constitution foresees” must include “a
method for transforming the will of the
majority into effective government.” In his
view, this method could be harmed by “the
unjustified use of political factors to entrench
a minority in power.” Justice Breyer quoted
extensively from Reynolds to support his
view that “[t]he democratic harm of
unjustified entrenchment is obvious”:

4.
The Supreme Court's most recent case on
partisan gerrymandering, gives little more in
the way of guidance. Nevertheless, we set
forth those aspects of the decision that may
be useful in evaluating the plaintiffs' claims.
In the 1990s, the Democrats controlled both
houses of the Texas legislature and the
statehouse and enacted what was “later
described as the shrewdest gerrymander of
the 1990s.” Following the 2000 census,
Texas was entitled to two additional
congressional seats. However, the legislature
now was split politically between a
Republican Senate and a Democratic House
of Representatives. “As so constituted, the
legislature was unable to pass a redistricting
scheme,” resulting in a court-ordered plan
which left “[t]he 1991 Democratic Party
gerrymander largely in place as a ‘legal’
plan.” In 2002, however, Republicans gained
control of both houses of the legislature and
enacted
legislation
that
re-drew
congressional districting lines; these new
districts resulted in the Republicans securing

“Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded
on representative government, it would seem
reasonable that a majority of the people of a
State could elect a majority of that State's
legislators....
Since
legislatures
are
responsible for enacting laws by which all
citizens are to be governed, they should be
bodies which are collectively responsive to
the popular will.”
Where unjustified entrenchment takes place,
voters find it far more difficult to remove
those responsible for a government they do
not want; and these democratic values are
dishonored.
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21 seats with 58% of the vote in statewide
races, compared to the Democrats' 11 seats
with 41% of the vote.

share of the seats. A test that treats these two
similarly effective power plays in such
different ways does not have the reliability
appellants ascribe to it.”

Shortly after the plan was enacted, some
Texas voters mounted both statutory and
constitutional challenges to it. In the
constitutional challenge, the plaintiffs
claimed that a decision to enact a new
redistricting plan mid-decade, “when solely
motivated by partisan objectives, violates
equal protection and the First Amendment
because it serves no legitimate public
purpose and burdens one group because of its
political opinions and affiliation.” The
Supreme Court disagreed.

Justice Kennedy also noted that the current
Texas map could “be seen as making the
party balance more congruent to statewide
party power.” “To be sure,” Justice Kennedy
continued,
“there is no constitutional requirement of
proportional representation, and equating a
party's statewide share of the vote with its
portion of the congressional delegation is a
rough measure at best. Nevertheless, a
congressional plan that more closely reflects
the distribution of state party power seems a
less likely vehicle for partisan discrimination
than one that entrenches an electoral
minority.”

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Souter
and Ginsburg, opined that “a successful claim
attempting to identify unconstitutional acts of
partisan gerrymandering must do what
appellants' sole-motivation theory explicitly
disavows: show a burden, as measured by a
reliable standard, on the complainants'
representational rights.” Moreover, Justice
Kennedy was concerned that the plaintiffs'
proposed test would exempt from
constitutional scrutiny other, more serious
examples of partisan gerrymandering:

Justice Kennedy also commented on a
submission by an amicus which “propose[d]
a symmetry standard that would measure
partisan bias by ‘compar[ing] how both
parties would fare hypothetically if they each
(in turn) had received a given percentage of
the vote.’ ” He stated:
Amici's proposed standard does not
compensate for appellants' failure to provide
a reliable measure of fairness. The existence
or degree of asymmetry may in large part
depend on conjecture about where possible
vote-switchers will reside. Even assuming a
court could choose reliably among different
models of shifting voter preferences, we are
wary of adopting a constitutional standard
that invalidates a map based on unfair results
that would occur in a hypothetical state of
affairs. Presumably such a challenge could be
litigated if and when the feared inequity
arose.
More
fundamentally,
the
counterfactual plaintiff would face the same
problem as the present, actual appellants:
providing a standard for deciding how much
partisan dominance is too much. Without

“The text and structure of the Constitution
and our case law indicate there is nothing
inherently suspect about a legislature's
decision to replace mid-decade a courtordered plan with one of its own. And even if
there were, the fact of mid-decade
redistricting alone is no sure indication of
unlawful political gerrymanders. Under
appellants' theory, a highly effective partisan
gerrymander that coincided with decennial
redistricting would receive less scrutiny than
a bumbling, yet solely partisan, mid-decade
redistricting. More concretely, the test would
leave untouched the 1991 Texas redistricting,
which entrenched a party on the verge of
minority status, while striking down the 2003
redistricting plan, which resulted in the
majority Republican Party capturing a larger
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altogether discounting its utility in
redistricting planning and litigation, I would
conclude asymmetry alone is not a reliable
measure of unconstitutional partisanship.

Justice Stevens also set forth some of the
representational harms engendered by
political gerrymanders. Specifically, he noted
that, “in addition to the possibility that a
representative may believe her job is only to
represent the interests of a dominant
constituency, a representative may feel more
beholden to the cartographers who drew her
district than to the constituents who live
there.”

Justice Kennedy thus concluded that “a
legislature's decision to override a valid,
court-drawn plan mid-decade” is not
“sufficiently suspect to give shape to a
reliable
standard
for
identifying
unconstitutional political gerrymanders.”
Consequently, he concluded that the
petitioners had not established a “legally
impermissible use of political classifications”
and had not stated a claim on which relief
could be granted.

Justice Breyer, in addition to joining Justice
Stevens's opinion, wrote separately to
describe why he believed that the plan
violated the Constitution:
[B]ecause the plan entrenches the Republican
Party, the State cannot successfully defend it
as an effort simply to neutralize the
Democratic Party's previous political
gerrymander. Nor has the State tried to justify
the plan on nonpartisan grounds, either as an
effort to achieve legislative stability by
avoiding legislative exaggeration of small
shifts in party preferences or in any other
way.

Justice Stevens, in a separate opinion joined
by Justice Breyer, reiterated the view of
impartiality that he had articulated in Vieth.
He observed that “the Fourteenth
Amendment's prohibition against invidious
discrimination[ ] and the First Amendment's
protection of citizens from official retaliation
based on their political affiliation” “limit the
State's power to rely exclusively on partisan
preference in drawing district lines.” He
explained:

In sum, “the risk of entrenchment is
demonstrated,” “partisan considerations
[have] render[ed] the traditional districtdrawing compromises irrelevant,” and “no
justification other than party advantage can
be found.” The record reveals a plan that
overwhelmingly relies upon the unjustified
use of purely partisan line-drawing
considerations and which will likely have
seriously harmful electoral consequences.
For these reasons, I believe the plan in its
entirety violates the Equal Protection Clause.

The equal protection component of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires actions
taken by the sovereign to be supported by
some legitimate interest, and further
establishes that a bare desire to harm a
politically disfavored group is not a
legitimate interest. Similarly, the freedom of
political belief and association guaranteed by
the First Amendment prevents the State,
absent a compelling interest, from
“penalizing citizens because of their
participation in the electoral process, ... their
association with a political party, or their
expression of political views.” These
protections embodied in the First and
Fourteenth
Amendments
reflect
the
fundamental duty of the sovereign to govern
impartially.

Justices Souter and Ginsburg adhered to their
view, set forth in Vieth, as to the proper test
for political gerrymandering, but concluded
that there was “nothing to be gained by
working through these cases on th[at]
standard” because, like in Vieth, the Court
“ha[d] no majority for any single criterion of
impermissible gerrymander.” Chief Justice
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Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, agreed with
Justice Kennedy “that appellants ha[d] not
provided a reliable standard for identifying
unconstitutional political gerrymanders,” but
took no position as to “whether appellants
ha[d] failed to state a claim on which relief
can be granted, or ha[d] failed to present a
justiciable controversy.” Finally, Justices
Scalia and Thomas reiterated their view that
the voters' political gerrymandering claims
were nonjusticiable.

processes and to elect legislators of their
choice.” In Gaffney, the Court again noted
that apportionment plans that “invidiously
minimize[ ]” the voting strength of “political
groups”
“may
be
vulnerable”
to
constitutional challenges.
In these cases, the Court's emphasis on
ensuring that an individual's vote receive the
same weight as every other person's vote
necessarily implicates that individual's
associational rights. The Court previously
has observed the link between the right to
vote and the right to associate in its ballotaccess cases. One of the foundational ballotaccess cases, involved a challenge to a state
law which required independent candidates
to file their nominating petitions seventy-five
days before the primary election in order to
qualify for the general election ballot. The
Court observed that the statute in question
implicated both the “right to vote” and
“freedom of association”: “Each provision of
these schemes, whether it governs the
registration and qualifications of voters, the
selection and eligibility of candidates, or the
voting process itself, inevitably affects—at
least to some degree—the individual's right
to vote and his right to associate with others
for political ends.”

5.
In its consideration of the reapportionment
issue, the Court has acknowledged that the
appropriate analysis is grounded not only in
its jurisprudence of equal protection, but also
its jurisprudence of associational rights under
the First Amendment. The gravamen of an
equal protection claim is that a state has
burdened artificially a voter's ballot so that it
has less weight than another person's vote. A
year after Reynolds, the Court again
articulated this concept in Fortson v. Dorsey,
when it evaluated whether multimember
legislative districts had a constitutionally
impermissible impact on the weight of
African–American voters. There, the Court
reiterated its concern that voters' ability to
participate in the electoral process was
unequal. While declining to hold
multimember districts were unconstitutional
per se, it noted that “designedly or otherwise,
a multi-member constituency apportionment
scheme, under the circumstances of a
particular case, [might] operate to minimize
or cancel out the voting strength of racial or
political elements of the voting population.”
Again, in White v. Regester, the Court held
that certain multimember districts were
violative of the Constitution when the
plaintiffs produced evidence that an election
was not “equally open to participation by the
group in question—that its members had less
opportunity than did other residents in the
district to participate in the political

The Court then outlined the analysis a court
must undertake in considering a challenge to
a state's election law:
“It must first consider the character and
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights
protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to
vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate
the precise interests put forward by the State
as justifications for the burden imposed by its
rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not
only determine the legitimacy and strength of
each of those interests, it also must consider
the extent to which those interests make it
necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.
Only after weighing all these factors is the
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reviewing court in a position to decide
whether the challenged provision is
unconstitutional.”

Amendment associational rights, we weigh
the character and magnitude of the burden the
State's rule imposes on those rights against
the interests the State contends justify that
burden, and consider the extent to which the
State's concerns make the burden necessary.
Regulations imposing severe burdens on
plaintiffs' rights must be narrowly tailored
and advance a compelling state interest.
Lesser burdens, however, trigger less
exacting review, and a State's important
regulatory interests will usually be enough to
justify
reasonable,
nondiscriminatory
restrictions. No bright line separates
permissible election-related regulation from
unconstitutional infringements on First
Amendment freedoms.”

Applying these steps, the Court determined
that the early filing deadline at issue in
Anderson placed a burden on independent
parties and that “it is especially difficult for
the State to justify a restriction that limits
political participation by an identifiable
political group.” After considering the state's
interests in keeping voters well-educated
about the candidates, being fair to the parties
who hold primaries, and ensuring political
stability, the Court held that there was an
unconstitutional burden on “the interests of
the voters who chose to associate together to
express their support for [an independent's]
candidacy and the views he espoused.” The
Court also noted that, in reaching its
conclusion, it was relying “directly on the
First and Fourteenth Amendments” and was
“not engag[ing] in a separate Equal
Protection Clause analysis.” It had relied,
however,

Nevertheless, the close relationship between
equal protection and associational rights is
clear. For example, one of the equal
protection cases relied upon in Anderson, the
Court considered the constitutionality of a
law which required new political parties to
obtain the signatures of electors equaling
15% of the number of ballots cast in the
preceding gubernatorial election. It stated:

“on the analysis in a number of our prior
election cases resting on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These
cases, applying the “fundamental rights”
strand of equal protection analysis, have
identified the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights implicated by restrictions
on the eligibility of voters and candidates,
and have considered the degree to which the
State's restrictions further legitimate state
interests.”

[W]e have ... held many times that
“invidious” distinctions cannot be enacted
without a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. In determining whether or not a state
law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we
must consider the facts and circumstances
behind the law, the interests which the State
claims to be protecting, and the interests of
those who are disadvantaged by the
classification. In the present situation the
state laws place burdens on two different,
although overlapping, kinds of rights—the
right of individuals to associate for the
advancement of political beliefs, and the right
of qualified voters, regardless of their
political persuasion, to cast their votes
effectively. Both of these rights, of course,
rank among our most precious freedoms. We
have repeatedly held that freedom of

Since Anderson, the Court has continued to
assess election laws through the lens of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, without
explicit reference to the Equal Protection
Clause. In evaluating election laws, the Court
employs a multi-step process that looks at the
totality of the circumstances:
“When deciding whether a state election
law violates First and Fourteenth
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association is protected by the First
Amendment. And of course this freedom
protected against federal encroachment by
the First Amendment is entitled under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the same
protection from infringement by the States.
Similarly we have said with reference to the
right to vote: “No right is more precious in a
free country than that of having a voice in the
election of those who make the laws under
which, as good citizens, we must live. Other
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the
right to vote is undermined.”

classifications such as race and population.
These reservations have been grounded in the
concern that distinguishing between
legitimate
and
illegitimate
political
motivations is not a task to be undertaken by
judges. In their view, moreover, there are
insurmountable problems in formulating
manageable standards. Other Justices have
not accepted such a limitation. As we shall
discuss at greater length later, however, this
case does not present these conundrums. We
are not presented with the problem of
distinguishing between permissible and
impermissible political motivations. We have
a far more straight-forward situation. The
plaintiffs have established, on this record,
that
the
defendants
intended
and
accomplished an entrenchment of the
Republican Party likely to endure for the
entire decennial period. They did so when the
legitimate redistricting considerations neither
required nor warranted the implementation of
such a plan.

The Court held that the law in question was
unconstitutionally burdensome on new
political parties.
We therefore believe that there is a solid basis
for considering the associational aspect of
voting in assessing the gravamen of the harm
allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs. Indeed, in
this case, the associational harm is especially
important to the analysis because the
testimony of the defendants' witnesses as
well as the plaintiffs' demonstrate that, given
the legislative practice and custom of
Wisconsin, legislative action is controlled, as
a practical matter, solely by the majority
caucus. In such a circumstance, when the
state places an artificial burden on the ability
of voters of a certain political persuasion to
form a legislative majority, it necessarily
diminishes the weight of the vote of each of
those voters when compared to the votes of
individuals favoring another view. The
burdened voter simply has a diminished or
even no opportunity to effect a legislative
majority. That voter is, in essence, an unequal
participant in the decisions of the body
politic.

IV
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As our description of the case law reveals, the
law governing political gerrymandering, still
in its incipient stages, is in a state of
considerable flux. We must, however, accept
that situation and seek in these authorities a
solution to the case before us. Therefore,
while not discounting the difficulty of the
task before us, we now identify the
guideposts available to us.
We begin with a principle that is beyond
dispute. State legislative apportionment is the
prerogative and therefore a duty of the
political branches of the state government.
We must “recognize[ ] the delicacy of
intruding on this most political of legislative
functions.” We also know that we cannot rely
on the simple finding “that political
classifications were applied.” Similarly, “the

On the facts presented in past cases, some
members of the Supreme Court have
expressed the view that judicial enforcement
of the principle that each voter has a right to
have his vote treated equally must be limited
to situations where the dilution is based on
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mere lack of proportional representation will
not be sufficient to prove unconstitutional
discrimination.”

1.
When considering the level of partisan intent
necessary to establish a politicalgerrymandering claim, our first task is to
determine what kind of partisan intent
offends the Constitution. The plurality in
Bandemer simply required a plaintiff to show
any level of “intentional discrimination
against an identifiable political group.” It
suggested that “[a]s long as redistricting is
done by a legislature, it should not be very
difficult to prove that the likely political
consequences of the reapportionment were
intended.” A majority of the Court in Vieth,
however, rejected the Bandemer plurality's
test, which included this standard of intent.

It is clear that the First Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause protect a citizen
against state discrimination as to the weight
of his or her vote when that discrimination is
based on the political preferences of the
voter. This principle applies not simply to
disparities in raw population, but also to other
aspects of districting that “operate to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of
racial or political elements of the voting
population.” Specifically, apportionment
plans that “invidiously minimize[ ]” the
voting strength of “political groups” “may be
vulnerable” to constitutional challenges,
because “each political group in a State
should have the same chance to elect
representatives of its choice as any other
political group,”

At the outset, we note that the Court recently
has acknowledged that the constitutionality
of partisan favoritism in redistricting is an
open question. Nevertheless, we know that
legislatures may employ some political
considerations when making redistricting
decisions; considerations such as achieving
“political fairness,” and “avoiding contests
between incumbent[s],” are permissible.

We conclude, therefore, that the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection clause
prohibit a redistricting scheme which (1) is
intended to place a severe impediment on the
effectiveness of the votes of individual
citizens on the basis of their political
affiliation, (2) has that effect, and (3) cannot
be justified on other, legitimate legislative
grounds.

That some political considerations may
intrude into the redistricting process without
running afoul of the Constitution, however,
does not answer the question whether
partisan favoritism is permissible. The
Court's members appear to acknowledge that
some level of partisanship is permissible, or
at least inevitable, in redistricting legislation.
The plurality in Vieth, for instance, noted that
“partisan districting is a lawful and common
practice.” In his opinion, Justice Kennedy
observed that political classifications are
“generally permissible.” Justices Souter and
Breyer, dissenting in Vieth, expressed the
view that partisan favoritism in some form
was inevitable, if not necessarily desirable.

A. Discriminatory Intent or Purpose
The Supreme Court has stressed the “basic
equal protection principle that the invidious
quality of a law ... must ultimately be traced
to a discriminatory purpose.” A legislature's
discriminatory intent also factors into a First
Amendment analysis.
The Court explicitly has held that equal
protection challenges to redistricting plans
require a showing of discriminatory purpose
or intent. This requirement applies with equal
force to cases involving political
gerrymanders.

Other justices, however, have not
acknowledged that political affiliation is “an
appropriate standard for excluding voters
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from a congressional district.” Even so, these
justices have proposed tests that “cover only
a few meritorious claims” and “preclude
extreme abuses” of the districting process.

State. Still, the total effect of party Y's effort
is to capture more new seats than Party X
captured. Party X's gerrymander was more
egregious. Party Y's gerrymander was more
subtle. In my view, however, each is
culpable.”

As a starting point, it is safe to say that this
concept of abuse of power seems at the core
of the Court's approach to partisan
gerrymandering. In Arizona State Legislature
v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission, the Court defined partisan
gerrymandering as “the drawing of
legislative district lines to subordinate
adherents of one political party and entrench
a rival party in power.” Justice Kennedy
noted in Vieth that a claim of partisan
gerrymandering “must rest ... on a conclusion
that [political] classifications ... were applied
in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated
to any legitimate legislative objective.” The
plurality, as well, acknowledged that “an
excessive injection of politics is un lawful.”
And Justice Breyer in dissent observed that
there was “at least one circumstance where
use of purely political boundary-drawing
factors can amount to a serious, and
remediable, abuse, namely, the unjustified
use of political factors to entrench a minority
in power.”

“Excessiveness” does not need to be defined
simply in terms of raw seat tallies. The
danger with extreme partisan gerrymanders is
that they entrench a political party in power,
making that party—and therefore the state
government—impervious to the interests of
citizens affiliated with other political parties.
This imperviousness may be achieved by
manipulating a map to achieve a
supermajority. But it also may be achieved by
“lock[ing]-in” or creating the requisite “safe
seats” such that legislators “elected from
such safe districts need not worry much about
the possibility of shifting majorities” and
“have little reason to be responsive to the
political minorities within their district.”
When a party is “locked-in” through the
intentional manipulation of legislative
districts, “representational harms” to those
affiliated with the “out”-party necessarily
ensue. Specifically, “in addition to the
possibility that a representative may believe
her job is only to represent the interests of a
dominant constituency, a representative may
feel more beholden to the cartographers who
drew her district than to the constituents who
live there.” The result is a system that assigns
different weights to the votes of citizens and
accords to those citizens different levels of
legislative responsiveness based on the party
with which they associate.

When “acceptable”—or at least tolerable—
crosses a line to become “excessive,”
however, remains unclear. Moreover, as
Justice Kennedy warns, a standard of
excessiveness has its drawbacks:
“[C]ourts must be cautious about adopting
a standard that turns on whether the partisan
interests in the redistricting process were
excessive. Excessiveness is not easily
determined. Consider these apportionment
schemes: In one State, Party X controls the
apportionment process and draws the lines so
it captures every congressional seat. In three
other States, Party Y controls the
apportionment process. It is not so blatant or
egregious, but proceeds by a more subtle
effort, capturing less than all the seats in each

Whatever gray may span the area between
acceptable and excessive, an intent to
entrench a political party in power signals an
excessive injection of politics into the
redistricting process that impinges on the
representational rights of those associated
with the party out of power. Such a showing,
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principle of “one-person, one-vote,” it did not
rule out the possibility that a districting plan,
which included multimember districts, could
“operate to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of racial or political elements of the
voting population.” Similarly, in Gaffney, the
Court observed that “[s]tate legislative
districts may be equal or substantially equal
in population and still be vulnerable under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”

therefore, satisfies the intent requirement for
an equal protection violation.
2.
A “ ‘discriminatory purpose’ ... implies more
than intent as volition or intent as awareness
of consequences. It implies that the
decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part,
‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”
The plaintiffs therefore must show that the
intent to entrench the Republican Party in
power was “a motivating factor in the
decision.” It need not be the “sole[ ]” intent
or even “the ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ one.”
Indeed, it rarely can “be said that a legislature
or administrative body operating under a
broad mandate made a decision motivated by
a single concern.” This is certainly true in
redistricting legislation where the Court has
identified “traditional districting principles
such as compactness, contiguity, and respect
for political subdivisions” that legitimately
may inform drafters in the drawing of district
lines.

Moreover, the Court has made clear that
“traditional districting principles” are not
synonymous
with
equal
protection
requirements. Instead, they “are objective
factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a
district has been gerrymandered.” In other
words, they are constitutionally permissible,
but not “constitutionally required.” Id.
Individual Justices also have noted that a
map's compliance with traditional districting
principles does not necessarily speak to
whether a map constitutes a partisan
gerrymander:
“[E]ven those criteria that might seem
promising at the outset (e.g., contiguity and
compactness) are not altogether sound as
independent judicial standards for measuring
a burden on representational rights. They
cannot promise political neutrality when used
as the basis for relief.”

Relying on traditional districting principles,
defendants propose a novel rule: a
redistricting plan that “is consistent with, and
not a radical departure from, prior plans with
respect to traditional districting principles”
cannot, as a matter of law, evince an
unconstitutional intent. In other words,
compliance with traditional districting
principles necessarily creates a constitutional
“safe harbor” for state legislatures.

Highly sophisticated mapping software now
allows lawmakers to pursue partisan
advantage without sacrificing compliance
with traditional districting criteria. A map
that appears congruent and compact to the
naked eye may in fact be an intentional and
highly effective partisan gerrymander. When
reviewing intent, therefore, we cannot simply
ask whether a plan complied with traditional
districting principles. Therefore, the
defendants' contention—that, having adhered
to traditional districting principles, they have
satisfied the requirements of equal
protection—is without merit.

The defendants' approach finds no support in
the law. It is entirely possible to conform to
legitimate redistricting purposes but still
violate the Fourteenth Amendment because
the discriminatory action is an operative
factor in choosing the plan. Indeed, the Court
rejected a similar claim in Fortson: while
acknowledging that there was no
“mathematical disparity” that violated the
405

We therefore must confront the question of
how we are to discern whether, in creating the
map that became Act 43, the drafters
employed an impermissible intent—cutting
out for the long-term those of a particular
political affiliation. In assuming this task, we
are mindful that “[i]nquiries into
congressional [and other legislative bodies']
motives or purposes are a hazardous matter.”
When the issue is one of “mixed intent” as it
is here, “[e]valuating the legality of acts ...
can be complex .... When the actor is a
legislature and the act is a composite of
manifold choices, the task can be even more
daunting.” “Determining whether invidious
discriminatory purpose was a motivating
factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent
as may be available,” including (1) “[t]he
impact of the official action” as “an important
starting point”; (2) “the historical background
of the decision”; (3) “[t]he specific sequence
of events leading up to the challenged
decision”; (4) “[d]epartures from the normal
procedural sequence”; (5) “legislative or
administrative history ..., especially ...
contemporary statements by members of the
decisionmaking body, minutes of its
meetings, or reports.”

cases, courts are able to discern the
legislature's intent more easily and less
intrusively because the evidence is far more
direct.
This case falls more in the latter category.
The Court never has invalidated a
redistricting plan on the ground of partisan
gerrymandering, and the Court's recent
pronouncements have caused some district
courts to question the viability of the cause of
action. Here, the record demonstrates that,
although the drafters were aware of some
constitutional limits on the degree to which
they could neutralize the political power of
the opposition party, those limits were not
firmly established.
We therefore turn to the sequence of events
that led to the enactment of Act 43 to discern
whether one purpose behind the legislation
was to entrench a political party in power.
3.
a. Evidence of intent
The evidence at trial establishes that one
purpose of Act 43 was to secure the
Republican Party's control of the state
legislature for the decennial period. The
drafters' concern with the durable partisan
complexion of the new Assembly map was
present from the outset of the legislative
process. Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick began
drafting the map that would become Act 43
in April 2011. One of their first orders of
business was to develop a composite partisan
score that accurately reflected the political
makeup of population units, which would
allow them to assess the partisan make-up of
the new districts. When they came up with a
composite of “all statewide races from [20]04
to 2010” that “seem[ed] to work well,” they
sent it to Professor Gaddie.

However, discerning the intent of a
legislative body can be less daunting in some
cases than in others. In some cases, the
legislature is aware that a distinction is
constitutionally
impermissible
and
surreptitiously attempts to create legislation
on the basis of that distinction. These cases
require that we engage in a careful inquiry of
circumstantial evidence, because the drafters'
intent often is hidden from the casual
observer. In other cases, a legislature seems
unaware that a distinction is constitutionally
impermissible and deliberately enacts
legislation on the basis of that distinction.
This situation typically arises in periods
before the Supreme Court has illuminated the
full meaning of a constitutional right. In these

Professor Gaddie, the “advisor on the
appropriate racial and/or political make-up of
legislative ... districts,” “buil[t] a regression
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model ... to test the partisan makeup and
performance of districts as they might be
configured in different ways.” Professor
Gaddie then tested the drafters' composite
measure against his model and confirmed
that their measure was “almost a perfect
proxy for the open seat vote, and the best
proxy you'll come up with.” Professor Mayer
testified that the drafters' composite measure
correlated very strongly with his own
measure of partisanship, which led him to
conclude that “they knew exactly what they
were doing, that they had a very accurate
estimate of the underlying partisanship of the
Act 43 maps.”

drawn by the court in Baumgart v.
Wendelberger.
The process of drafting and evaluating these
alternative district maps spanned several
months. In April, the drafters produced a
document
comparing
the
partisan
performance of the Current Map to two early
draft maps: Joe's Basemap Basic and Joe's
Basemap Assertive. Under the Current Map,
the drafters anticipated that the Republicans
would win 49191 Assembly seats. This
number increased to 52 under the Joe's
Basemap Basic map and to 56 under the Joe's
Basemap Assertive map. The number of safe
and leaning Republican seats increased from
40 under the Current Map to 45 under the
Joe's Basemap Basic map and 49 under the
Joe's Basemap Assertive map; the number of
swing seats decreased from 19 to 14 to 12.
The number of safe and leaning Democratic
seats, however, remained roughly the same
under all three maps, hovering between 38
and 40.

Once Ottman, Foltz, and Handrick received
Professor Gaddie's imprimatur on their
composite measure, they employed this
measure “to assess the partisan impact of the
map[s] that [they] drew.” We find that the
maps the drafters generated, as well as the
statistical comparisons made of the various
maps, reveal that a focal point of the drafters'
efforts was a map that would solidify
Republican control. The maps often bore
names that reflected the level of partisan
advantage achieved. For instance, maps
labeled “aggressive” referenced “a more
aggressive map with regard to GOP leaning.”
When producing these more advantageous
maps, the drafters did not abandon traditional
districting criteria; to the contrary, the maps
complied with traditional districting criteria
while also ensuring a significant partisan
advantage.

The drafters prepared and evaluated the
partisan performance of at least another six
statewide alternative maps.196 Each of these
maps improved upon the anticipated proRepublican advantage generated in the initial
two draft plans. The total number of expected
Republican seats now ranged between 57 and
60, and the number of swing seats was
diminished to between 6 and 11. The number
of Democratic seats again remained about the
same under each draft map.
The drafters sent their completed draft maps
to Professor Gaddie, who created a visual “S”
curve for each map. These “S” curves show
how each map would operate within an array
of electoral outcomes. To produce the “S”
curves, Professor Gaddie calculated the
expected partisan vote shares for each
district. He then shifted the vote share of each
district ten points in either direction, from
40% to 60%, and assigned a color to districts
that “lean[ed]” towards, or were “safe” seats

The drafters also created spreadsheets that
collected the partisan scores, by district, for
each of the map alternatives. For each
spreadsheet, there was a corresponding table
that listed the number of “Safe” Republican
seats, “Lean” Republican seats, “Swing”
seats, “Safe” Democratic seats, and “Lean”
Democratic seats; these figures also were
compared to the number of seats in each
category under the Current Map, the map
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seats are 50% or better,” but under the Team
Map, “59 Assembly seats are 50% or better.”

for that party. Professor Gaddie explained
that his analysis “was designed to tease out a
potential estimated vote” under a range of
electoral scenarios, when either “the
Democrats have a good year” or “the
Republicans have a good year.” At bottom,
the “S” curves—at least some of which were
printed in large format and kept in the map
room—allowed a non-statistician, by mere
visual inspection, to assess the partisan
performance of a particular map under all
likely electoral scenarios. On one occasion,
Professor Gaddie showed the “S” curves to
Senator Fitzgerald and explained to the
Senator “how to interpret” them.

The Team Map underwent even more intense
partisan scrutiny in a document identified as
“summary.xlsx.” The drafters divided the
new Team Map districts into six categories of
partisan performance, listing beside each
district its “new incumbent” and its
Republican vote share under the Current Map
and the Team Map; the change in Republican
vote share was the district's “improvement”
under the new plan. The drafters considered
five districts to be “Statistical Pick Up[s],”
meaning they were currently held by a
Democratic incumbent but “move[d] to 55%
or better” in Republican vote share under the
new Team Map. Fourteen districts were
grouped under the heading “GOP seats
strengthened a lot,” meaning they were
“[c]urrently held GOP seats that start[ed] at
55% or below that improve[d] by at least 1%”
in Republican vote share.215 Eleven districts
were “GOP seats strengthened a little,”
meaning they “improve[d] less than 1%.”216
Only three districts were labeled “GOP seats
weakened a little,” meaning they had “start
[ed] at 55% or below” but “decline[d]”
slightly in Republican vote share.217
Another three districts were “GOP seats
likely lost,” *894 meaning they had
“drop[ped] below 45%” Republican vote
share under the Team Map. Finally, the
drafters noted four districts where Democrats
were “weakened,” which were districts with
“45% or better” Democratic vote share “that
bec[a]me more GOP” under the Team Map.
The drafters also identified twenty
Republican Assembly members who enjoyed
sufficiently comfortable partisan scores such
that they could become “GOP donors to the
team.” These were members of the Assembly
who had partisan scores of 55% or greater
and, therefore, could spread their partisan
voting strength to politically weaker
colleagues.

Over several days in early June, the drafters
presented a selection of regional maps drawn
from their statewide drafts, approximately
three to four per region, to the Republican
leadership. Along with these regional
alternatives, the leadership “saw the partisan
scores for the maps that [the drafters]
presented to them in those alternatives.” Foltz
testified during his deposition that although
he could not recall a particular example, he
was sure that he was asked by the leadership
about the partisan performance of the various
regional options.
Following this meeting, the drafters
amalgamated the regional alternatives chosen
by the leadership. Foltz testified that “the
draft map called team map emerged as a
result of the ... leadership's choices at those
meetings.” Under the Team Map, which was
also referred to as the “Final Map,”208 the
Republicans could expect to win 59
Assembly seats, with 38 safe Republican
seats, 14 leaning Republican, 10 swing, 4
leaning Democratic, and 33 safe Democratic
seats. In the Tale of the Tape, the drafters
compared the partisan performance of the
Team Map directly to the Current Map on
each of these criteria.210 They highlighted
specifically that under the Current Map, “49
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The Team Map also was sent to Professor
Gaddie. The “S” curve demonstrates that this
map would allow the Republicans to
maintain a comfortable majority under likely
voting scenarios; their statewide vote share
could fall to 48%, and they still would
preserve a 54 seat majority in the Assembly.
The Democrats, by contrast, would need 54%
of the statewide vote to capture a simple
majority of Assembly seats.

they submitted it to Professor Gaddie to
assess the fortitude of the partisan design in
the wake of various electoral outcomes.
The map that emerged from this process
reduced markedly the possibility that the
Democrats could regain control of the
Assembly even with a majority of the
statewide vote. The map that would become
Act 43 had a pickup of 10 Assembly seats
compared to the Current Map. As well, if
their statewide vote fell below 48%, the
design of Act 43 ensured that the Republicans
would maintain a comfortable majority.

Once the map had been finalized, Foltz
presented each Republican member of the
Assembly with information on his or her new
district. These memos provided a
“[c]omparison of [k]ey [r]aces” in the new
districts compared to the old. Specifically,
the memoranda detailed what percentage of
the population in the old and new districts
voted for Republican candidates in
representative statewide and national
elections held since 2004. Importantly, the
memoranda did not provide the individual
legislators with any information about
contiguity, compactness, or core population.

Finally, it is clear that the drafters were
concerned with, and convinced of, the
durability of their plan. Professor Gaddie
confirmed the staying power of the
Republican majority under the plan, and
Ottman emphasized to the Republican caucus
the long-term consequences of enacting the
plan.
We conclude, therefore, that the evidence
establishes that one of the purposes of Act 43
was to secure Republican control of the
Assembly under any likely future electoral
scenario for the remainder of the decade, in
other words to entrench the Republican Party
in power.

Additionally, Ottman made a presentation to
the Republican caucus that highlighted the
long-term effects of Act 43, as reflected in his
prepared notes: “The maps we pass will
determine who's here 10 years from now,”
and “[w]e have an opportunity and an
obligation to draw these maps that
Republicans haven't had in decades.”

b. Alleged shortcomings in the evidence
The defendants point to the miscalculation of
the composite measure, to limitations of the
composite measure itself, and to the drafters'
lack of reliance on Professor Gaddie's
analysis as evidence that they did not have the
requisite intent to subjugate the voting
strength of Democrats. The defendants first
note that the drafters' partisan score “was not
even correct.” Because of an error in the data
for the 2006 Governor's race—one of the
components for their composite measure—
the drafters' numbers were skewed, and the
resulting partisan scores were more proRepublican than if the scores had been
calculated with the correct data. However, as

In sum, from the outset of the redistricting
process, the drafters sought to understand the
partisan effects of the maps they were
drawing. They designed a measure of
partisanship and confirmed the accuracy of
this measure with Professor Gaddie. They
used this measure to evaluate regional and
statewide maps that they drew. They labeled
their maps by reference to their partisanship
scores, they evaluated partisan outcomes of
the maps, and they compared the partisanship
scores and partisan outcomes of the various
maps. When they completed a statewide map,
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the plaintiffs note, these errors may diminish
the reliability of the composite measure, but
they are irrelevant to the drafters' intent.

an explanation of what they showed. That
Ottman may not have used the “S” curves
much once they were generated, or that Foltz
was not able to explain their full significance
at trial, five years later, does not diminish the
fact that the drafters sought, and received,
Professor Gaddie's expert analysis on how
each map would behave under the range of
likely electoral scenarios.

The defendants also disparage the notion that
“the partisan scores were a crystal ball with
predictive powers ensuring that Act 43 would
lock Democrats out from seats that leaned
Republican.” They contend that their
composite did not have a “forward-looking
component,” but was simply “an average of
past elections applied to the new districts.”
We reject as not worthy of belief the assertion
that the drafters would have expended the
time to calculate a composite score for each
district on the statewide maps simply to gain
an historical understanding of voting
behavior. Their measure was only useful to
them—and the exercise of calculating the
composite was only worth the effort—if it
helped them assess how Republican
representatives in the newly created districts
likely would fare in future elections.

Finally, the defendants contend that the
partisan intent shown by the evidence in this
case cannot be considered invidious because
Act 43's districts are consistent with
traditional districting principles. However, as
we have explained earlier, a plan that adheres
to those principles can violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Here, the evidence shows
that one purpose of enacting Act 43 was to
secure Republican control of the Wisconsin
Assembly. In particular, the history of Act 43
reveals that the drafters created several
alternatives that resulted in a less severe
partisan outcome. Of the maps presented to
them, the Republican leadership opted for a
map that significantly increased the number
of Republican-leaning districts compared to
the Current Map. Further, the memos
prepared for the Assembly members
informed them whether the district number
had changed, whether adjustment to the
district population was necessary based on
the census numbers, and provided a
“[c]omparison of [k]ey [r]aces” in the new
districts compared to the old, but provided
little information regarding traditional
districting factors.

Moreover, each completed map was
submitted to Professor Gaddie, who then
generated an “S” curve. The “S” curves were
designed to discern “the political potential of
the district.” Professor Gaddie explained that,
when he used the term “potential,” he meant
“[i]f you had an election in the future, how
might it turn out. So when I say potential ...
this is our best estimate of what a nonincumbent election would look like given a
particular set of circumstances, depending on
whether one party is stronger or weaker.”
According to the defendants, however,
Professor Gaddie's “S” curves are irrelevant
to the issue of intent because the drafters
“didn't look at them much.” We cannot
accept that estimation of the importance of
Professor Gaddie's work to the drafters. The
record makes clear that the drafters sent
Professor Gaddie their completed maps for
which he produced “S” curves. Both Ottman
and Foltz testified that, when the “S” curves
were generated, Professor Gaddie provided

These facts, in tandem with the
overwhelming number of reports and
memoranda addressing the partisan outcomes
of the various maps, lead us to conclude that,
although Act 43 complied with traditional
redistricting principles, it nevertheless had as
one of its objectives entrenching the
Republicans' control of the Assembly.
B. Discriminatory Effect of Act 43
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Act 43 also achieved the intended effect: it
secured for Republicans a lasting Assembly
majority. It did so by allocating votes among
the newly created districts in such a way that,
in any likely electoral scenario, the number of
Republican seats would not drop below 50%.
Through the combination of the actual
election results for 2012 and 2014, the swing
analyses performed by Professors Gaddie and
Mayer, as well as the plaintiffs' proposed
measure of asymmetry, the efficiency gap (or
“EG”), the plaintiffs have “show[n] a burden,
as measured by a reliable standard, on [their]
representational rights.”

have predicted Democratic vote percentages
of between 50 and 60%. This demonstrates
that, under Act 43, Republican voters are
distributed over a larger number of districts
so that they can secure a greater number of
seats; in short, “Republicans are distributed
in a much more efficient manner than
Democrats.” Professor Mayer's graph also
reveals that there are only 15 districts with a
predicted Republican vote percentage of 60%
or greater; this is compared to 25 districts that
have a predicted Democratic vote percentage
of 60% or greater. In other words, Democrats
have been packed into “safe” Democratic
districts.

1.

The 2012 and 2014 election results reveal
that the drafters' design in distributing
Republican voters to secure a legislative
majority was, in fact, a success. In 2012,
Republicans garnered 48.6% of the vote, but
secured 60 seats in the Assembly.250 In
2014, Republicans increased their vote
percentage to 52 and secured 63 Assembly
seats.

It is clear that the drafters got what they
intended to get. There is no question that Act
43 was designed to make it more difficult for
Democrats, compared to Republicans, to
translate their votes into seats. In the Tale of
the Tape, the drafters compared the partisan
performance of the Team Map directly to the
Current Map. Where the Current Map had
only “49 [Assembly] seats” that were “50%
or better” for Republicans, the Team Map
increased that number by ten so that “59
Assembly seats” were designated as “50% or
better” for Republicans. Moreover, under the
Team Map that became Act 43, Republicans
expected the following seat distribution: 38
safe Republican seats, 14 leaning
Republican, 10 swing, 4 leaning Democratic,
and 33 safe Democratic seats.

Moreover, Professors Gaddie and Mayer
testified that, consistent with what actually
occurred in 2012 and 2014, under any likely
electoral scenario, the Republicans would
maintain a legislative majority. After
Professors Gaddie and Mayer developed their
regression models to measure baseline
partisanship, each conducted a separate
swing analysis to demonstrate this outcome.
“What a swing analysis does,” Professor
Mayer explained, “is ask the question ... what
might happen” under different electoral
conditions. To determine this, “the statewide
vote percentage” is altered by a fixed amount,
typically in one-percentage-point increments,
across all districts. “It's a way of, generally
speaking, estimating what is a plausible
outcome given a change in the statewide
vote, which in this case a change in the
statewide vote is a proxy for a different
election environment, what might happen if

Professor Mayer explained the significance
of this distribution at trial. Using the baseline
partisan measure that he used to create his
Demonstration Plan, Professor Mayer created
a histogram that graphed the predicted
percentage of Republican vote of each
district (by 5% increments) on the x axis, and
the number of districts that fell into each 5%
increment on the y axis. The graph reveals
that Act 43 includes 42 districts with
predicted Republican vote percentages of
between 50 and 60%; only seventeen districts
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there's a pro-Democratic swing or a proRepublican swing.”

Republican vote share dropped in 2012 to
48.6%, Republicans still secured 60 seats—
10 more than what Professor Gaddie's “S”
curve predicted. Additionally, when the
Republican vote share increased in 2014 to
52%, the Republicans increased the number
of seats they held by 3, as opposed to their
seat share being stagnant, as predicted by
Professor Mayer. In other words, the actual
election results suggest that Act 43 is more
resilient in the face of an increase in the
statewide Democratic vote share, and is more
responsive to an increase in the statewide
Republican vote share, than either Professor
Gaddie or Professor Mayer anticipated.

Professor Gaddie's swing analysis is
contained in his “S” curves. His “S” curves
include the electoral outcome for each map
based on Republican statewide vote
percentage ranging from 40% to 60%. The
“S” curve for the Team Map demonstrates
that, to maintain a comfortable majority (54
of 99 seats), Republicans only had to
maintain their statewide vote share at 48%.
The Democrats, by contrast, would need
more than 54% of the statewide vote to obtain
that many seats.
Professor Mayer's swing analysis did not
include the wide-ranging electoral scenarios
set forth in Professor Gaddie's “S” curves.
Instead, Professor Mayer included only likely
electoral scenarios in his analysis. He looked
at the electoral outcomes dating back to 1992
and determined that the maximum statewide
vote share the Democrats had received was
54% in 2006, or roughly 3% more than they
had received in 2012. The minimum
statewide vote share Democrats had received
was 46% in 2010, or roughly 5% less than
they had received in 2012. Professor Mayer's
swing analysis, therefore, looked at how Act
43 would fare under these two scenarios—the
Democrats receiving 46% of the vote, and the
Democrats receiving 54% of the vote.
Adjusting the Democratic vote share in each
district by these amounts, Professor Mayer
predicted that a 5% decrease in Democratic
vote share would have no effect on the
allocation of legislative seats; the
Republicans would keep the 60 seats they
had, but would not increase their numbers.
When Democratic vote share increased by
3% to 54%, Professor Mayer predicted that
the Democrats would secure only 45 seats.

The fact that Democrats and Republicans
were treated differently under Act 43
becomes even more stark when we examine
the number of seats secured when the parties
obtain roughly equivalent statewide vote
shares. In 2012, the Democrats received
51.4% of the statewide vote, but that
percentage translated into only 39 Assembly
seats. A roughly equivalent vote share for
Republicans (52% in 2014), however,
translated into 63 seats—a 24 seat disparity.
Moreover, when Democrats' vote share fell to
48% in 2014, that percentage translated into
36 Assembly seats. Again, a roughly
equivalent vote share for Republicans (48.6%
in 2012) translated into 60 seats—again a 24
seat disparity. The evidence establishes,
therefore, that, even when Republicans are an
electoral minority, their legislative power
remains secure.
2.
The record here is not plagued by the
infirmities that have precluded the Court, in
previous cases, from concluding that a
discriminatory effect has been established. In
Bandemer, the Court made clear that
plaintiffs could not establish a constitutional
violation based “on a single election.” This
was because

However, both Professor Gaddie and
Professor Mayer underestimated the strength
of Act 43 when it came to securing and
maintaining Republican control. When the
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“Indiana is a swing State. Voters
sometimes prefer Democratic candidates, and
sometimes Republican. The District Court
did not find that because of the 1981 Act the
Democrats could not in one of the next few
elections secure a sufficient vote to take
control of the assembly.... The District Court
did not ask by what percentage the statewide
Democratic vote would have had to increase
to control either the House or the Senate. The
appellants argue here, without a persuasive
response from the appellees, that had the
Democratic candidates received an additional
few percentage points of the votes cast
statewide, they would have obtained a
majority of the seats in both houses. Nor was
there any finding that the 1981
reapportionment
would
consign
the
Democrats to a minority status in the
Assembly throughout the 1980's or that the
Democrats would have no hope of doing any
better in the reapportionment that would
occur after the 1990 census. Without findings
of this nature, the District Court erred in
concluding that the 1981 Act violated the
Equal Protection Clause.”

more resistant to increases in Democratic
vote share, and more responsive to increases
in Republican vote share, than was predicted.
Consequently, it is not the case that “an
additional few percentage points of the votes
cast statewide” for the Democrats will yield
an Assembly majority.
Furthermore, because we have the actual
election results to confirm the reliability of
Professor Gaddie's model and “S”—curve
analysis, we are not operating only in the
realm of hypotheticals—a prospect that at
least one member of the Court in LULAC
found troubling. In LULAC, Justice Kennedy
commented on a proposal by one of the amici
to adopt a partisan-bias standard, which
would compare how the two major parties
“would fare hypothetically if they each (in
turn) had received a given percentage of the
vote.” Justice Kennedy explained that,
“[e]ven assuming a court could choose
reliably among different models of shifting
voter preferences, we are wary of adopting a
constitutional standard that invalidates a map
based on unfair results that would occur in a
hypothetical state of affairs. Presumably such
a challenge could be litigated if and when the
feared inequity arose.”

The record here answers the shortcomings
that the Bandemer plurality identified. First,
we now have two elections under Act 43. In
2012, the Democrats garnered 51.4% of the
vote, but secured only 39 seats in the
Assembly—or 39.3% of the seats.267 In
2014, the Democrats garnered 48% of the
vote and won only 36 seats—or 36.4% of the
seats.268 If it is true that a redistricting “plan
that more closely reflects the distribution of
state party power seems a less likely vehicle
for partisan discrimination,” then a plan that
deviates this strongly from the distribution of
statewide power suggests the opposite.

Professor Gaddie's “S” curves and Professor
Mayer's swing analysis, like a partisan-bias
analysis, depend upon a hypothetical state of
affairs: they assume a uniform increase or
decrease in vote share across all districts—
something that does not occur in actual
elections. Here, however, the predictive work
of the professors is combined with the results
of two actual elections in which the feared
inequity did arise.
3.

Moreover, as described in some detail above,
Professor Gaddie's “S” curve and Professor
Mayer's swing analysis reveal that the
Democrats are unlikely to regain control of
the Assembly. And Act 43 has proven even

While the evidence we have just described
certainly makes a firm case on the question of
discriminatory effect, that evidence is further
bolstered by the plaintiffs' use of the
“efficiency gap,” or EG for short, to
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demonstrate that, under the circumstances
presented here, their representational rights
have been burdened. We begin with an
explanation of the EG. Because the EG is a
new measure and was the focus of extensive
testimony at trial, we believe it appropriate to
examine its value and shortcomings in detail.

favor of one party (Party A), however, means
that Party A wasted votes at a lower rate than
the opposing party (Party B). It is in this sense
that the EG is a measure of efficiency:
because Party A wasted fewer votes than
Party B, Party A was able to translate, with
greater ease, its share of the total votes cast in
the election into legislative seats. Put simply,
an EG in Party A's favor means it carried less
electoral dead weight; its votes were,
statistically, more necessary to the victories
of its candidates, and, consequently, it
secured a greater proportion of the legislative
seats than it would have secured had Party A
and Party B wasted votes at the same rate.

a.
The allegations in this case are that Act 43's
drafters employed two of the traditional
methods of gerrymandering in order to
diminish the electoral power of Democratic
voters in Wisconsin: “packing” and
“cracking.” Packing refers to the
concentration of a party's voters in a limited
number of districts; as a result, the party wins
these packed districts by large margins.270
Cracking, on the other hand, is the division of
a party's voters across a number of districts
such that the party is unable to achieve a
majority in any. The EG is a measure of the
degree of both cracking and packing of a
particular party's voters that exists in a given
district plan, based on an observed electoral
result.

In a related sense, the EG can be viewed as a
measure of the proportion of “excess” seats
that a party secured in an election beyond
what the party would be expected to obtain
with a given share of the vote. In a purely
proportional representation system, a party
would be expected to pick up votes and seats
at a one-to-one ratio, i.e., for every additional
percentage of the statewide vote the party
gains, it should also gain a percentage in the
share of the seats. Based on decades of
observed historical data, however, the parties'
experts agreed that with single-member,
simple-plurality systems like Wisconsin's,
we can expect that for every 1% increase in a
party's vote share, its seat share will increase
by roughly 2%. Thus, a party that gets 52%
of the statewide vote should be expected to
secure 54% of the legislative seats. If the
party instead translates its 52% of the vote
into 58% of the seats, the district plan has
demonstrated an EG of 4% in favor of that
party (the difference between the expected
seat share and the actual seat share).

The EG calculation is relatively simple. First,
it requires totaling, for each party, statewide,
(1) the number of votes cast for the losing
candidates in district races (as a measure of
cracked voters), along with (2) the number of
votes cast for the winning candidates in
excess of the 50% plus one votes necessary
to secure the candidate's victory (as a
measure of packed voters). The resulting
figure is the total number of “wasted” votes
for each party. These wasted vote totals are
not, of themselves, independently significant
for EG purposes; rather, it is the comparative
relationship of one party's wasted votes to
another's that yields the EG measure. The EG
is the difference between the wasted votes
cast for each party, divided by the overall
number of votes cast in the election. When
the two parties waste votes at an identical
rate, the plan's EG is equal to zero. An EG in

Both Professors Mayer and Jackman
calculated the EG for the 2012 Assembly
elections in Wisconsin. In his analysis,
Professor Mayer employed the “full
method,” which requires aggregating,
district-by-district, the wasted votes cast for
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each party. Applying this methodology, he
determined that Act 43 yielded a proRepublican EG of 11.69%. Professor
Jackman, however, used the “simplified
method,” that assumes equal voter turnout at
the district level. His calculations estimated a
pro-Republican EG of 13% for the 2012
election. Professor Jackman also calculated
an EG for the 2014 election; that calculation
resulted in a pro-Republican EG of 10%.

entire decennial period. Therefore, in his
expert opinion, Wisconsin Democrats would
continue to have a less effective vote for the
life of the plan. Barring an “unprecedented
political earthquake,” Democrats would be at
an electoral disadvantage for the duration of
Act 43.
Professor Jackman also presented a swing
analysis that was specific to Wisconsin. He
relied on the actual results from 2012 in each
district in Wisconsin and then adjusted the
vote in each district based on a 5% swing in
each party's vote share. He then calculated
the EG for each of these vote-share levels.
Professor Jackman observed that, even with a
5% swing in the Democrats' favor, the EG
would not drop below 7%.

Professor Jackman also conducted an
historical analysis of redistricting plans
which compared the trends in efficiency gaps
across a wide variety of states over the last
forty years (a total of 786 state legislative
elections). He observed that an EG in the first
year after a districting plan is enacted bears a
relatively strong relationship to the efficiency
gap over the life of a plan. The party that
“wastes” more votes in the first election year
is likely to continue “wasting” more votes in
future elections.
Relatedly, Professor Jackman conducted two
additional analyses which suggest that an
efficiency gap above 7% in any districting
plan's first election year will continue to favor
that party for the life of the plan. First,
Professor Jackman compared districting
plans across a wide variety of states, and
determined that over 95% of plans with an
EG of at least 7% will never have an EG that
favors the opposite party. Second, Professor
Jackman conducted a “swing analysis” of all
redistricting plans since 2010 and determined
that nearly all plans that resulted in a 7%
efficiency gap favoring one party in the first
election year will retain an efficiency gap that
favors that same party, even when one adjusts
a party's statewide vote share by five points.

As we already have seen, this more efficient
distribution of Republican voters has allowed
the Republican Party to translate its votes into
seats with significantly greater ease and to
achieve—and preserve—control of the
Wisconsin legislature. In both elections held
under Act 43, the Republicans obtained a far
greater proportion of the Assembly's 99 seats
than they would have without the leverage of
a considerable and favorable EG. In 2012, the
Republicans won 61% of Assembly seats
with only 48.6% of the statewide vote,
resulting in a 13% EG in their favor. In 2014,
the Republicans garnered 52% of the
statewide vote but secured 64% of Assembly
seats, resulting in a pro-Republican EG of
10%.295 Thus, the Republican Party in 2012
won about 13 Assembly seats in excess of
what a party would be expected to win with
49% of the statewide vote, and in 2014 it won
about 10 more Assembly seats than would be
expected with 52% of the vote.

Professor Jackman then compared his EG
estimates for Act 43 with the historical EG
estimates from other states. Given historical
trends and averages, he opined that
Wisconsin's plan would have an average proRepublican efficiency gap of 9.5% for the

Moreover, the expert testimony before us
indicates that the Republican Party's
comparative electoral advantage under Act
43 will persist throughout the decennial
period; Democratic voters will continue to
find it more difficult to affect district-level
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outcomes, and, as a result, Republicans will
continue to enjoy a substantial advantage in
converting their votes into seats and in
securing and maintaining control of the
Assembly.

As it has been presented here, the EG does
not impermissibly require that each party
receive a share of the seats in proportion to its
vote share. Rather, the EG measures the
magnitude of a plan's deviation from the
relationship we would expect to observe
between votes and seats. We do not believe
Vieth or LULAC preclude our consideration
of the EG measure.

b.
The defendants have made a number of legal,
methodological, and policy-based attacks
against judicial use of the EG as a measure of
a district plan's partisan effect. We begin with
their claim that use of the EG is foreclosed by
Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme
Court has made clear that the Constitution
does not require that a map result in each
party gaining a share of the legislative seats
in proportion to their share of the statewide
vote. (“To be sure, there is no constitutional
requirement of proportional representation
....”). The defendants have argued throughout
this action that this precept forecloses the use
of any metric that employs a votes-to-seats
relationship as its starting point to measure a
plan's partisan effect. The EG, they say, is
rooted in a baseline requirement that a district
plan
deliver
hyper-proportional
representation in the form of the 2-to-1 seatsto-votes ratio described above and is
therefore unavailable for use as a measure of
discriminatory effect.

We turn next to what are best described as
methodological and operational critiques of
the EG measure. First, the defendants point
out that the plaintiffs have proposed two
distinct methods for calculating the EG. The
differing approaches can yield materially
different EG values, which, in turn, will
produce uncertainty in the maps that should
be subject to judicial scrutiny. As explained
previously, Professor Mayer employed the
“full method,” which included aggregating
every district's wasted votes for each party.
Professor Jackman used the “simplified
method” that assumes equal voter turnout at
the district level. These two methods produce
identical results when voter turnout is equal
across districts; however, where voter turnout
varies, as it does in Wisconsin, the EG
measure will differ depending on the method
used.
Although we view the full method as
preferable because it accounts for the reality
that voters do not go to the polls at equal rates
across districts, we do not believe that this
calls into question Professor Jackman's use of
the simplified method in his analysis.
Professor Goedert in his expert report
described the simplified method as “an
appropriate and useful summary measure”
for calculating the EG,302 and the parties
have stipulated that the shortcut's implied 2to-1 votes-to-seats relationship reflects the
“observed average seat/votes curve in
historical U.S. congressional and legislative
elections.” Were there record evidence
indicating that Professor Jackman's shortcut

We cannot accept this argument. To say that
the Constitution does not require proportional
representation is not to say that highly dis
proportional representation may not be
evidence of a discriminatory effect. Indeed,
acknowledging that the Constitution does not
require proportionality, Justice Kennedy
observed in LULAC that “a congressional
plan that more closely reflects the
distribution of state party power seems a less
likely vehicle for partisan discrimination than
one that entrenches an electoral minority.”
We do not believe, therefore, that the
Constitution precludes us from looking at the
ratio of votes to seats in assessing a plan's
partisan effect.
416

did not correlate highly with both the full
method and electoral reality, we would have
reason to doubt its validity. Because this is
not the case here, we are not troubled by the
existence of distinct methods of calculating
the EG. Moreover, we are not addressing a
legislative plan that is at the statistical
margins. In this case, both methods yield an
historically large, pro-Republican EG.

testified that the EG will vary depending on
whether there is a national wave in the
electorate favoring one party or the other. He
described a hypothetical scenario in which a
national pro-Republican wave resulted in an
increase in Republican vote share in every
district of two points above the otherwise
expected Republican vote share. This slight
change, Mr. Trende explained, could alter the
outcomes in particularly close races and thus
produce a significantly different EG value
than if the national wave had not occurred.
Professor Goedert raised a related point. He
suggested that assessing a given plan based
on the results of the first observed election
under the plan is arbitrary and may yield
problematic results if that first election
happens to be a national wave election.

The defendants also contend that the EG, as
an indicator of partisan gerrymandering, is
both overinclusive and underinclusive. They
presented evidence that districting plans,
which had been put in place by courts,
commissions, or divided governments,
sometimes register high EG values.304
Conversely, the defendants pointed to several
congressional districting plans that are
commonly
understood
as
partisan
gerrymanders but registered low EG values
or even EG values favoring the party that did
not create the districting map. We do not
share this particular concern. If a nonpartisan
or bipartisan plan displays a high EG, the
remaining components of the analysis will
prevent a finding of a constitutional violation.
For example, if a claim of partisan
gerrymandering is brought against a court- or
commission-drawn district plan with a high
EG, it will stall when the plaintiffs attempt to
make
the
necessary
showing
of
discriminatory intent. In the same way, a
challenge to a map enacted with egregious
partisan intent but demonstrating a low EG
also will fail because the plaintiffs cannot
demonstrate the required discriminatory
effect. The present case, of course, does not
present either of these situations. Here, the
plaintiffs have put forward sufficient
evidence showing both that Act 43 was
enacted with impermissible intent and that it
demonstrates a large and durable EG value.

We acknowledge these as legitimate
criticisms of the EG measure generally;
however, they are less compelling in the
context of this case. Both concerns are rooted
in an EG being drawn from only a single
election, which, for any number of reasons,
may represent an electoral aberration. Here
we have the results of two elections under Act
43, one in which the Republicans failed to
garner a majority of the statewide vote
(2012), and one in which they exceeded it by
two percentage points. Under both electoral
scenarios, there was a sizeable proRepublican efficiency gap: 13% in 2012 and
10% in 2014.
Even in the absence of these results, however,
there is evidence in the record that establishes
the durability of Act 43's pro-Republican
efficiency gap. Professor Jackman conducted
an historical analysis of redistricting plans
which compared the trends in efficiency gaps
across a wide variety of states over the last
forty years (totaling 786 state legislative
elections). Based on this analysis, Professor
Jackman estimated that Wisconsin's plan,
with an initial pro-Republican efficiency gap
of 13.3%, would have a plan average pro-

Lastly, the defendants argue that the EG
measure is overly sensitive to small changes
in voter preferences. At trial, Mr. Trende
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Republican efficiency gap of 9.5%. In other
words, the Republicans' ability to translate
their votes into seats will continue at a
significantly advantageous rate through the
decennial period.

majority of the statewide vote. Again,
however, drafters who had the intent to create
a proportional system hardly could be
accused of harboring a discriminatory intent.
Moreover, the defendants have offered no
evidence that Act 43's drafters had any
interest in hewing closely to proportional
representation; indeed, the evidence is
directly to the contrary. For these reasons, we
are not persuaded that the policy objections
to the EG bear any relationship to this case.
We further emphasize, in any event, that we
have not determined that a particular measure
of
EG
establishes
presumptive
unconstitutionality, which itself diminishes
all of the defendants' policy-based
arguments. Instead, we acknowledge that the
expert opinions in this case have persuaded
us that, on the facts before us, the EG is
corroborative evidence of an aggressive
partisan gerrymander that was both intended
and likely to persist for the life of the plan.

Moreover, Mr. Trende himself attested to the
durability of Act 43's EG in the face of a wave
election. In his expert report, Mr. Trende
observed that if the Democrats engaged in a
“modestly better effort” to get out the vote,
and secured just 600 more votes in Districts
1 and 94, the “EG falls by more than two
points off these modest shifts, to 9.466.”
Nevertheless, Mr. Trende conceded that,
although such a shift might affect the EG's
applications in other contexts, it “would not
make a difference in terms of whether the
Wisconsin map invited Court scrutiny”
because the EG still was above the plaintiffs'
proposed threshold of 7%.
The defendants also raise policy-based
objections to the EG as a measure of
discriminatory effect. First, they claim that
the creation of many competitive districts,
which may be a desirable and non-partisan
policy choice, will result in a highly sensitive
map in which the EG could swing rather
wildly with even mild electoral shifts. We do
not doubt this is the case. However, as with
some of the criticisms that we already have
discussed, this concern is ameliorated by
other aspects of the equal protection analysis.
It would be difficult to establish that drafters
who designed a map with many competitive
districts had the requisite partisan intent to
show a constitutional violation.

In sum, we conclude that the plaintiffs have
established, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Act 43 burdens the
representational rights of Democratic voters
in Wisconsin by impeding their ability to
translate their votes into legislative seats, not
simply for one election but throughout the
life of Act 43. We therefore turn our attention
to whether the burden is justified by some
legitimate state interest.
V
JUSTIFICATION
In the initial stages of this litigation, the
plaintiffs took the view that, should they
successfully establish the intent and effects
elements of their constitutional claim, the
burden should then shift to the defendants to
show that Act 43's unlawful effects were “
‘unavoidable’ in light of the state's political
geography and legitimate districting
objectives.” In our summary judgment order,
we noted that “some type of burden-shifting

The defendants similarly claim that
identifying an EG of zero as the baseline or
ideal would discourage states from enacting
systems of proportional representation.
Professor Goedert in particular noted that if a
state successfully achieved proportional
representation, the plan might fail an EG
analysis because it fails to give a hyper
proportional share to the party winning the
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is appropriate,” adding that “to the extent that
plaintiffs have an initial burden to show that
[Act 43] cannot be justified using neutral
criteria,” it was met at the summary judgment
stage by their presentation of the
Demonstration Plan. We left open the
question of which party ultimately should
bear the burden of proving Act 43's
legitimacy.
However,
we
rejected
definitively the plaintiffs' “unavoidable”
standard as an “overstate[ment]” of the
degree of the burden.

consistent with the Court's approach in the
state legislative malapportionment context.

In response, the plaintiffs reformulated the
third step of their test to allow the defendants
to avoid liability if they can justify Act 43's
effects on the basis of legitimate districting
goals or Wisconsin's natural political
geography. They maintain, however, that it is
the State's burden ultimately to prove that Act
43's effect is justified and not their burden to
prove that it is not.

The evidence further makes clear that,
although Wisconsin's natural political
geography plays some role in the
apportionment process, it simply does not
explain adequately the sizeable disparate
effect seen in 2012 and 2014 under Act 43.
Indeed, as we already noted and will discuss
again, the defendants' own witnesses
produced the most crucial evidence against
justifying the plan on the basis of political
geography. Their testimony credibly
established that Act 43's drafters produced
multiple alternative plans that would have
achieved the legislature's valid districting
goals while generating a substantially smaller
partisan advantage. We therefore must
conclude that, regardless where the burden
lies, Act 43's partisan effect cannot be
justified by the legitimate state concerns and
neutral factors that traditionally bear on the
reapportionment process.

The record before us does not require us to
anticipate how the Supreme Court will
resolve the allocations of proof on this issue.
It is clear that the parties, recognizing the
present ambiguity on this point, placed before
us all the evidence they could in support of
their respective positions. Assuming the
plaintiffs have the ultimate burden of proof
on the issue, they have carried that burden.

The defendants maintain that even this lesser
showing is too demanding. They argue that
because Act 43 complies with traditional
districting objectives, its partisan effect is
necessarily excusable as a matter of law and
need not be explained by neutral
considerations. We already have considered
this argument in detail in our evaluation of
the intent element of the plaintiffs' claim, and
so we do not repeat that discussion here.
In the absence of explicit guidance from the
Supreme Court, we think that the most
appropriate course in this context is to
evaluate whether a plan's partisan effect is
justifiable, i.e., whether it can be explained
by the legitimate state prerogatives and
neutral factors that are implicated in the
districting process. This approach allows us
to hew as closely as possible to the Supreme
Court's approach in analogous areas. As we
observed in our summary judgment order,
members of the Court have applied this
formulation at several points throughout its
political gerrymandering case law. It is also

A.
The defendants' primary argument is that
Wisconsin's political geography naturally
favors Republicans because Democratic
voters reside in more geographically
concentrated areas, particularly in urban
centers like Milwaukee and Madison. For this
reason, they submit, any districting plan in
Wisconsin necessarily will result in an
advantageous distribution of Republican
voters statewide just as Act 43 does.
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The plaintiffs have stressed, as a general
matter throughout this litigation, that even if
there were some inherent pro-Republican
bias in Wisconsin, there is no evidence that
such a bias could explain Act 43's large EG
measures. They maintain that without such
evidence, political geography cannot justify
the burden that Act 43 places on Democratic
voters in Wisconsin.

substitute for quantitative data on the margin
of victory in each county. Without this
information, we cannot know whether, for
example, a county won by a Republican
presidential candidate was deeply or
narrowly Republican. Nor can we tell how
the partisan breakdown of that county may
have changed over time; as long as the county
retained the same partisan majority, it
remained the same color. In our view, this
evidence is worthy of little, if any, weight.

The bulk of evidentiary support for the
defendants' political geography argument
was presented through the testimony of Mr.
Trende. His overarching theory is that the
Democratic coalition nationwide has become
more liberal over the last several decades; as
a result, it has contracted geographically and
is now concentrated heavily in urban areas.
This concentration, in turn, has hurt the
Democratic Party in congressional elections,
which tend to favor parties with wider
geographic reach. Mr. Trende first
demonstrated this theory using color-coded
maps illustrating the 1996, 2004, and 2008
presidential vote results by county in Texas,
Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, and
Virginia. Over the three election cycles, the
number of counties shaded blue (indicating
that a majority of the county's votes in the
presidential election were cast for the
Democratic candidate) decreased, and the
number of red counties (indicating that a
majority of the county's votes in the
presidential election were cast for the
Republican candidate) increased. Mr. Trende
testified that these maps supported his
hypothesis that the Democratic coalition has
shrunk over time.

The remainder of Mr. Trende's testimony
concerned the political geography of
Wisconsin itself, which he analyzed using a
measure called the “partisan index” (“PI”).
The PI, he explained, is the difference
between a party's vote share at one electoral
level and its vote share at a larger electoral
level. For example, the Republican PI for the
State of Wisconsin is “computed by
subtracting the share of the state that voted
for the Republican presidential candidate
from the share of the nation that voted for the
Republican presidential candidate.” The
purpose of the PI is “to determine the partisan
lean of political units” in order to “compare
results across elections.”
Mr. Trende explained that Wisconsin's
statewide PI, as compared to the national
electorate, has remained stable since the
1980s; however, the county and ward PI
values have shifted. He presented colorcoded maps illustrating Wisconsin's
presidential vote results by county in 1996,
2004, and 2012. Each county was colored a
shade of blue or red depending on its degree
of partisanship, e.g., counties with large
Democratic or Republican PI values were
shaded dark blue or dark red, respectively.
Although the maps did not contain the actual
county PI values, Mr. Trende testified that the
pro-Democratic PI values of Dane and
Milwaukee Counties increased significantly
between 1996 and 2012. He also testified that
the combined PI values of three of

We are skeptical that presidential voting
trends at the county level in states other than
Wisconsin bear directly on the determination
that we must make about Wisconsin's
political geography. Moreover, the colorcoding of Mr. Trende's maps, although a
useful demonstrative, purported to serve as a
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Wisconsin's reliably Democratic counties—
Dane, Milwaukee, and Rock—nearly
doubled between 1996 and 2012, despite the
statewide Democratic vote share actually
decreasing over that time. On crossexamination, Mr. Trende conceded that the
heavily Republican Ozaukee, Washington,
and Waukesha Counties had Republican PI
values as large as the Democratic PI values in
Dane and Milwaukee Counties. However, the
trial evidence also showed that the total
number of votes cast for major-party
candidates in the Republican counties were
significantly smaller than their Democratic
counterparts.

level of analytical detail necessary to
conclude that political geography explains
Act 43's disparate partisan effects. Mr.
Trende's conclusions regarding the PI values
of Wisconsin's counties were based largely
on the shaded maps rather than quantitative
data analysis. And although Mr. Trende did
provide PI values for particular proDemocratic counties, he conceded on crossexamination that several counties had proRepublican PI values as large as the proDemocratic numbers observed in Dane and
Milwaukee counties.
Additionally, we question how useful Mr.
Trende's nearest neighbor analysis is in the
context of this case. The significance of the
distance between wards of similar
partisanship is not clear given the restraints
placed on the districting process in
Wisconsin.
Under
the
Wisconsin
Constitution, Assembly districts must “be
bounded by county, precinct, town or ward
lines, to consist of contiguous territory and be
in as compact form as practicable.” Wis.
Const. art. IV, § 4. Accordingly, the distance
between wards of similar partisanship is
relevant to reapportionment only to the extent
that it is feasible that those wards be grouped
together in one contiguous district. The
nearest neighbor analysis, however, does not
differentiate between those wards that
realistically could be aggregated to form a
lawful assembly district—wards that are
physically adjacent (or at least near one
another) and not separated by legally
significant boundaries—and those that are
not.

Mr. Trende then applied the PI to Wisconsin's
wards in what he referred to as a “nearest
neighbor” analysis. First, he calculated wardlevel PI values in order to determine the
average partisan lean of Wisconsin's wards
from 2002 to 2014. Mr. Trende testified that,
based on his analysis, “over time, the average
Democratic ward had become about two-anda-half percent more Democratic than it was in
2002”; he did not, however, observe the same
trend in Republican wards. Mr. Trende then
grouped the wards into quantiles based on
their degree of partisanship—the more
heavily Democratic wards together with
similarly Democratic wards and the same for
Republican wards—and used a computer
program to determine, for each ward in each
grouping, the median distance between that
ward and a ward of similar partisanship. Mr.
Trende concluded that, over time,
Democratic-leaning wards in each quantile
had grown closer together but Republicanleaning wards actually had grown farther
apart. In his view, this made it more difficult
to draw a neutral districting plan that did not
favor Republicans.

This problem is further compounded by Mr.
Trende's use of the median distance between
wards rather than the mean distance.
Although the average Republican ward is
twice the size of the average Democratic
ward, the undisputed trial evidence was that
the median Republican ward is six times the
size of the median Democratic ward. When

Although Mr. Trende's report and testimony
provides
some
helpful
background
information on political trends and political
geography generally, they do not provide the
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the mean is used, however, Professor Mayer
demonstrates that the distance between
Democratic and Republican wards of similar
partisanship “are exactly parallel,” and the
disparity
between
Republicanand
Democratic-leaning wards and their closest
neighboring ward of similar partisanship
substantially decreases.

therefore may have affected Professor
Goedert's ward-level analysis. Furthermore,
Professor Mayer testified that, in this context,
the relevant geographic unit is not the ward
but rather the district because, to create a
district plan, wards ultimately must be
aggregated into districts, at which point their
biases may disappear. He also presented his
own analysis illustrating that Wisconsin's
ward distribution, although “not perfectly
symmetrical,”
resembles
a
normal
distribution (i.e., a bell curve). He testified
that such a distribution is closer to what
would be expected given a neutral political
geography.
When
Professor
Mayer
aggregated the wards into Act 43's districts,
however, the resulting distribution was
skewed due to “an unusually large number of
districts where the Democrats will receive
between 40 and 50 percent” of the district
vote. In Professor Mayer's opinion, this
incongruity between the distributions of
Wisconsin's wards and its districts
demonstrates that Act 43's partisan
imbalance is caused by its district
configuration; indeed, he characterized this
distribution of districts as “the fingerprint of
a gerrymander ... the absolute DNA of
cracking.”

Like Mr. Trende, Professor Goedert testified
that Wisconsin's political geography
inherently favors Republicans. Using
Wisconsin's 2012 Presidential election
results, Professor Goedert employed a
uniform swing to adjust the vote share in each
ward and anticipate the results in an election
where each party garnered 50% of the total
statewide vote. He then assembled the wards
into ten different groups based on this
adjusted percentage of the Democratic vote
share. Professor Goedert's analysis showed
that between seven and eight percent of
Wisconsin's wards had a very high
concentration of Democrats (more than
eighty percent), while fewer than one percent
of wards demonstrated a similar strength in
Republican vote. He testified that because
significantly more wards in Wisconsin are
narrowly Republican than are narrowly
Democratic, it is “fairly easy” “to try to pack
Democrats into a small number of districts,”
because “there are so many wards that are
already so heavily packed.” For the same
reasons, he explained, it is “easy” to
“disperse” Republican voters.

Professor Mayer also presented his own
analysis of Wisconsin's political geography.
Specifically, he testified at length about
measures known as the “Isolation Index” and
“Global Moran's I,” which he said are far
more common in this area of academic study
than the methods employed by the
defendants' experts. According to Professor
Mayer, he used the Isolation Index to
measure the extent to which the average
Republican or Democratic voter lives in a
ward that leans more heavily Republican or
Democratic than the state as a whole. Global
Moran's I, he explained, was used to measure
the likelihood that a Republican- or
Democratic-leaning ward is adjacent to a
similarly Republican- or Democratic-leaning

The persuasiveness of Professor Goedert's
ward-level analysis was called into question
at trial. To begin, the evidence showed that in
the 2010 redistricting cycle Wisconsin's
wards were, for the first time in the state's
modern history, drawn after the Assembly
district lines were created under Act 43.
Professor Goedert admitted that he was
unaware of this chronology when he
conducted his analysis. The partisan
imbalance in Act 43's district configuration
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ward. Professor Mayer testified that both of
these measures show that Wisconsin's
political geography is neutral and does not
inherently favor one party or the other.

wards that are similarly Republican. We find
these facts to be consistent with the notion
that Democratic voters are uniquely packed
in urban centers like Milwaukee and
Madison.

We do not find these methods reliable as they
have been applied in this context. Professor
Mayer acknowledged on cross-examination
that he had not heard of the Isolation Index
before he was retained as an expert in this
case. Similarly, Professor Mayer testified that
he had never calculated the Global Moran's I
measure before he was retained for this
litigation. Moreover, the defendants
emphasized during trial that Professor Mayer
relied on scholarly articles that either used a
related measure known as Local Moran's I, or
used Global Moran's I to study demographic
groups. He could not point to any peerreviewed, scholarly article that had used
either measure specifically on partisanship.

Moreover,
Mr.
Trende's
testimony
establishes that the counties with the highest
Democratic PI values are far larger in
population than counties with equivalent
Republican PI values. This fact indicates that
some of the most heavily Democratic areas in
Wisconsin are more densely populated than
their equally Republican counterparts. Again,
we find this to be consistent with a modest
Republican advantage in the State's political
geography.
We also find it significant that Republicanleaning wards in Wisconsin tend to be twice
the size of Democratic-leaning wards.
Indeed, when Professor Mayer conducted his
own nearest neighbor analysis using the
mean distances between wards, it became
clear that this size differential exists at every
level of partisanship. We recognize that the
impact of this disparity on the districting
process arguably is negligible because
districts must be approximately equal in
population; ward size, therefore, does not
directly bear on the creation of districts. Still,
the tendency of Republican wards to be much
larger than Democratic wards is consistent
with the notion that Democratic voters on the
whole are more likely than Republican voters
to live in geographically concentrated areas.
This, in turn, increases the prospect that
heavily Democratic wards will exist within
the same political boundary such that it is, at
least somewhat, more difficult to draw
politically competitive districts in that part of
the state.

Having carefully examined the evidence
bearing on this issue, we find that substantial
portions of the record indicate, at least
circumstantially, that Wisconsin's political
geography affords Republicans a modest
natural advantage in districting. Indeed, the
plaintiffs conceded as much in their closing
argument when counsel stated that “there
likely is some natural packing” of
Democratic voters, “especially of minority
voters in places like Milwaukee.” Several
pieces of evidence lead us to this conclusion.
The first, and most compelling, is Professor
Mayer's analysis comparing the distributions
of Wisconsin's wards and Act 43's districts by
Democratic vote share. As Professor Mayer
himself testified, the ward-level distribution
is “not perfectly symmetrical.” In fact, the
mean ward in the distribution—the highest
point on the curve—is located left of the fifty
percent line, which indicates that the average
ward in Wisconsin leans slightly Republican.
His analysis also shows that there are a
substantial number of wards that are over
eighty percent Democratic, but virtually no

Finally, it is undisputed that Professor
Mayer's Demonstration Plan itself exhibited
a slight pro-Republican bias despite his stated
objective, reiterated at trial, of drawing an
alternative to Act 43 that performed
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particular, once the drafters had “a statewide
plan finalized, all 99 assembly districts,” they
would “take th[e] [partisan] composite
column from auto[B]ound and then move it
over into ... Excel spreadsheets.” These
spreadsheets evaluated a plan's expected
district-by-district partisan performance, and
the drafters exported and saved them for
numerous statewide draft plans.

comparably on traditional districting
objectives but “had an efficiency gap as low
to zero as [he] could get it.” Under the
Demonstration Plan, when the Republicans
secure 48% of the statewide vote as they did
in 2012, the plan still yields an EG of 2.2% in
favor of the Republicans. This certainly is a
far smaller advantage than the 11.69% proRepublican EG generated under Act 43 in
2012, but it nevertheless illustrates that even
a neutrally drawn plan, crafted under
conditions unimpeded by politics, imposes a
slight burden on Democratic voters.

Although the autoBound software also
enabled the drafters to generate reports on
other districting criteria that they were
considering, the defendants have not pointed
us to any documents in the record that
compare the various
maps under
consideration according to traditional district
criteria. It therefore is unclear precisely how
the drafters' statewide maps performed on
other districting criteria. Nevertheless, Foltz
testified that the drafters “would pull regional
alternatives from” the statewide maps they
had finalized and evaluated. These regional
maps were then presented to the Republican
leadership with the expectation that they
ultimately would be a part of a final district
plan. Neither Foltz nor Ottman testified, and
nothing in the record indicates, that any of
these
statewide
plans
performed
unsatisfactorily on any other districting
criteria.
Indeed,
had
these
maps
demonstrated, for instance, insufficiently
compact districts or an unacceptable number
of municipal splits, the drafters would not
have pulled regional alternatives from them
to present to the legislative leadership. We
therefore can infer that the finalized
statewide plans for which we have partisan
performance spreadsheets in the record
complied satisfactorily with the other
districting criteria that the drafters
considered.

For these reasons, we find that Wisconsin's
political geography, particularly the high
concentration of Democratic voters in urban
centers like Milwaukee and Madison, affords
the Republican Party a natural, but modest,
advantage in the districting process.
B.
Because the evidence at trial establishes that
Wisconsin has a modestly pro-Republican
political geography, we now examine
whether this inherent advantage explains Act
43's partisan effect. We conclude that it does
not.
The record reveals that, before the legislature
enacted Act 43, its drafters had produced
several alternative district plans that
performed satisfactorily on traditional
districting criteria but secured a materially
smaller partisan advantage when compared to
the advantage produced by Act 43. Foltz and
Ottman testified that, while drafting a
particular map, they would remain attentive
to various districting criteria—population
equality, compactness, contiguity, and
municipal and county splits—as well as
where incumbents lived and levels of
disenfranchisement. When the drafters
finalized a statewide map, they were able to
generate various reports through the
autoBound software that evaluated the plan
on these different districting criteria. In

The evidence also revealed that as the
reapportionment process progressed and the
drafters finalized and evaluated these
statewide draft plans, the magnitude of the
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expected partisan advantage increased. In
many instances, the names of these plan
alternatives reflected the degree of partisan
advantage that could be anticipated in the
map, e.g., “Assertive” or “Aggressive.” Each
of the drafters' partisan score spreadsheets
included a corresponding table comparing the
partisan performance of the draft plan to the
Current
Map.
These
performance
comparisons were made on the following
criteria: “Safe” Republican seats, “Lean”
Republican seats, “Swing” seats, “Safe”
Democratic seats, and “Lean” Democratic
seats. Under the Current Map, the drafters
anticipated that the Republicans would
secure 49 Assembly seats, with 40 districts
safe or leaning Republican, 40 districts safe
or leaning Democratic, and 19 swing
districts. However, by the time the drafters
had solicited the preferences of the
Republican legislative leadership and pieced
together the Team Map—the closest version
in the record to Act 43—the expected
Republican seats had ballooned to 59. The
number of safe or leaning Republican
districts had grown from 40 to 52, apparently
at the expense of swing districts, which
decreased from 19 to 10. The number of safe
or leaning Democratic districts also were
reduced from 40 to 37.

seats, respectively, compared to the 49
expected under the Current Map. The Current
Plan's 40 safe and leaning Republican
districts improved to 45 and then to 49, while
the number of swing districts dwindled from
19 to 14 to 12. The number of proDemocratic districts, however, remained
relatively constant.
Apparently not satisfied with the political
performance of these early plans, the drafters
produced and evaluated at least another six
statewide maps prior to their meeting with the
Republican leadership in early June 2011.
Each of these maps improved upon the
anticipated
pro-Republican
advantage
generated in the initial two draft plans. The
total number of expected Republican seats in
these drafts ranged between 57 and 60, and
the number of swing seats ranged between 6
and 11. The number of Democratic seats
again remained about the same under each
draft map.
The Team Map, as an amalgamation of
several statewide plan alternatives, reflects
the drafters' iterative efforts throughout the
drafting process to achieve a substantial, if
not maximal, partisan advantage. That these
efforts were highly successful is obvious with
the benefit of hindsight. But the drafters
themselves took pains to gauge their success
at the time, taking stock of the degree to
which they had improved upon the Current
Map. In their Tale of the Tape, the drafters
compared the partisan performance of the
Team Map directly to the Current Map. They
highlighted specifically that under the
Current Map, “49 seats are 50% or better,”
but under the Team Map, “59 Assembly seats
are 50% or better.” In a second document,
they categorized each of Wisconsin's
Assembly districts according to its partisan
“improvement” from the Current Map to the
Team Map. For example, five districts were
“Statistical Pick Up[s],” held by a
Democratic incumbent who would now face

Careful review of the record convinces us
that benign factors cannot explain this
substantial increase in Republican advantage
between the Current Map and the plan that
would become Act 43. Rather, it is evident
that the drafters achieved this end by making
incremental “improvements” to their plan
alternatives throughout the drafting process.
For example, the Republican advantages
expected in the drafters' initial two draft
plans, produced in early April 2011, were
significantly smaller than the advantage
anticipated in the Team Map. Under these
draft plans—Joe's Basemap Basic and Joe's
Basemap Assertive—the drafters expected
Republican candidates to win 52 and 56
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a “55% or better” Republican vote share.
Another
fourteen
districts
were
“strengthened a lot”: “Currently held GOP
seats that start[ed] at 55% or below [and]
improve[d] by at least 1%” in Republican
vote share. The drafters also made particular
note of which Republican Assembly
members had contributed to the achievement
of their partisan goals, the 20 so-called “GOP
donors to the team.”

Professor Mayer's Demonstration Plan
provides additional evidence that the
legislative imbalance resulting from Act 43 is
not attributable to political geography.
Professor Mayer attempted to draw an
alternative districting plan to Act 43 “that had
an efficiency gap as low to zero as I could get
it” while also complying with traditional
districting criteria as well as Act 43. He first
created a regression model that estimated
partisanship for each geographic area, so that
he could compare his plan to Act 43. To
ensure the model was accurate, Professor
Mayer compared the predictions made by his
regression model to the actual results in 2012.
He concluded that the results aligned almost
perfectly.

The substantial record evidence of the
multiple statewide plan alternatives produced
during the drafting process convinces us that
Wisconsin's modest, pro-Republican political
geography cannot explain the burden that Act
43 imposes on Democratic voters in
Wisconsin. The drafters themselves
disproved any argument to the contrary each
time they produced a statewide draft plan that
performed satisfactorily on legitimate
districting criteria without attaining an
expected partisan advantage as drastic as that
demonstrated in the Team Map and,
ultimately, in Act 43. In reaching this
conclusion, we emphasize that we did not
require, as the plaintiffs initially proposed,
that the defendants show that Act 43's
partisan effect was necessary or unavoidable.
Rather, our task at trial was to determine
whether the burden that Act 43 imposes is
justifiable in light of legitimate districting
considerations and neutral circumstances.
The defendants offered Wisconsin's natural
political geography as one such neutral
circumstance. Because we find that a
Republican advantage in political geography,
although it exists, cannot explain the
magnitude of Act 43's partisan effect, and
because we find that the plan's drafters
created and passed on several less
burdensome plans that would have achieved
their lawful objectives in equal measure, we
must conclude that the burden imposed by
Act 43 is not justifiable.

Once he was confident in his model,
Professor Mayer “used a GIS redistricting
program called Maptitude for redistricting to
go ahead and complete the task of actually
drawing the Assembly district map.”
Proceeding along this course, Professor
Mayer was able to draw a districting map that
would have yielded a pro-Republican EG of
only 2.2% for 2012, and “is comparable to
Act 43” with respect to “all constitutional
requirements.” Specifically his plan has a
population deviation of .86% whereas Act 43
has a population deviation of .76%. He also
noted that his plan keeps the same number of
majority-minority districts. The plan is also
slightly more compact, based on the “Reock
score,” than Act 43. Finally, it had three
fewer county splits but two more municipal
splits than Act 43.
The defendants argue that we should discount
the evidentiary value of the Demonstration
Plan for several reasons. First, they maintain
that the Demonstration Plan “achieved its EG
through 20/20 hindsight” and that the low EG
will “hold only for those specific election
conditions” that occurred in 2012.
Specifically, the defendants contend that if
the Republicans had a good electoral
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2,357,592 people”—a number that the court
found to be “striking.”

outcome like the one they saw in 2014, they
would have received 63 seats under the
Demonstration Plan and ended up with the
same EG as Act 43. Consequently, from the
standpoint of partisan effects, the
Demonstration Plan is just as problematic as
Act 43.

On a similar note, the defendants point out
that Professor Mayer did not draw Senate
districts and therefore did not account for
how many voters would be disenfranchised
by moving into a Senate district where they
would not get a vote for another two years.
Ottman testified that, because he worked for
Senator Fitzgerald and “was familiar with the
Senate seats,” he “was able to eyeball
[disenfranchisement] a little bit.” Foltz
testified
that
“you
can
notice
[disenfranchisement] when you're drawing
individual districts. But I think it's another
one of those metrics where the back-end
report is really where you get a sense for
where you're sitting.” Although Foltz ran
“disenfranchisement reports on [his] plans,”
he did not testify as to specific numerical
targets he was aiming for, nor did he testify
that any of his maps were changed in
response to the reports that were generated.

Although this evidence shows the need to test
how the Demonstration Plan fares under
likely electoral scenarios, it does not render
the Demonstration Plan useless for our
purposes.
Under
Professor
Mayer's
Demonstration Plan, the EG would be
significantly pro-Republican had the
Republicans received a high vote share in the
first election year of the plan. However, had
the opposite happened, and Democrats
received a higher vote share in the first
election year, the EG would have skewed
towards the Democrats. This is because the
Demonstration Plan was designed to have
competitive districts, and the EG will be
reactive to such districts. By contrast, as
Professor Gaddie's and Professor Jackman's
sensitivity analyses show, Act 43 will remain
pro-Republican regardless of the electoral
outcome. Consequently, the Demonstration
Plan and Act 43 do not suffer from the same
infirmities.

The defendants also urge that the
Demonstration Plan incorporates districts
around Fond du Lac that are not compact.
There may be individual districts in the
Demonstration Plan that are not as compact
as their equivalent districts in Act 43.
Nevertheless, the Demonstration Plan has a
better overall “Reock score”—the measure of
compactness utilized by the drafters—than
Act 43 has. We cannot conclude, therefore,
that, overall, the Demonstration Plan was less
compact than Act 43.

The defendants also contend that Professor
Mayer's Demonstration Plan fails to account
for core retention, i.e., it does not try to keep
districts from the previous districting plan in
a similar form. Although there is testimony
by Ottman that the drafters “looked at kind of
what the core of the existing district was
compared to the new district,” we question
how much this consideration actually
factored into the drafting process. In Baldus,
the court noted that “[o]nly 323,026 people
needed to be moved from one assembly
district to another in order to equalize the
populations numerically,” but that “Act 43
moves more than seven times that number—

Finally, the defendants argue that the
Demonstration Plan fails to protect
incumbents to the same degree as Act 43.
Professor Mayer testified that he “didn't pay
attention to where incumbents resided.” The
defendants contend that the number of paired
incumbents in the Demonstration Plan was so
great that such a plan would not have passed
in the legislature. According to the
defendants, the Demonstration Plan paired 37
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incumbents, 13 more than were paired in Act
43.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife makes clear
that we must assess the issue of standing at
all stages of the proceedings. Therefore, now
that we have set forth the factual record and
the elements of a political gerrymandering
cause of action, we revisit the issue of
standing.405 The standing requirement is
meant to ensure that the plaintiffs have
“alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.” The party invoking
federal jurisdiction, here the plaintiffs, bears
the burden of establishing Article III
standing.

There is no question that, unlike Act 43, the
Demonstration Plan does not take into
account incumbency concerns. This infirmity
does not negate entirely the value of the
Demonstration Plan. Notably, the defendants
have not argued that the location of
incumbents hampered them in their efforts to
draw a non-partisan plan or otherwise
accounts for the electoral imbalance resulting
from Act 43. Nevertheless, Professor Mayer's
lack of attentiveness to this concern well
might diminish the Demonstration Plan's
worth as a viable, legislative alternative. The
Demonstration Plan still shows, however,
that it is very possible to draw a map with
much less of a partisan bent than Act 43 and,
therefore, that Act 43's large partisan effect is
not due to Wisconsin's natural political
geography.

The constitutional requirements for standing
are well-established:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an
“injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent,
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ” Second,
there must be a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of—
the injury has to be “fairly ... trace[able] to
the challenged action of the defendant, and
not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action
of some third party not before the court.”
Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to
merely “speculative,” that the injury will be
“redressed by a favorable decision.”

The evidence of multiple statewide plan
alternatives produced during the drafting
process, coupled with Professor Mayer's
Demonstration Plan, convinces us that
Wisconsin's modest, pro-Republican political
geography cannot explain the burden that Act
43 imposes on Democratic voters in
Wisconsin. The drafters established this
finding themselves; they produced several
statewide draft plans that performed
satisfactorily on legitimate districting criteria
without attaining the drastic partisan
advantage demonstrated in the Team Map
and, ultimately, in Act 43. Professor Mayer's
Demonstration Plan further dispels the
defendants' claim. As we have noted in our
discussion, the evidence in support of a larger
effect of political geography simply lacked
specificity and careful analysis and,
consequently, was less convincing.

We turn first to the question whether the
plaintiffs have established the invasion of a
legally protected interest. Although the
proposition is not settled in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, we hold, for the reasons set
forth in this opinion, that state legislatures
cannot, consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause, adopt a districting plan that is
intended to, and does in fact, entrench a
political party in power over the decennial
period. The plaintiffs have established that,
“[a]s a result of the statewide partisan
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gerrymandering, Democrats do not have the
same opportunity provided to Republicans to
elect representatives of their choice to the
Assembly. As a result, the electoral influence
of plaintiffs and other Democratic voters
statewide has been unfairly [and]
disproportionately ... reduced” for the life of
Act 43. Professor Whitford testified to the
impact of political gerrymandering on
individual voters in Wisconsin where it is
“extremely difficult” to pass legislation
through a bipartisan coalition. Wisconsin's
strict caucus system means that all of the
important “debate and discussion” of
proposed legislation takes place in the party
caucus meeting, and the party's vote, yea or
nay, is the one “that matters.” Consequently,
erecting a barrier that prevents the plaintiffs'
party of choice from commanding a
legislative majority diminishes the value of
the plaintiffs' votes in a very significant way.

the party of one's choice. Moreover, Act 43
did, in fact, prevent Wisconsin Democrats
from being able to translate their votes into
seats as effectively as Wisconsin
Republicans.
Wisconsin
Democrats,
therefore, have suffered a personal injury to
their Equal Protection rights—akin to that
suffered by the plaintiffs in Baker—that is
both concrete and particularized.
Moreover, there can be no dispute that a
causal connection exists between Act 43 and
the plaintiffs' inability to translate their votes
into seats as efficiently as Republicans. The
evidence has established that one of the
purposes behind Act 43 was solidifying
Republican control of the legislature for the
decennial period. Indeed, the drafters had
drawn other statewide maps that, their own
analysis showed, would secure fewer
Republican seats. Finally, adopting a
different statewide districting map, perhaps
one of those earlier maps or a map as
proposed
in
Professor
Mayer's
Demonstration Plan, would redress the
constitutional violation by removing the
state-imposed impediment on Democratic
voters.

We believe the situation here is very close to
that presented in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
82 S.Ct. 691. In Baker, the plaintiffs'
constitutional claim was that a decades-old
districting statute constitute[d] arbitrary and
capricious state action, offensive to the
Fourteenth Amendment in its irrational
disregard of the standard of apportionment
prescribed by the State's Constitution or of
any standard, effecting a gross disproportion
of representation to voting population. The
injury which appellants assert is that this
classification disfavors the voters in the
counties in which they reside, placing them
in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable
inequality vis-à -vis voters in irrationally
favored counties.

Defendants nevertheless contend that the
plaintiffs lack standing for several reasons.
First, they assert that “[a] majority of Justices
in Vieth properly recognized that a statewide
challenge to a redistricting plan was not
justiciable.” This view, however, is not the
equivalent of holding that the plaintiffs did
not have standing to pursue their cause of
action. Standing is just one aspect of
justiciability, which also includes ripeness,
mootness, and the political question doctrine.
The Vieth plurality held that the plaintiffs'
claim for political gerrymandering presented
a nonjusticiable political question; only one
Justice opined that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring a statewide political
gerrymandering claim.

The Court explained that, “[i]f such
impairment does produce a legally
cognizable injury, [the appellants] are among
those who have sustained it.” As noted above,
today we recognize a cognizable equal
protection right against state-imposed
barriers on one's ability to vote effectively for
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The defendants also claim that in recognizing
the plaintiffs' standing to challenge a
statewide map, we are at odds with the
Court's holding in United States v. Hays.
Hays, like its predecessor, involved
allegations that a districting map constituted
“an effort to segregate voters into separate
voting districts because of their race.” This
particular cause of action is limited,
therefore, to individuals who “reside[ ] in a
racially gerrymandered district” because they
are the ones who “ha[ve] been denied equal
treatment because of the legislature's reliance
on racial criteria.”

surely an individual Democrat could bring a
constitutional challenge to the law even
though the harm was shared by so many.
Moreover, an injury is not sufficiently
particularized only if it is a wrong shared by
the “public at large”:
“We have consistently held that a plaintiff
raising only a generally available grievance
about government—claiming only harm to
his and every citizen's interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws, and
seeking relief that no more directly and
tangibly benefits him than it does the public
at large—does not state an Article III case or
controversy.”

The rationale and holding of Hays have no
application here. As we already have
discussed, the harm in such cases is not that
the racial group's voting strength has been
diluted, but that race has been used “as a basis
for separating voters into districts.” The
district lines, therefore, “embody stereotypes
that treat individuals as the product of their
race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts—
their very worth as citizens—according to a
criterion barred to the Government by history
and the Constitution.” The concern here is a
very different one: it is the effect of a
statewide districting map on the ability of
Democrats to translate their votes into seats.
The harm is the result of the entire map, not
simply the configuration of a particular
district. It follows, therefore, that an
individual Democrat has standing to assert a
challenge to the statewide map.

The harm that the plaintiffs have experienced
is not one shared by the public at large. It is
one shared by Democratic voters in the State
of Wisconsin. The dilution of their votes is
both personal and acute. Consequently, the
plaintiffs have satisfied the requirement of a
particularized injury.
The defendants finally maintain that “[t]here
is no reliable causal connection between redoing statewide districts and what the
Plaintiffs themselves are involved in, namely
localized elections.” We believe that this
claim is belied by the evidence. The plaintiffs
have established that, given Wisconsin's
caucus system, the efficacy of their vote in
securing a political voice depends on the
efficacy of the votes of Democrats statewide.
Moreover, the drafters themselves drew maps
that would have resulted in significantly
greater partisan balance than that obtained by
Act 43. In short, there is no question that Act
43 imposed a disability on Democratic voters
and that redrawing a district map—indeed,
perhaps employing one of the drafters' earlier
efforts—would remove that disability.

The defendants also argue that the wrong
alleged by the plaintiffs is not sufficiently
“particularized” to satisfy the standing
requirement. According to the defendants,
“the plaintiffs are asserting an injury that is
not personal to any one of them, but instead
is common to anyone who supports the
Democratic Party.” We cannot take the
defendants' arguments at face value. If, for
instance, Congress should pass a law that
imposed income taxes only on Democrats,

VII
ORDER
A. Remedy
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In their complaint, the plaintiffs request three
types of relief: (1) that we declare the
Assembly districts established by Act 43
unconstitutional; (2) that, “[i]n the absence of
a state law establishing a constitutional
district plan for the Assembly districts,
adopted by the Legislature and signed by the
Governor in a timely fashion, [we] establish
a redistricting plan that meets the
requirements of the U.S. Constitution and
federal statutes ...”; and (3) that we enjoin the
defendants from “administering, preparing
for, and in any way permitting the
nomination or election of members of the
State Assembly from the unconstitutional
districts that now exist.”

set forth in our docket numbers 152 and 158
are GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

We defer, at this time, a ruling on the
appropriate remedy. The parties have not had
an opportunity to brief fully the timing and
propriety of remedial measures. We therefore
order briefing on the appropriate remedy
according to the following schedule:
1. The parties shall file simultaneous briefs
on the nature and timing of all appropriate
remedial measures in 30 days' time;
2. Simultaneous response briefs are due 15
days thereafter.
The parties will provide the court with all
evidentiary and legal support they believe is
required for the court to make its ruling. If the
parties do not believe that the court can rule
on the appropriate remedy without the benefit
of additional testimony, they should inform
the court of the nature and extent of the
testimony they believe is required.
B. Evidentiary Matters
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the
motions set forth in our docket numbers 151
(with respect to the admission of exhibits 98–
100, 102, 118–119, 131, 141, 148, 150–152,
333, 391, 394, 405–406, 408, 414–415, 417,
and 498) and 154 are DENIED. The motions
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“Partisan gerrymandering is almost as old as America, but will the
Supreme Court decide it has gone too far?”
Los Angeles Times
David G. Savage
June 19, 2017

The Supreme Court agreed Monday to decide
whether partisan gerrymandering — in which
voting districts are drawn to favor one party
— is a time-honored American political
tradition or has evolved into an
unconstitutional rigging of elections.

For example, Pennsylvania, Ohio and
Michigan are closely divided states in terms
of party affiliation and all voted for former
President Obama. Yet 34 of their 48 House
representatives are Republican largely
because of gerrymandering.

The Wisconsin case of Gill vs. Whitford, to
be heard in the fall, could yield one of the
most important rulings on political power in
decades.

North Carolina’s electoral map was rejected
by the Supreme Court recently for illegally
using race in an effort to create more GOPleaning districts. It sends 10 Republicans and
three Democrats to the House, even though
statewide races often reflect a population that
is narrowly divided.

Gerrymandering has been derided for
generations, often mocked in cartoons
depicting bizarre-shaped districts that look
like salamanders or spiders.

Democrats have played the same game,
although they now control far fewer states. In
Maryland, Democrats drew a map that
allowed their party to control seven of the
eight seats in the House.

But in recent decades, because of software
programs, gerrymandered maps look less
obvious and are more effective in giving one
party an insurmountable advantage. The
maps can all but ensure that the party in
power at the beginning of a decade — when
districts are drawn — will keep control of a
state legislature and win most of a state’s
seats in the U.S. House of Representatives.

What is unclear is whether the justices see
this as politics as usual. The Supreme Court
has viewed political gerrymandering as
distasteful but not illegal. The justices have
never struck down a state’s electoral map
because it was unfairly partisan, though they
have outlawed gerrymandering along racial
lines.

Democrats maintain that the Republican
Party has used its control of electoral maps
after the 2010 census to give Republicans an
unfair grip on power in Congress.

Voting rights advocates are hopeful that it
will be different this time. They say party
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leaders have gone too far in rigging the
system in their favor.

damaging this practice has become, the
Supreme Court will adopt a clear legal
standard that will ensure our democracy
functions as it should.”

Paul Smith, a lawyer for the Campaign Legal
Center, said gerrymandering “is worse now
than any time in recent memory.” He
represents a dozen Democratic voters from
Wisconsin who sued the state over its
electoral map for the state Assembly.

The Republican National Committee does
not share his assessment of the problem or the
solution. Its lawyers urged the Supreme
Court to take up the Wisconsin case and
uphold the state’s map. They argued that their
party’s advantage reflects the “reality of
political geography.” They say Democratic
voters are concentrated in the cities, giving
the GOP a big edge elsewhere. “The
Constitution contains no right to proportional
representation in legislative bodies based on
statewide totals,” they argued.

The map makes it likely the GOP will win a
supermajority of seats in the Assembly even
when more votes are cast statewide for
Democrats than for Republicans.
In 2012, 51% of Wisconsin voters cast ballots
for Democrats in the state legislative races,
compared with 48.6% for Republicans. But
Republicans still won 60 of the 99 seats in the
Assembly.

Wisconsin’s attorney general directly
appealed to the Supreme Court. The state’s
lawyers said the districts were compact and
neatly drawn. They said the Democrats are at
a disadvantage because their voters are
concentrated in Milwaukee and Madison.

Last year, a three-judge federal panel agreed
with the challengers and ruled 2 to 1 that the
Wisconsin map was unconstitutional. The
map’s “motivating factor” was an “intent to
entrench a political party in power,” said
Judge Kenneth Ripple, a Reagan appointee to
the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in
Chicago. The judges cited the work of
University of Chicago law professor
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, who devised a
mathematical formula that showed the
Wisconsin plan was an extreme gerrymander.

They urged the court to overturn the lowercourt ruling and throw out the claim on the
grounds that redistricting is a political
process, not a legal one. They also won a
procedural ruling on Monday that could be a
good omen for the Republicans.
Shortly after announcing the court would
hear the case, the justices issued an order that
put on hold the lower court’s decision that
required Wisconsin lawmakers immediately
redraw the map for its legislative districts.
The order came on a 5-4 vote. The four
Democratic appointees — Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan — dissented.

Trevor Potter, president of the Campaign
Legal Center and former Republican
chairman of the Federal Election
Commission, urged the high court to affirm
that decision. “The threat of partisan
gerrymandering isn’t a Democratic or
Republican issue. It’s an issue for all
American voters,” he said. “We’re confident
that when the justices see how pervasive and
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That means the court’s five Republican
appointees
voted
with
Wisconsin’s
Republican leaders. The five justices
apparently agreed with the state's argument
that it should not be forced to redraw the map
until the high court finally rules on its
constitutionality. But the order also suggests
they are skeptical of the lower court's ruling.
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“The Supreme Court Takes On Partisan Gerrymandering”
The Atlantic
Vann R. Newkirk II
June 19, 2017

Partisan
gerrymandering
can
be
unconstitutional—at least in theory. In the
1986 case of Davis v. Bandemer, the
Supreme Court did not find reason to declare
an unconstitutional gerrymander, but its
ruling
did
state
“that
political
gerrymandering cases are properly justiciable
under the Equal Protection Clause.”

Census-based decennial redistricting as an
opportunity to dilute Democratic votes and
solidify partisan advantage in the future. That
advantage was so effective that at the time of
the lower court’s ruling, scholars claimed
Democrats would have to win 54 percent of
the available votes to regain political control
of the state.

Despite that ruling, and despite regular
rulings against racial gerrymanders over the
past five decades, the Court hasn’t actually
declared a single political district
unconstitutional on the grounds that it
disenfranchises voters by political party. In
the 2004 Vieth v. Jubelirer case, Justice
Antonin Scalia’s ruling on Pennsylvania
congressional districts “concluded that
political
gerrymandering claims
are
nonjusticiable because no judicially
discernible and manageable standards for
adjudicating such claims exist.”

There’s still an uphill battle for the Wisconsin
plaintiffs and for opponents of partisan
gerrymandering. In the Court’s order, the
question of jurisdiction was postponed until a
hearing on the merits of the case. That means
the justices will have to determine if partisan
gerrymandering is even justiciable. If they
decide it’s not, that might be the death blow
to
future
cases
alleging
partisan
gerrymandering.
But there’s some hope for the plaintiffs yet.
As Ian Millhiser at ThinkProgress notes, in
the 2004 Vieth v. Jubelirer case, Justice
Anthony Kennedy left the door open for a
challenge. In response to Scalia’s holding
that partisan gerrymanders are impossible to
consider because there are no standards to
measure how they affect constitutional rights
and no useful objective tests to identify them
(unlike racial gerrymanders, where discrete
known factors are applied by the Court),
Kennedy wrote that “if workable standards

That ruling will be tested over the coming
weeks, as the Court agreed Monday to review
Gill v. Whitford, after a federal district court
in November struck down Republican-drawn
state assembly maps in Wisconsin on the
grounds of partisan gerrymandering. In a
story similar to other gerrymandering cases
percolating in federal courts now, after
grabbing control of the Wisconsin state
legislature in 2010, Republicans used the
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do emerge to measure these burdens …
courts should be prepared to order relief.”

and federal lawmaking bodies. Opponents—
armed now with landmark analysis from
Justice Kagan making it much easier to
identify racial gerrymanders—will have real
tools to fight this advanced gerrymandering,
especially if the precedent in this case makes
a partisan test available.

The lower court, at least, was swayed by one
such standard. The University of Chicago
professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos and the
Public Policy Institute of California fellow
Eric McGhee devised a way to measure the
“efficiency gap” between parties. They
measure “wasted” votes that occur either
when a voter votes for a losing candidate or
when a voter votes for a candidate who would
have won anyways, which in turn captures
the extent to which voters are “cracked” and
placed in districts where their preferred
candidates will never win or “packed” into
hyper-concentrated districts. If one party has
substantially more wasted voters and a lower
efficiency
than
the
other,
then
Stephanopoulos and McGhee claim that’s
proof of an unconstitutional gerrymander.
The lower court found that claim compelling.

But if the Court takes the view that partisan
gerrymandering is simply not actionable—or
the more extreme view that it’s not any
different from other partisan pieces of the
political process under the Constitution—that
decision will make it difficult to stop an
increasingly sophisticated wave of hyperpartisan gerrymandering in 2021 and beyond.

It’s unclear if the Supreme Court will find
their formula equally compelling, but its
decision will reverberate either way. North
Carolina’s redrawn congressional districts
now face review by federal courts as partisan
gerrymanders after the original Republicandrawn maps were struck down by the
Supreme Court. There are also ongoing
lawsuits in Maryland and Pennsylvania over
partisan gerrymandering.
The Court’s decision might impact those
cases, but it could also have major effects on
the future of redistricting. The 2020 Census
isn’t far away, and Republicans in 2010
created a proof-of-concept for using hyperpartisan redistricting to amplify Democratic
voter concentration and dominate local, state,
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“How 2 academics got the Supreme Court to reexamine
gerrymandering”
Vox
Dylan Matthews
June 19, 2017

The Supreme Court has officially agreed to
hear a case with the potential to put firm
limits on partisan gerrymandering — and
dramatically change the way states draw
legislative boundaries.

Ripple, the author of that opinion, wrote, "We
conclude … that the evidence establishes that
one of the purposes of [the district map] was
to secure Republican control of the Assembly
under any likely future electoral scenario for
the remainder of the decade, in other words
to entrench the Republican Party in power."

The case, Gill v. Whitford, challenges the
2011 Wisconsin state assembly map. Those
districts were drawn by the Republican state
legislature in Wisconsin, and packed
Democrats into a smaller number of districts
to maximize Republican odds. The lawsuit
argues that the map is an unconstitutional
effort to help Republicans retain power.

The panel stayed the map and ordered the
legislature to redraw it. As part of agreeing to
hear the case, the five conservatives on the
Supreme Court (John Roberts, Neil Gorsuch,
Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas, and
Anthony Kennedy) stayed the ruling,
effectively
removing
the
near-term
requirement that Wisconsin redraw its map.
The four liberals (Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena
Kagan) dissented.

That kind of gerrymandering, the suit alleges,
violates Democrats’ constitutional rights in
two ways: under the First Amendment
freedom of association, since they’re being
disenfranchised based on the party they chose
to join, and under the 14th Amendment’s
equal protection clause, because Democrats
are effectively entitled to less representation
than Republicans.

The Wisconsin state assembly districts being
challenged. Wisconsin State Legislature
Gerrymandering is as old as the American
republic, and has been done for a variety of
reasons. Historically, districting meant to
reduce the power of black voters has been
very common. But partisan gerrymandering
has also been a dominant force. Typically, the
party in control of a state legislature will try

A divided three-judge panel of the US
District Court for Wisconsin ruled last year
against the Wisconsin map, concluding that
the plaintiffs are correct and that the map’s
gerrymandering is unconstitutional. Kenneth
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Since then, there’s been a lot of academic
energy around trying to develop such a
standard. University of Chicago law
professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos and
political scientist Eric McGhee devised one
promising option, which notes that
gerrymandering forces the losing party to
"waste" votes by placing all its voters into a
small number of districts where the party gets
a landslide, rather than spreading out those
voters so they can have more impact.

to draw congressional and state legislative
districts in such a way as to maximize their
own odds.
For instance, Democrats in charge of the
Maryland legislature have divvied up
Democratic base voters in the DC suburbs
and Baltimore into large a number of
districts, while concentrating Republicans in
more rural parts of the state in a smaller
number of districts. Republicans in Ohio and
Pennsylvania have done the reverse,
concentrating urban voters in a few heavily
Democratic districts.

Stephanopoulos and McGhee argue that fair
districting requires a roughly equal number
of wasted votes for each party, and that
districting schemes where one party is
wasting
many
more
votes
are
unconstitutional. They call their metric the
“efficiency gap,” calculated by taking the
difference between the number of “wasted
votes” for each party, and dividing that
difference by the total number of votes.

While the Supreme Court has ruled on many
aspects of the districting process — banning
state legislative districts with unequal
populations and banning districts intended to
disenfranchise black voters — it has issued
muddled opinions on the question of whether
partisan gerrymanders are unconstitutional.
There’s extensive case law on racial
gerrymanders, which has established that
racial discrimination in districting is subject
to strict scrutiny by courts.

The efficiency gap is key to the plaintiffs’
arguments in Gill v. Whitford. They
proposed setting a threshold of 7 percent: If a
districting plan produces a larger gap than
that, if one party is getting a wasted-vote
advantage of more than 7 percent of the total
vote, then it’s getting a huge leg up, which
will continue for a long time. As Yale Law
School dean Heather Gerken noted in a Vox
piece following the initial district court
decision, a gap above that amount indicates
that the disadvantaged party “would have
almost no chance of taking control of the
legislature during the 10-year districting
cycle.”

But discrimination on the basis of party is not
the same as racial discrimination. The Court
has agreed to no firm standard as to which
political considerations are and are not
allowed in creating congressional and
legislative districts, and in 2004’s Vieth v.
Jubelirer a plurality opinion by the right wing
of the Court argued that no such standard is
even possible.
But the Court’s four liberals dissented, and
Anthony Kennedy filed a concurrence
arguing that it was possible the Court could
develop such a standard in the future.

By contrast, the Wisconsin plan created
efficiency gaps of 13 percent and 10 percent
in 2012 and 2014, respectively. Those are
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truly massive advantages enjoyed by the
Republican Party.
By taking up the case, the Supreme Court is
essentially promising to rule on the merits of
the efficiency gap as a means of determining
whether an improper partisan gerrymander
has happened — and, if one has occurred, on
whether that violates either First or 14th
Amendment protections.
The key question, as always on this Supreme
Court, is where Kennedy will land. His 2004
concurrence indicated an openness to
quantitative measures of partisan skew, and
the efficiency gap and similar measures were
to some extent devised to answer that demand
of his. However, he sided with the Court’s
conservatives in staying the lower court
ruling, which might indicate a lack of
sympathy with the plaintiffs and a
willingness to let the map slide.
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“How This Supreme Court Case Will Affect the Next Election”
Time
Thomas Wolf
June 21, 2017

The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear
argument this fall in a potentially landmark
partisan-gerrymandering
case
from
Wisconsin. This will give the Justices an
opportunity to weigh in on an important
question that they’ve never clearly answered:
Whether there are any constitutional limits on
politicians’ ability to draw electoral maps to
give their party a leg up. How the Court
decides will go a long way to determining
whether you choose your representatives —
or the other way around — and whether
you’ll be able to hold them accountable when
they put party agendas over your interests.

process for the final plan, which was
engineered to ensure Republicans would get
a 54-seat majority even if they only garnered
48% of the statewide vote.
The map performed even more reliably than
expected. In 2012, Republicans won 60 of the
99 seats in the Wisconsin Assembly despite
winning only 48.6% of the two-party statewide vote; in 2014, they won 63 seats with
only 52% of the state-wide vote. These
results are way off from what we’d expect
given the history of Wisconsin’s elections.
And using this extremely unusual majority,
Republicans in the legislature went on to pass
a raft of controversial legislation, including
(on party lines) a law eliminating
investigations into political misconduct that
had targeted associates of Scott Walker, the
state’s Republican governor.

The Wisconsin case — known as Gill v.
Whitford — is a great opportunity for the
Justices to (attempt to) answer this question
because it involves an especially extreme and
troubling example of gerrymandering. In
2010, Wisconsin voters elected a Republican
governor and Republican majorities to both
statehouses, giving the GOP total control
over the state’s redistricting process for the
first time in 40 years. The party’s leaders
seized the opportunity. They hired a private
law firm to supervise aides and consultants
who worked away in a secret “map room”
Democrats were shut out of the process, and
even rank-and-file Republicans were shown
only information relating to their own
districts. Leadership rushed the approval

Parties using super-majorities to pursue
extreme agendas is unfortunate and wrong,
but not hard to explain. After all, if legislators
think their majorities are safe regardless of
how you vote, why wouldn’t they think they
have leeway to push the envelope? (A similar
dynamic seems to be at work in Congress
right now, where the wildly unpopular health
care bill passed the House even with twenty
Republicans defecting.)

440

In 2015, a group of Wisconsin voters sued to
force the legislature to draw a less biased and
more representative map. This was, in many
ways, a gamble: no plaintiffs had taken a
partisan-gerrymandering case to trial and
won in more than three decades. But the
plaintiffs broke that streak. (Plaintiffs in
racial gerrymandering cases — which ask
courts to determine whether mapmakers
relied too heavily on race when drawing
district lines — have historically had more
success, including a major victory in North
Carolina in May.)

Wisconsin argued that it was impossible to
draw a less biased map because Democrats
were clustered together while Republicans
were spread around the state. The trial court
found, however, that any clustering — to the
extent it existed — couldn’t account for the
map’s severe and durable levels of bias.
If the Supreme Court agrees that Wisconsin’s
gerrymander is unconstitutional, you could
see substantial changes to redistricting. The
ruling would open the door to challenges
targeting other maps that have the same kind
of extreme, lasting bias favoring one party
that’s been seen in Wisconsin. A recent
report by the Brennan Center shows there are
roughly six congressional maps and nine or
so state legislative maps like that right now.
Challenges are already pending in North
Carolina
and
Pennsylvania.
More
importantly, a win for the plaintiffs will
change the rules of the game for the next
round of redistricting in 2021. If legislators
can no longer get a pass for drawing maps to
maximize their party’s advantage, they’re
less likely to try to do so.

The trial court ruled that the assembly map
was “an aggressive partisan gerrymander”
that unconstitutionally guaranteed a
Republican majority in the state assembly “in
any likely electoral scenario,” violating both
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause (which, among other
things, requires that all voters have an equal
opportunity to participate in elections) and
the First Amendment. In making their case to
the court, the challengers pointed to strong
evidence that the bias in the Wisconsin map
wasn’t accidental, including documents
showing how the mapmakers used advanced
statistics to figure out how each district
would vote and how they developed a string
of maps that became increasingly biased in
favor of Republicans with each iteration. The
goal of the map, as one key document said,
was to “determine who’s here 10 years from
now.” The plaintiffs also relied on the results
of the “efficiency gap,” a mathematical test
that can flag maps that have a level of bias so
high that it’s statistically unlikely that it’s
random.

Changes in how legislators draw maps would
likely have a major impact on how Congress
and state legislatures look and act. For
example, the same Brennan Center report
shows that 16 to 17 Republican seats in the
current House of Representatives are due to
extremely biased maps. That’s a majority of
the 24 seats Democrats would need to win to
take back control of the House. With a
different mix of legislators on the Hill,
Congress’ legislative priorities could change.
This all means that you could see the return
of legislatures that more accurately mirror the
diverse communities they represent, and
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legislators that are more responsive to your
concerns. When politicians can’t pick their
voters and retreat to their safe seats, voters
are back in charge.
If, meanwhile, the Court rules in a way that
gives partisan gerrymandering a greenlight,
the battle against partisan abuses likely
would shift from the courts to voters. In
several states — including Michigan and
Ohio — reformers are putting together ballot
initiatives to turn redistricting over to
independent commissions. But this solution
isn’t available in every state, only
underscoring the importance of the Court
stepping in this fall to provide some new
ground rules.
Those rules will set the tone for American
politics and elections for a generation and
determine whether voters, rather than
politicians, run our governments. It doesn’t
get much more fundamental than that.
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“Does Partisan Gerrymandering Violate the First Amendment?”
Slate
Mark Joseph Stern
June 19, 2017

On Monday morning, the Supreme Court
agreed to hear Gill v. Whitford, a blockbuster
case that could curb partisan gerrymandering
throughout the United States. Shortly
thereafter, the justices handed down two
excellent decisions bolstering the First
Amendment’s free speech protections for sex
offenders and derogatory trademarks. While
the link between these two rulings and
Whitford isn’t obvious at first glance, it
seems possible that both decisions could
strengthen the gerrymandering plaintiffs’
central argument—and help to end extreme
partisan redistricting for good.

Amendment. They split, however, on the
question of why, exactly, the rule violates the
freedom of speech. Justice Samuel Alito,
joined by Chief Justice John Roberts as well
as Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen
Breyer, applied the somewhat lenient test for
commercial speech, which requires that a law
be “narrowly drawn” to further “a substantial
interest.” The trademark rule, Alito wrote, is
ridiculously broad: It could apply to such
theoretical trademarks as “Down with
homophobes” (disparaging beliefs) and
“James Buchanan was a disastrous president”
(disparaging a person, “living or dead”). The
law, then, “is not an anti-discrimination
clause,” Alito concluded. It “is a happy-talk
clause,” one that is far too sweeping to
survive constitutional scrutiny.

The first ruling, Matal v. Tam, involves “a
dance-rock band” called the Slants that
sought to trademark its name. Simon Tam,
the founding member, chose the name
precisely because of its offensive history,
hoping to “reclaim” the term. (He and his
fellow band members are Asian American.)
But the Patent and Trademark Office refused
to register the name, citing a federal law that
bars the registration of trademarks that could
“disparage … or bring … into contemp[t] or
disrepute” any “persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols.”
(The same rule spurred the revocation of the
Redskins’ trademark.)

Justice Anthony Kennedy perceived even
more insidious censorship at play. In a
concurrence joined by Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena
Kagan, Kennedy wrote that the measure in
question
constitutes
“viewpoint
discrimination”—an “egregious” form of
speech suppression that is “presumptively
unconstitutional.”
Under
the
First
Amendment, Kennedy explained, the
government may not “singl[e]out a subset of
messages for disfavor based on the views
expressed,” even when the message is

Every justice agreed that the antidisparagement law ran afoul of the First
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conveyed “in the commercial context.” The
anti-disparagement rule does exactly that,
punishing an individual who wishes to
trademark a name that the government finds
offensive. “This is the essence of viewpoint
discrimination,” Kennedy declared, and it
cannot comport with the First Amendment.

the user from engaging in the legitimate
exercise of First Amendment rights.” The
North Carolina law therefore suppresses too
much expression and is thus in contravention
of the Constitution.
In his ode to social media, Kennedy
proclaimed that the internet has become “the
modern public square,” the 21st-century
equivalent to those “public streets and parks”
where the Framers hoped Americans would
“speak and listen, and then, after reflection,
speak and listen once more.” (Kennedy’s
prose remains distinctive as ever.) In a
concurrence, Alito, joined by Roberts and
Thomas, rejected Kennedy’s public square
theory as “loose,” “undisciplined,” and
“unnecessary
rhetoric”
that
elides
“differences between cyberspace and the
physical world.” The three conservatives
agreed that the North Carolina law swept too
far but insisted that Kennedy’s opinion
granted sex offenders a dangerous amount of
freedom on the web.

A similar rift opened up between the justices
in the second free speech case of the day,
Packingham v. North Carolina—another
unanimous ruling with split opinions. (Justice
Neil Gorsuch did not participate in either
case, as oral arguments came before he was
confirmed.) Packingham involved a North
Carolina law that prohibited registered sex
offenders from accessing any social media
website, including Facebook, LinkedIn, and
Twitter. The language of the statute is so
sweeping that it also barred access to
websites with commenting features such as
Amazon and even the Washington Post. In
essence, the law excludes sex offenders from
the internet. North Carolina has used it to
prosecute more than 1,000 people.

So: What do these cases—both correctly
decided, in my view—have to do with
gerrymandering?

Kennedy, joined by all four liberals,
subjected the law to intermediate scrutiny,
asking whether it “burden[s] substantially
more speech than is necessary to further the
government’s legitimate interests.” He easily
found that it did. The “Cyber Age is a
revolution of historic proportions,” Kennedy
wrote, and “social media users … engage in
a wide array of protected First Amendment
activity on topics as diverse as human
thought.” Our interactions on the internet
alter “how we think, express ourselves, and
define who we want to be”; to “foreclose
access to social media altogether is to prevent

To start, it’s important to view
gerrymandering through a free speech lens,
one developed by Kennedy himself in 2004.
When the government draws districts
designed to dilute votes cast on behalf of the
minority party, it punishes voters on the basis
of expression and association. To create an
effective gerrymander, the state classifies
individuals by their affiliation with political
parties—a
fundamental
free
speech
activity—then diminishes their ability to
elect their preferred representatives.
Supporters of the minority party can still cast
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ballots. But because of their political views,
their votes are essentially meaningless.

under the Constitution. Similarly, when the
court’s conservatives gutted the Voting
Rights Act in 2013, they did not call the right
to vote “fundamental.” Instead, they
celebrated the “fundamental principle of
equal sovereignty,” an archaic and
discredited states’ rights doctrine. The upshot
of that decision seemed to be that states’
rights are fundamental but voting rights are
not.

Kennedy has called this a “burden on
representational rights.” It’s also something
much simpler: viewpoint discrimination. In
performing a partisan gerrymander, the
government penalizes people who express
support for a disfavored party—much like, in
Tam, the government penalizes those who
wish to trademark a disfavored phrase. Both
state actions punish individuals on the basis
of their viewpoints: If you back the minority
party, your vote won’t matter; if you give
your band an offensive name, you can’t
trademark it. And even though neither action
qualifies as outright censorship, both restrict
“the public expression of ideas” that the First
Amendment is meant to protect.

Kennedy voted to uphold the voter ID law
and kneecap the Voting Rights Act. But the
justice is always evolving, and his aside in
Packingham reads to me like a renewed
commitment to the franchise set in the free
speech context. If so, that’s terrific news for
opponents of partisan gerrymandering. Such
gerrymandering limits an individual’s
fundamental right to vote (by making her
vote useless) on the basis of her viewpoint
(that is, her support for a political party). In
effect, the practice attaches unconstitutional
conditions to both voting rights and free
speech, putting many voters in a quandary:
They can either muffle their political
viewpoints and cast meaningful ballots or
express their political viewpoints and cast
meaningless ballots. The Constitution does
not permit states to punish individuals for
exercising their rights in this manner.

Packingham also includes a subtler gift to the
Whitford plaintiffs. In an aside, Kennedy
compared the North Carolina law
unfavorably to a Tennessee measure that bars
campaigning within 100 feet of a polling
place. Unlike the North Carolina law,
Kennedy explained, the Tennessee statute
“was enacted to protect another fundamental
right—the right to vote.”
Perhaps this passage is just more “loose
rhetoric”—but I doubt it. Fundamental rights
receive heightened protection under the
Constitution. And although most Americans
would probably agree that voting is a
fundamental right, the Supreme Court has
been cagey about saying so and inconsistent
in safeguarding it. When the court upheld a
voter ID law in 2008, for example, six
justices paid lip service to the “right to vote”
even as they shredded it; only the dissenting
justices noted that the right is “fundamental”

Unfortunately, these tea leaves do not
indicate inevitable doom for partisan
gerrymandering. Kennedy recently indicated
concern about judicial intervention into the
redistricting process, and in the past he has
questioned whether courts can accurately
gauge which gerrymanders go too far. The
Whitford challengers believe they have the
right tool to measure partisan gerrymanders,
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a mathematical formula called the efficiency
gap. Nobody yet knows if Kennedy will
agree, and the justice has sent mixed
signals—it’s worth noting that he joined the
court’s conservatives in voting to stay the
lower court decision in Whitford while the
justices consider the case. (The court had
ordered Wisconsin to redraw its maps.)
Still, Monday’s decision indicates that
Kennedy and the court are, at the very least,
moving in the right direction on the issues at
the heart of partisan gerrymandering. Free
expression and association aren’t really free
if the government can punish you for your
viewpoint by ensuring your ballot doesn’t
matter; the right to vote isn’t fundamental if
it can be diluted on the basis of political
affiliation. The basic First Amendment
principles Kennedy espoused on Monday
explain why the court may well curtail
partisan gerrymandering next term. In fact,
they explain why the Constitution demands
nothing less.
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“Wisconsin Federal Court Permanently Blocks State Redistricting Plan”
Urban Milwaukee
January 27, 2017

A three-judge panel in the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin today
permanently blocked the state’s redistricting
plan that unconstitutionally denies voters the
ability to elect lawmakers. This ruling by the
court ensures that new, constitutional maps
will be in place for the next state legislative
elections.

Wisconsin Voters. Today, the court made a
clear statement that holding yet another
unconstitutional election under Act 43 would
cause significant harm to the voters. The
Wisconsin legislature has continuously
demonstrated a disregard for the rights of the
voters and an inability to craft a fair, legal
redistricting plan. In drawing a new plan, the
legislature must put voters first, not partisan
politics. Rest assured that our plaintiffs will
continue to be involved in this process,
monitoring the legislature’s actions and
assuring that the new plan meets all the legal
requirements.”

Whitford v. Gill is the first case in 30 years
that has allowed a partisan gerrymander
challenge to go to trial. The state will now
decide whether to appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
The Campaign Legal Center (CLC) along
with co-counsel represent lead plaintiff Bill
Whitford and the other 11 plaintiffs in the
case. Private counsel on the case includes
Douglas M. Poland of Rathje & Woodward,
LLC, Peter G. Earle, Michele L. Odorizzi of
Mayer
Brown
and
Nicholas
O.
Stephanopoulos of University of Chicago
Law School.

Doug Poland, partner attorney at the law firm
Rathje & Woodward, released the following
statement:
“The November 1 deadline means the
legislature has plenty of time to hold hearings
with broad participation from Wisconsin
citizens,” said Doug Poland of the law firm
Rathje & Woodward, who served as co-lead
trial counsel. “There is no excuse for limiting
participation by all interested parties to draw
a fair map in an open and transparent process.
The time for cloaking the process in secrecy
has ended. The plaintiffs, their lawyers, and
all of Wisconsin, are watching.”

Should Whitford v. Gill reach the Supreme
Court it will provide the nation’s highest
court the opportunity to set a legal standard
on partisan gerrymandering for the first time.
CLC Director of Voting Rights and
Redistricting Gerry Hebert released the
following statement:

Bill Whitford, the lead plaintiff in the case,
released the following statement:

“This is truly another monumental victory for
the plaintiffs in this case and for all
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“I’m very pleased with this decision. Today
is a good day for Wisconsin voters, and
another step in the journey of ensuring that
our voices are heard. Now, we will be
keeping a watchful eye on the state
legislature as they draw the new maps and I
ask them, for the sake of our democracy, to
put partisan politics aside and the interests of
all voters first.”
Dale Schultz, former Senate Majority Leader,
released the following statement:
“Wisconsin citizens deserve clarity, and
potential candidates need to know what
districts they would be running in,” said
former Senate Majority Leader Dale Schultz
(R-Richland Center), who co-chairs the Fair
Elections Project. “The court is making the
right decision to implement their verdict, and
we are pleased that Wisconsin is on its way
to having honest elections. I hope the
Legislature chooses to conduct this new mapdrawing process in an open, transparent
manner, heeding the concerns of multiple
federal panels.”
Sachin Chheda, Director of the Fair Elections
Project, released the following statement:
“Yet again, the federal courts have ruled
clearly – Wisconsin’s district maps are an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, they
violate the rights of millions of Wisconsin
citizens, and it’s time to move ahead and
draw new maps,” said Sachin Chheda,
Director of the Fair Elections Project, which
helped organize the lawsuit. “This is a victory
for democracy and we look forward to a
process to draw these maps that engage the
community and invite public participation.
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Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute
16-980
Ruling Below: A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Husted, 838 F.3d 699 (C.A.6 (Ohio), 2016)
Organizations and an individual brought action for declaratory and injunctive relief against Ohio
Secretary of State, alleging violations of National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and Help
America Vote Act (HAVA), relating to state's process for removing inactive registrants from
state's registered voter rolls and state's confirmation notice for registrants whose residence had
changed. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, George C. Smith, J.,
denied plaintiffs' request for permanent injunction and entered judgment for Secretary. Plaintiffs
appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Question Presented: Whether 52 U.S.C. § 20507 permits Ohio's list-maintenance process,
which uses a registered voter's voter inactivity as a reason to send a confirmation notice to that
voter under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

A. Philip Randolph Institute; Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless; Larry Harmon,
Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
Jon Husted, Secretary of State, Defendant–Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
Decided on September 23, 2016
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
CLAY, Circuit Judge.

from the rolls pursuant to the Supplemental
Process, or to count provisional ballots cast
by such persons. Finally, Plaintiffs alleged
that the change-of-address confirmation
notices mailed to voters as part of the
Supplemental Process fail to meet the
standards for such notices set out in the
NVRA. Before us is Plaintiffs' appeal from
the district court's order denying Plaintiffs'
request for a permanent injunction and
directing entry of judgment in favor of the
Secretary. For the reasons set forth below, we
REVERSE the district court's judgment and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

The A. Philip Randolph Institute (“APRI”),
the Northeast Ohio Coalition for the
Homeless (“NEOCH”), and Larry Harmon
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed suit seeking to
enjoin the defendant, Ohio Secretary of State
Jon Husted (“the Secretary”), from removing
the names of registered voters from Ohio's
voter rolls pursuant to the state's so-called
Supplemental Process, which Plaintiffs
allege violates the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”), and the
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”).
Plaintiffs also sought an injunction requiring
the Secretary either to reinstate otherwise
eligible voters who were improperly removed

BACKGROUND
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voters who have not engaged in any “voter
activity” for two years. For the purposes of
the Supplemental Process, “voter activity”
includes “filing a change of address” with a
designated state agency; “filing a voter
registration card with the [BOE]; ... casting
an absentee ballot; casting a provisional
ballot; [or] voting on election day.” After
compiling a list of inactive voters, each BOE
sends a confirmation notice to those on its
list. As with the NCOA Process, voters sent a
confirmation notice are removed from the
rolls if they subsequently fail to vote for four
years and fail to either respond to the notice
or re-register. In sum, under the
Supplemental Process, a voter is purged from
the rolls after six years of inactivity—even if
he or she did not move and otherwise remains
eligible to vote.

Factual History
In addition to maintaining procedures for
removing the names of the deceased, those
who have been adjudicated incompetent, and
convicted felons from its voter rolls, Ohio
utilizes two processes for identifying and
purging from the rolls voters who are no
longer eligible to vote because they have
moved outside their county of registration.
The first is Ohio's “NCOA Process,” under
which the Secretary's office compares the
names and addresses contained in Ohio's
Statewide Voter Registration Database to the
National Change of Address (“NCOA”)
database. “The NCOA database contains
names and addresses of individuals who have
filed changes of address with the United
States Postal Service.” The Secretary
thereafter provides each county's Board of
Elections (“BOE”) with a list of voters
registered therein who appear to have *703
moved, based on the comparison of the two
databases. The BOEs then “send[ ] a
confirmation notice ... to each individual
identified.” That notice is a postage prepaid
forwardable form on which the voter must
indicate whether he or she still lives at the
same address. Recipients of the notice are
removed from the rolls if they: (1) do not
respond to the confirmation notice or update
their registration; and (2) do not subsequently
vote during a period of four consecutive years
that includes two federal elections.

When this litigation began, the confirmation
notices sent to voters pursuant to both the
NCOA Process and Supplemental Process
required that voters provide their name,
current Ohio address, date of birth, and either
their Ohio driver's license number, their
Social Security number, or a copy of a
document verifying their identity and
address. The notices required that voters
provide such information regardless of
whether they had changed address or were
merely confirming that they still lived at the
same address. Moreover, the notices did not
adequately inform voters of the consequences
of failing to respond to the notice; rather, the
form indicated that the recipient's registration
“may” be canceled if he or she did not
respond, re-register, or vote in the next four
years. Finally, the form failed to inform
voters who had moved outside of Ohio on
how they could remain eligible to vote in
their new state.
As discussed below, the Secretary issued a
new confirmation notice form during the
pendency of this litigation. On the newly
issued form, voters can confirm that they

Ohio's so-called “Supplemental Process” is
the second method the state uses for
identifying and removing from the rolls
voters who are no longer eligible to vote due
to a change of residence. The Supplemental
Process is largely identical to the NCOA
Process, except in the way it begins: rather
than identifying voters who may have moved
by reference to the NCOA database, each
county's BOE compiles a list of registered
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have not changed address by simply signing,
dating, and returning the postage prepaid
form. The new form also provides voters with
the dates by which they must either return the
form or vote in order to remain registered.
Notably, however, the new form still lacks
information on how persons who have moved
to another state can register to vote in their
new state.

from the rolls pursuant to the Supplemental
Process. Four days later, Plaintiffs agreed to
withdraw their request for a TRO in exchange
for the Secretary's agreement not to initiate
the Supplemental Process prior to July 1,
2016. A week after Plaintiffs filed their
complaint, the parties agreed to engage in
limited discovery and to address all the
dispositive issues in the case through
simultaneous briefing. The parties filed their
briefs in May and June of 2016, with
Plaintiffs styling their briefs as memoranda
supporting motions for summary judgment
and a preliminary injunction. On June 17,
2016—the day the parties' final briefs were
due before the district court—the Secretary
issued a directive requiring BOEs to use a
new version of the confirmation notice form.
As discussed above, that new form corrected
all but one of Plaintiffs' alleged deficiencies.
On June 29, 2016, the district court issued an
order denying Plaintiffs' motions for
summary judgment and a preliminary
injunction; the order directed entry of
judgment in favor of the Secretary.
Addressing the parties' arguments under
permanent injunction standards, the court
began by rejecting Plaintiffs' arguments that
the Supplemental Process violates the NVRA
and the HAVA. The court held that because
Section 8 of the NVRA does not explicitly
dictate what information states may or must
use as a “trigger” for sending a confirmation
notice, that decision was impliedly left to the
states. The court also concluded that the
Supplemental Process does not violate the
NVRA and the HAVA's prohibition on
removing voters from the rolls solely by
reason of their failure to vote because such
removal occurs only after a voter has failed
to vote and failed to respond to a
confirmation notice.
Turning to the Plaintiffs' arguments
regarding the legality of Ohio's confirmation
notice form, the district court first noted the
Secretary's promise that his newly issued

Procedural History
This case began with two letters sent by
NEOCH and APRI to the Secretary in
December 2015 and February 2016,
respectively. Both letters asserted that Ohio's
Supplemental Process violated Section 8 of
the NVRA. Not long after sending their
letters, APRI and NEOCH representatives
began meeting with the Secretary in an
attempt to resolve their concerns without
litigation. Those meetings failed to produce
results, causing Plaintiffs to file this suit in
federal district court on April 6, 2016.
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged two causes of
action relevant to this appeal: first, that the
Supplemental Process unlawfully removes
registered voters from the rolls due to their
failure to vote in violation of Section 8,
subsection (b)(2) of the NVRA, 52 U.S.C. §
20507(b)(2); and second, that the
confirmation notices sent to voters under
both the NCOA Process and the
Supplemental Process fail to meet the
standards for such forms set out in the
NVRA, 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(2).
The day after filing their complaint, Plaintiffs
moved for a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”) prohibiting the Secretary from
“removing eligible Ohio voters from the
voter rolls on account of their failure to vote
pursuant to Ohio's ‘Supplemental Process.’ ”
Plaintiffs' motion also requested a
preliminary injunction compelling the
Secretary to reinstate voters already removed
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form would be used during the upcoming
voter roll purges. Relying on that promise,
the court held that the Secretary's voluntary
cessation of illegal activity was sufficient to
moot Plaintiffs' challenges to the
confirmation notice form. Finally, the court
rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the newly
issued form still violated 52 U.S.C. §
20507(d)(2)(B) by failing to provide those
who have moved out of Ohio with
information on how to stay registered. The
court held that this argument was waived
because Plaintiffs' briefing failed to raise the
argument, and that the argument failed on the
merits in any event because it “defies logic”
that the NVRA would require local registrars
to “coach” voters on how to register in a
different state. Thus having rejected all of
Plaintiffs' arguments on the merits, the
district court held that no preliminary
injunction was warranted and that judgment
should be entered for the Secretary.4
Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal the
following day.

Congress' stated purposes in enacting the
NVRA were, inter alia, “to establish
procedures that will increase the number of
eligible citizens who register to vote in
elections for Federal office; ... [and] to ensure
that accurate and current voter registration
rolls are maintained.” “These purposes
counterpose two general, sometimes
conflicting, mandates: To expand and
simplify voter registration processes so that
more individuals register and participate in
federal elections, while simultaneously
ensuring that voter lists include only eligible
... voters.” Those sometimes conflicting
mandates are reflected in the language of
Section 8 of the NVRA, 52 U.S.C. § 20507,
which is where our analysis must begin.
Importantly, Section 8's language pairs the
mandate that states maintain accurate voter
rolls with multiple constraints on how the
states may go about doing so.
Those constraints begin with subsection (a)
of Section 8, which states that “[i]n the
administration of voter registration for
elections for Federal office, each State shall
... provide that the name of a registrant may
not be removed from the official list of
eligible voters except” under certain
circumstances. The Act then provides an
exhaustive list of circumstances justifying
removal: “criminal conviction or mental
incapacity as provided by state law, the death
of the registrant, or ... a change of the
registrant's residence.” This case concerns
the final circumstance justifying removal—
change of residence—which is subject to its
own mandate and accompanying constraints.
Subsection (a)(4) of Section 8 requires that
states “conduct a general program that makes
a reasonable effort to remove the names of
ineligible voters from the official lists of
eligible voters by reason of ... a change in the
residence of the registrant;” the Act thereafter
specifies that any such program must be

DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
The parties agree that there are no disputes
regarding the facts recounted above, and that
the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' request
for an injunction was based solely on its
interpretation of the NVRA and the HAVA.
“When reviewing the decision of a district
court to grant or to deny a request for
issuance of a permanent injunction, ... legal
conclusions are reviewed de novo.” We also
review de novo the district court's conclusion
that some of Plaintiffs' claims are now moot.
Analysis
I.
Plaintiffs' Challenge to Ohio's
Supplemental Process
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conducted “in accordance with subsections
(b), (c), and (d).” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4)(B).
Subsection (b) provides two additional
constraints on states' discretion. First, all roll
maintenance procedures must “be uniform,
nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.” Second, and
more pertinent to this appeal, subsection
(b)(2) provides that roll maintenance
procedures “shall not result in the removal of
the name of any person from the official list
of voters registered to vote in an election for
Federal office by reason of the person's
failure to vote.” This language from
subsection (b)(2) was later modified by the
HAVA, which appended the following clause
to the general prohibition on removal by
reason of failure to vote:

purpose of which is to systematically remove
the names of ineligible voters from the
official list of eligible voters” must be
completed “not later than 90 days prior to the
date of a primary or general election for
Federal office.” Second, subsection (d)(1)
establishes that states “shall not remove the
name of a registrant from the official list of
eligible voters in elections for Federal office
on the ground that the registrant has changed
residence” without first subjecting the
registrant to the confirmation notice
procedure outlined in that subsection. That
mandatory confirmation notice procedure is
the one described above as the final step of
Ohio's NCOA Process and Supplemental
Process: a forwardable postage prepaid and
pre-addressed form is sent to a voter, and the
voter is removed from the rolls if (1) he or she
does not respond to the confirmation notice
or update his or her registration, and (2) he or
she does not subsequently vote during a
period of four consecutive years that includes
two federal elections.

... except that nothing in this paragraph may
be construed to prohibit a State from using
the procedures described in subsections (c)
and (d) to remove an individual from the
official list of eligible voters if the
individual—

By the HAVA's own terms, however, this
language is not to “be construed to authorize
or require conduct prohibited under ... or to
supersede, restrict, or limit the application of
... [the NVRA].”

Finally, we note that in subsection (c)(1) of
Section 8, Congress provided states with an
example of a procedure for identifying and
removing voters who had changed residence
that would comply with the NVRA's
mandates and accompanying constraints.
That subsection provides that “[a] State may
meet the requirement of subsection (a)(4) by
establishing a program under which” voters
who appear to have moved based on
information contained in the NCOA database
are sent subsection (d) confirmation notices.
The parties do not dispute that Ohio's NCOA
Process mirrors this so-called “safe-harbor”
procedure and that the NCOA Process is thus
permissible under the NVRA.

Subsections (c) and (d) of Section 8 provide
two final constraints on states' roll
maintenance procedures. First, subsection
(c)(2)(A) provides that “any program the

The focus of this case, therefore, is Ohio's
Supplemental
Process.
Specifically,
Plaintiffs argue that the Supplemental
Process violates the clause of subsection

(A) has not either notified the applicable
registrar (in person or in writing) or
responded during the period described in
subparagraph (B) to the notice sent by the
applicable registrar; and then
(B) has not voted or appeared to vote in 2 or
more consecutive general elections for
Federal office.
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(b)(2)—hereinafter referred to as the
“prohibition
clause”—prohibiting
roll
maintenance processes that “result in the
removal of the name of any person from the
official list of voters registered to vote in an
election for Federal office by reason of the
person's failure to vote.” The Secretary
responds that the Supplemental Process is
permitted by the exception to subsection
(b)(2)'s prohibition clause added by the
HAVA—hereinafter referred to as the
“except clause”—which states: “... except
that nothing in this paragraph may be
construed to prohibit a State from using the
procedures described in subsections (c) and
(d).” The legality of Ohio's Supplemental
Process can therefore be boiled down to two
questions: whether the Process is expressly
permitted by subsection (b)(2)'s except
clause; and, if not, whether the Supplemental
Process violates that subsection's prohibition
clause.

trigger is subject to the prohibition clause; or,
in the alternative, whether the Supplemental
Process' incorporation of the confirmation
notice procedure means that the entire
Process—including the trigger—is permitted
under the except clause.
The Secretary advocates for the second of
these two positions. He states, for example,
that “[t]he language that a cancellation ‘shall
not result’ from a ‘failure to vote’ ‘except’
when coupled with the failure to ‘respond[ ]’
to an address-confirmation inquiry authorizes
the Ohio Supplemental Process.” The
operative language in this argument is the
phrase “when coupled with,” by which the
Secretary implies that a process resulting in
removal by reason of failure to vote is
nevertheless permitted by the except clause
so long as it is “coupled with” the procedures
outlined in subsection (d). We note, however,
that neither the phrase “when coupled with,”
nor any comparable language, appears in the
except clause's text. The Secretary's
argument is therefore flawed insofar as it
requires us to “read[ ] a phrase into the statute
when Congress has left it out.”

A. The Supplemental Process is not
expressly permitted by subsection (b)(2)'s
except clause
Turning to the first operative question, it
bears repeating that the Supplemental
Process fully incorporates subsection (d)'s
confirmation notice procedure. Certainly,
under the except clause's plain language, such
incorporation is permissible even though the
confirmation notice procedure itself involves
consideration of a registrant's failure to vote.
But that conclusion does not end our
inquiry—the Supplemental Process does not
only employ subsection (d)'s confirmation
notice procedure. Rather, under the
Supplemental Process, the confirmation
notice procedure is “triggered” by a
registrant's failure to engage in any “voter
activity” for two years. We must therefore
determine whether that trigger provision
should be analyzed separately from the
confirmation notice procedure, such that the

Moreover, the Secretary's reading of the
except clause would require us to ignore the
traditional rule of statutory construction
dictating that exceptions to a statute's general
rules be construed narrowly. Contrary to that
general rule, the Secretary would have us
adopt an expansive interpretation of the
except clause under which states can not only
“us[e] the procedures described in
subsections (c) and (d),” rather, under the
Secretary's interpretation, use of those
procedures would render states' processes
completely immune to the general rule that
the except clause modifies. We decline to
adopt this interpretation, and instead err on
the side of giving maximum effect to the
prohibition clause's general rule.
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Further counseling against the Secretary's
interpretation is the fact that reading “when
coupled with” into the except clause would
reduce the prohibition clause to mere
surplusage. That is because the plain
language of subsection (d)(1) provides that
processes for removing voters based on
change in residence must incorporate
subsection (d)'s confirmation notice
procedure. In other words, it is required that
such processes be “coupled with” subsection
(d)'s procedure. Thus, under the Secretary's
interpretation, subsection (b)(2)'s prohibition
clause would serve no purpose because all
state procedures would necessarily be
permitted by the except clause by virtue of
their (mandatory) incorporation of the
confirmation notice procedure. This reading
of the NVRA would contravene the Supreme
Court's repeated insistence that “a statute
should be construed so that effect is given to
all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous.”

Perhaps more importantly, we find that the
Secretary's “belt-and-suspenders” argument
ignores the NVRA's plain language:
subsection (b)(2)'s clauses are not written as
alternative presentations of the same rule;
rather, those clauses explicitly establish a
general rule with a proviso.
The Secretary also argues that the Senate and
House reports accompanying the NVRA
justify his interpretation of the except clause.
Those reports both state, in pertinent part:
Almost all states now employ some
procedure for updating lists at least once
every two years, though practices may vary
somewhat from county to county. About onefifth of the states canvass all voters on the list.
The rest of the states do not contact all voters,
but instead target only those who did not vote
in the most recent election (using not voting
as an indication that an individual might have
moved). Of these, only a handful of states
simply drop the non-voters from the list
without notice. These states could not
continue this practice under [the NVRA].

The Secretary responds that his interpretation
does not reduce the prohibition clause to
surplusage because when read together, the
prohibition and except clauses constitute a
single “belt-and-suspenders” rule that merely
“explains what is permitted and what is
prohibited by describing both sides of the
same coin.” In other words, the Secretary
would have us hold that subsection (b)(2)
only prohibits processes that do not
incorporate
the
confirmation
notice
procedure, and that the except clause simply
reinforces that prohibition by expressly
“permitt[ing]” use of the confirmation notice
and safe-harbor procedures. But this
argument once again ignores the fact that
subsection (d)(1) already mandates that “[a]
State shall not remove the name of a
registrant from the official list of voters”
without performing the confirmation notice
procedure. We decline to read subsection
(b)(2) as a mere reiteration of that mandate.

This passage in the reports, the Secretary
argues, suggests that subsection (b)(2)'s
prohibition is intended to invalidate only
those state processes that “simply drop the
non-voters from the list without notice.” Id.
Thus, the argument goes, the reports indicate
that the except clause permits any process
that
incorporates
subsection
(d)'s
confirmation notice procedure.
This argument is problematic for at least two
reasons. First, we may only look to the
legislative history of a statute to “explain the
meaning and purpose of a provision whose
text is genuinely ambiguous.” As discussed
above, the unambiguous language of Section
8 requires rejecting the Secretary's
interpretation, lest we be forced to
simultaneously write new language into, and
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essentially excise language out of, the
NVRA. But even if we did conclude that the
NVRA's language is ambiguous, we would
find little solace in the even more ambiguous
language of the congressional reports on
which the Secretary relies. Not only is the
above-quoted passage from the congressional
reports internally unclear as to which of the
practices described therein is prohibited
under the NVRA, the passage does not
purport to provide an exhaustive list of
processes that subsection (b)(2) was designed
to prohibit.

consequence, effect, or conclusion.’ ”
Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng'rs v.
Fed. Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 944, 952 (9th Cir.
2002). In this case, the Supplemental Process'
trigger provision explicitly uses a person's
failure to engage in any “voter activity”—
which includes voting—for two years as the
“trigger” for sending a confirmation notice.
Under the ordinary meaning of “result,” the
Supplemental Process would violate the
prohibition clause because removal of a voter
“proceed[s] or arise[s] as a consequence” of
his or her failure to vote.

Based on the above, we reject the Secretary's
contention that the Supplemental Process'
incorporation
of
subsection
(d)'s
confirmation notice procedure means that the
entire Supplemental Process is automatically
permitted under the except clause. That
interpretation of the NVRA would require us
to improperly ignore “the language and
design of the statute as a whole.” We further
conclude that the only reasonable reading of
the NVRA is that any part of a state's roll
maintenance process that does not mimic the
expressly permitted procedures outlined in
subsections (c) or (d)—in this case, the
Supplemental Process' two-year “trigger”
provision—is subject to subsection (b)(2)'s
prohibition clause.

As noted by the Secretary and the district
court,
however,
subsection
(b)(2)'s
prohibition clause appears to have been given
a more narrow interpretation by the HAVA.
Passed in 2002, the HAVA created an
“independent ... requirement [that states]
maintain an accurate list of eligible voters.”
In connection with that requirement, the
HAVA requires states to implement
[a] system of file maintenance that makes
a reasonable effort to remove registrants who
are ineligible to vote from the official list of
eligible voters. Under such system, consistent
with the National Voter Registration Act of
1993, registrants who have not responded to
a notice and who have not voted in 2
consecutive general elections for Federal
office shall be removed from the official list
of eligible voters, except that no registrant
may be removed solely by reason of a failure
to vote.

B. The Supplemental Process violates
subsection (b)(2)'s prohibition clause
Having concluded that we must focus our
analysis on the Supplemental Process' twoyear trigger provision, we turn to the second
dispositive question in this case: whether that
trigger provision “result[s]” in removal by
reason of failure to vote. We typically
“proceed from the understanding that unless
otherwise defined, statutory terms are
generally interpreted in accordance with their
ordinary meaning.” “Webster's dictionary
defines ‘result’ as ‘to proceed or arise as a

This section of the HAVA, the Secretary
argues, restates the NVRA's prohibition and
except clauses “in slightly different words”
and in so doing suggests that subsection
(b)(2)'s prohibition on consideration of
failure to vote only operates to prohibit state
processes that remove registrants from the
rolls “solely” by reason of their failure to
vote.
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(d)(1) already requires states to use the
confirmation notice procedure. Once again,
we decline “to adopt an interpretation of a
congressional enactment which renders
superfluous another portion of that same
law.”

In the end, however, this language from the
HAVA does not change our analysis because
operation of the Supplemental Process'
trigger is ultimately based “solely” on a
person's failure to vote. This is so,
notwithstanding
the
fact
that
the
Supplemental Process includes voting as one
of several types of “voter activity” in which a
voter must fail to engage in order to trigger
the sending of a confirmation notice. We
must assume not only that Congress intended
the prohibition clause to play some role in the
NVRA's statutory scheme, but also that
Congress intended the prohibition to be more
than a paper tiger. But the clause would have
no teeth at all if states could circumvent it by
simply including “voting” in a disjunctive list
of activities in which a registrant must fail to
engage in order to “trigger” the confirmation
notice procedure. In more concrete terms, a
state cannot avoid the conclusion that its
process results in removal “solely by reason
of a failure to vote,” by providing that the
confirmation notice procedure is triggered by
a registrant's failure either to vote or to climb
Mt. Everest or to hit a hole-in-one.

Finally, we note that the parties' arguments
and the district court's order raise two
additional questions: (1) whether processes
for identifying and removing from *712 the
rolls voters who have changed residence
must have provisions that “trigger”
subsection (d)'s confirmation notice
procedure; and (2) what the NVRA and the
HAVA have to say, if anything, about the
form such “triggers” can or cannot take.
While these questions are undoubtedly
important, we need not answer them in order
to hold that Ohio's Supplemental Process is
impermissible under the NVRA. Regardless
of whether “trigger” provisions are required,
and regardless of what forms such “triggers”
can or cannot take, it is clear that the
Supplemental Process does include a trigger,
and that that trigger constitutes perhaps the
plainest possible example of a process that
“result[s] in” removal of a voter from the rolls
by reason of his or her failure to vote. We
therefore hold that Ohio's Supplemental
Process violates Section 8, subsection (b)(2)
of the NVRA.

For his part, the Secretary reiterates that the
Supplemental
Process
incorporates
subsection (d)'s requirement that the voter
must fail to respond to a confirmation notice
before that voter can be removed from the
rolls. He thereafter argues that the Process'
incorporation of that failure-to-respond
requirement insures that voters are never
removed “solely” for failure to vote. But this
argument merely rehashes the one we
rejected above—that a state's process for
identifying and removing voters who have
changed residence comports with subsection
(b)(2)'s prohibition clause so long as it
incorporates subsection (d)'s confirmation
notice procedure. This interpretation of the
NVRA would render the prohibition clause
entirely superfluous because subsection

II. Plaintiffs' Challenge
Confirmation Notice Form

to

Ohio's

Below, the district court held: (1) that
Plaintiffs' challenges to Ohio's confirmation
notice form were mooted by the Secretary's
adoption of a new form that addressed all but
one of Plaintiffs' concerns; and (2) that
Plaintiffs' remaining challenge to the form—
that it fails to provide out-of-state voters with
information on how to remain registered—is
not supported by Section 8's statutory
language. We address these holdings in turn.
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required to produce evidence suggesting that
the Secretary planned on reengaging in the
allegedly illegal behavior after resolution of
the case. Rather, it was—and remains—the
Secretary's “formidable burden” of “showing
that it is absolutely clear the allegedly
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be
expected to recur.” The Secretary has failed
to meet that burden in this case.

A. Mootness
Claims become moot “when the issues
presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties
lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome.” Generally, “voluntary cessation of
allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the
tribunal of power to hear and determine the
case, i.e., does not make the case moot.”
However, a narrow exception to that general
rule exists in cases where a defendant
claiming that its voluntary compliance moots
a case successfully carries “the formidable
burden of showing that it is absolutely clear
the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur.” We have
stated that it is a “rare instance” in which this
standard will be met.

To begin, the new confirmation notice form
was issued pursuant to the Secretary's
“directive,” rather than any legislative
process. Thus, this is not a case in which
reversing the cessation would be particularly
burdensome. Indeed, it appears from the
record that the confirmation notice form is
revised on a relatively frequent basis—at
least four times in the last nine years, not
counting the most recent revision. And
because the Ohio Secretary of State is an
elected official, there remains a distinct
possibility that a future Secretary will be less
inclined to maintain the confirmation notice
in its current form. Finally, we note that the
circumstances of the Secretary's issuance of
the new form do not inspire confidence in his
assurances regarding the likelihood of
recurrence—he issued that new form on the
same day as the parties' final merits briefs
were due before the district court, attaching
the form as an exhibit to his brief and only
then presenting his mootness argument. This
fact makes the Secretary's voluntary
cessation appear less genuine.

The Secretary argues that because he is a
governmental actor, we should defer to his
assurances that his recent changes to the
confirmation notice form are permanent.
Although it is true that “cessation of the
allegedly illegal conduct by government
officials has been treated with more
solicitude by the courts than similar action by
private parties,” such solicitude does not
carry much of an official's burden of
demonstrating that “there is no reasonable
expectation ... that the alleged violation will
recur.” Indeed, the Supreme Court has
declined to defer to a governmental actor's
voluntary cessation, even where that
cessation occurred pursuant to legislative
process.

Given these facts, we conclude that the
Secretary has not carried his burden of
showing that it is “absolutely clear the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur.” Plaintiffs'
challenges to the confirmation notice
therefore have not been rendered moot by the
new form. Even if we felt differently about
the possibility of recurrence, however, that
alone would not render Plaintiffs' request for

Nevertheless, apparently relying on such
solicitude, the district court held that
Plaintiffs' claims were moot because “[t]here
is no evidence to suggest that the Defendant
does not plan to use this Revised Notice in
2016 or at any other point in the future.” We
note as an initial matter, however, that this
holding gets it backwards: Plaintiffs were not
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an injunction moot. A claim becomes moot
only if “interim relief or events have
completely and irrevocably eradicated the
effects of the alleged violation.” As Plaintiffs
note, the Secretary's newly-issued form does
nothing to correct the fact that Ohio has, for
years, been removing voters from the rolls
because they failed to respond to forms that
are blatantly non-compliant with the NVRA.
Thus, in any event, the new form could not
render all of Plaintiffs' claims for relief moot.

Plaintiffs' argument is based provides that
states must supply registrants with
information on how to “continue” to be
eligible to vote. Without much additional
analysis, the district court proclaimed that the
word
“continue”
necessarily
means
“continue to vote within that State—not
register in another state.” The Secretary's
arguments on appeal buttress this conclusion
by arguing that “[n]o voter can ‘continue to
be eligible’ to vote by moving from Ohio to
Michigan, ... [r]ather, the new Michigander
must become a newly registered Michigan
voter.”

B. Merits
The final question before us concerns the
merits of Plaintiffs' remaining challenge to
the newly issued confirmation notice form.
Plaintiffs argue that the form does not comply
with the NVRA's mandate, contained in
subsection (d)(2)(B) of Section 8, that “[i]f
the registrant has changed residence to a
place outside the registrar's jurisdiction in
which the registrant is registered,” any
confirmation notice sent to that voter must
provide “information concerning how the
registrant can continue to be eligible to vote.”
Plaintiffs assert that the newly issued form
violates this provision because it does not
provide Ohio registrants who have moved out
of state with information on how to reregister in their new state. This requirement
could be satisfied, Plaintiffs contend, by
simply modifying the confirmation notice to
direct the recipient to the Federal Election
Assistance Commission's website, on which
the recipient will find “instructions and
guidance for voter registration in all states.”

We find this argument unavailing. To begin,
subsection (d)(2)(B)'s plain language
contains no intra-state limitation. Instead,
that subsection provides that information on
how to continue to be eligible to vote must be
presented to anyone who “has changed
residence to a place outside the registrar's
jurisdiction.” The “outside the registrar's
jurisdiction” language is the part of
subsection
(b)(2)(B)'s
mandate
that
establishes its geographic applicability—had
Congress intended to place geographic
limitations on the mandate, it would have
done so with this language rather than relying
on a counterintuitive definition of the word
“continue.”
Moreover,
that
word—
“continue”—must be accorded its ordinary
meaning. “Continue” means to “keep up or
maintain esp[ecially] without interruption a
particular condition.” Certainly, a registrant
can “keep up or maintain ... without
interruption,” id. her condition of being
“eligible to vote,” regardless of whether she
must fully re-register or merely confirm her
new address.

Below, the district court held that it “defies
logic that the NVRA would saddle the
various secretaries of state (or their
equivalents) with the onerous burden of
coaching out-of-state residents through the
registration process in their new states of
residence.” In support of this assertion, the
court noted that the subsection on which

Further weighing against the Secretary's
interpretation of subsection (d)(2)(B)—
whereby “continuing” to vote excludes
situations in which voters must fully reregister—is the fact that some states require
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voters to fully re-register even when they
move to a new jurisdiction within the same
state. Indeed, the 2007 version of Ohio's
confirmation notice form suggests that Ohio
itself once required voters who moved
between counties to fully re-register. Under
the Secretary's reasoning, intra-state movers
subject to such re-registration requirements
would not be entitled to “information
concerning how [they] can continue to be
eligible to vote,” because the requirement
that they re-register means that they are not
“continuing” to be eligible to vote. Not only
would this outcome completely defeat the
purpose of subsection (d)(2)(B)'s mandate in
states with re-registration requirements, it
would contradict the Secretary and district
court's own conclusion that the word
“continue” operates to free states of
subsection (b)(2)(B)'s mandate with regard to
out-of-state movers only.

extent to which I disagree with the majority
opinion, although I respect it.
I commend the Secretary for issuing a new
confirmation notice form during the
pendency of this litigation. In all aspects of
the law, except for directions on how the
voter can continue his registration, it
complies with the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and the
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).
Both sides agree that the language of the
NVRA is unambiguous. “If the words of the
statute are unambiguous, the judicial inquiry
is at an end, and the plain meaning of the text
must be enforced.”
This seems to be a much simpler process than
as outlined in the majority opinion. The
Secretary has established a Supplemental
Process for purging voters from the voting
rolls in Ohio. The key language in the statute
attacked by the plaintiffs is from 52 U.S.C. §
20507(b)(2), which directs that States shall
not remove “the name of any person from the
official list of voters registered to vote in an
election for Federal office by reason of the
person's failure to vote.” However, that same
subsection allows a State to use “the
procedures described in subsections (c) and
(d) to remove an individual from the official
list of eligible voters” under certain
circumstances. That subsection indicates that
if the voter:

In sum, we conclude that the district court
erred by holding that Plaintiffs' claims
regarding Ohio's confirmation notice are
moot, and that the court erred by concluding
that Ohio need not provide out-of-state
movers with information on how they can
continue to be eligible to vote.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE
the district court's judgment and REMAND
for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
CONCURRING
IN
DISSENTING IN PART

PART

(A) has not either notified the applicable
registrar (in person or in writing) or
responded during the period described in
subparagraph (B) to the notice sent by the
applicable registrar; and then

AND

SILER, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and
concurring in part.
Because of the urgency of this issue and the
need to allow the Supreme Court to consider
it, I write the dissent/concurrence in
condensed fashion. It does not reflect the

(B) has not voted or appeared to vote in 2 or
more consecutive general elections for
Federal office,
then subsection (d) provides how States may
cancel registrations of those who may have
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changed addresses. Id. It provides that the
registrant should not be removed from the list
of voters unless he or she confirms that he or
she has changed residence or has failed to
respond to a notice described in paragraph (2)
and has not voted during a certain period of
time.

The decision of the district court also follows
the language in HAVA. The district court
cited the following language from that act:
[C]onsistent with the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 ..., registrants who
have not responded to a notice and who have
not voted in 2 consecutive general elections
for Federal office shall be removed from the
official list of eligible voters, except that no
registrant may be removed solely by reason
of a failure to vote.

The part of the statute which is in contention
is § 20507(b)(2), which indicates that the
State shall not remove the voter “by reason of
the person's failure to vote.” The Secretary
indicates that the person is not removed from
the voting rolls until after the registrant is sent
a notice by mail to find out if he or she still
lives at the old address. Not until that person
fails to respond, as plaintiff Larry Harmon
did, does the State then list the voter as
“inactive” in the registration database.
Nevertheless, this “inactive” voter has all the
rights to cast a regular ballot at any election,
but if four years transpire without the
registrant's voting, his or her registration
record is canceled. However, if the registrant
has any voting activity during those four
years, he or she returns to an active voter
status.

As the Secretary has explained, it is his
position that no voter is removed solely by
reason of a failure to vote, and thus he has
complied with the language from both
statutes. I agree. The statutes leave it to the
States to implement, and Ohio has developed
a lawful procedure.
On the question of mootness, I agree with the
majority that the plaintiffs had standing to
bring the challenge to the notice form when
the case was filed. However, I disagree with
the conclusion that this case is not moot
because the issues, save one, concerning the
confirmation notice form have been corrected
by the Secretary. Cessation of certain
“conduct by government officials has been
treated with more solicitude by the courts
than similar action by private parties.” I agree
with the district court that there is no
evidence to show that the Secretary would
change the current notice, and this court
should give him deference on that question.
However, I concur with the majority that the
current notice does not comply with the
NVRA final mandate that when the Secretary
sends the confirmation notice that the
registrant has been purged, the notice must
provide “information concerning how the
registrant can continue to be eligible to vote.”
The district court found that this issue was
waived by the plaintiffs for failure to include

The text of the NVRA directs the States to
“conduct a general program that makes a
reasonable effort to remove the names of
ineligible voters from the official lists of
eligible voters by reason of” death or
relocation. The district court found the
Secretary has made a reasonable effort to
carry out that mandate, and I agree. The State
cannot remove the registrant's name from the
rolls for a failure to vote only, and Ohio does
not do so. It removes registrants only if (1)
they have not voted or updated their
registration for the last two years, (2) also
failed to respond to the address-confirmation
notice, and (3) then failed to engage in any
voter activity in four consecutive years,
including two consecutive Federal elections
following that notice.
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it in their pleadings before filing their reply
brief. However, their motion for summary
judgment argued that the confirmation notice
forms do not advise people who have moved
out of the State how they could register in
their new State. Although I agree with the
district court that the State officials have been
given an “onerous burden of coaching out-ofstate residents through the registration
process in their new States of residence,” that
is what the statute requires. The district court
ruled that the mandate only applies to give the
registrant information about registering in
another location in Ohio, but the language of
the statute is broader than that. In their brief
on appeal, plaintiffs have suggested that an
easy way to comply would be by directing
voters to the Election Assistance
Commission's website containing the federal
form, which provides instructions and
guidance for voter registration in all States.
Although such a notice should be easy to
attach to the notification to the registrants, it
assumes that all registrants know how to
utilize websites.
Nevertheless, that is the relief which the
plaintiffs have requested, and it seems simple
enough for the Secretary to institute that
amendment to the notice.
Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the
district court, except insofar as it declined to
require the Secretary to amend its notice to
voters who have moved to other States. I
would grant relief on that sole issue.
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“High court to review Ohio’s method for removing voters from
registration rolls”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes
May 30, 2017

“I remain confident that once the justices
review this case they will rule to uphold the
decades-old process that both Republicans
and Democrats have used in Ohio to maintain
our voter rolls as consistent with federal
law,” he added.

The Supreme Court said Tuesday it will hear
yet another voting rights dispute next term
and consider reinstating Ohio’s method for
purging the names of those who do not
regularly vote from registration rolls.
Civil rights groups, which have successfully
challenged the state’s process, told the
Supreme Court that there was no reason to
disturb a decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 6th Circuit striking down the
rules as a violation of federal voting law.

He said that in his time in office, the efforts
have resulted in the removal of nearly
560,000 deceased Ohioans from the rolls and
“the resolution of more than 1.65 million
voters who were registered more than once.”

Democrats and advocates for the poor say the
state’s efforts are disproportionately felt in
neighborhoods that tend to vote Democratic.
The procedure has prompted years of
litigation between the advocates and the
Republican-led legislature.

But opponents say it is inappropriate to have
such efforts be triggered by a failure to vote.
Under Ohio’s procedure, voters who do not
vote for two years are sent registration
confirmation notices. If they do not respond
and do not vote over the next four years, they
are removed from the rolls.

But Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted, a
Republican who is running for governor, said
the process has been used under both
Democrats and Republicans. It is a way to
clear the voter rolls of those who have died or
moved away and increases public
confidence, he said.

The groups that challenged the law said the
procedure violates a part of the National
Voter Registration Act of 1993, which
prohibits a voter-list maintenance program
for federal elections that “result[s] in the
removal of the name of any person from the
official list of voters . . . by reason of the
person’s failure to vote.”

“Maintaining the integrity of the voter rolls is
essential to conducting an election with
efficiency and integrity,” Husted said in a
statement.
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Other states take action only after receiving
notice that a person has moved, the groups
said.
The provision in the federal law “reflects the
basic principle that, just as every eligible
voter has the constitutional right to vote, each
one also has the right not to cast a vote — and
the mere exercise of that right should not be
the basis for removal from the voter rolls,”
the organizations told the court in a brief.
André Washington, president of one of the
groups that challenged the state, the Ohio A.
Philip Randolph Institute, said in a statement
that the names of approximately 40,000
voters in Cuyahoga County were purged in
2015 “and a disproportionate number of
those people came from low-income
neighborhoods and communities of color.”
Husted told the court that it needed to get
involved because a growing number of states
had similar procedures.
But opponents said only a handful of states
do what Ohio does and that the justices
should wait for the issue to be examined by
other courts.
The case, which will be argued in the term
that begins in October, is Husted v. A. Philip
Randolph Institute.
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“Use It or Lose It?”
The Atlantic
Matt Ford
May 30, 2017

The U.S. Supreme Court will review Ohio’s
contested purge of its voter rolls next term,
adding a potentially major case on voting
rights to its docket for the first time since
Justice Neil Gorsuch joined the high court.

years, he or she is automatically struck from
the rolls.
A group of civil-rights organizations,
including the A. Philip Randolph Institute,
the think tank Demos, and the ACLU of
Ohio, filed a lawsuit against Ohio Secretary
of State Jon Husted challenging the
supplemental process’s legality in early
2016. They pointed to two federal laws, the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 and
the Help America Vote Act of 2002, that
forbid states from removing registered voters
from the rolls for simply not voting. Husted
countered that the federal provision doesn’t
apply because the supplemental process
doesn’t force voters from the rolls unless
they’ve also failed to respond to the mailed
confirmation notice. By his apparent
estimation, that intervening step means the
state hasn’t broken either law.

The justices agreed to hear the case, Husted
v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, in their
weekly release of orders on Tuesday. At issue
is the removal of tens of thousands of Ohio
voters from the state’s voter list ahead of last
November’s election. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals blocked the process before
Election Day last year before it had fully
taken effect, while a federal district court
allowed 7,515 voters who had already been
removed by that point to cast a ballot.
State election officials across the country
routinely remove voters who have died,
moved to another state, or become otherwise
ineligible to vote. In 1994, Ohio added what’s
known as the “supplemental process” to its
standard removal procedure: The Ohio
secretary of state’s office compiles a list of
registered voters who have gone two years
without any “voter activity”—which covers
acts ranging from updating one’s voter
information to casting an absentee,
provisional, or Election Day ballot—and
sends them a confirmation notice. If the
notice isn’t returned and the registered voter
doesn’t participate over the following four

A federal district court initially dismissed the
lawsuit. But a three-judge panel in the Sixth
Circuit sided with the organizations, ruling
that the prohibition against removing eligible
Americans for not voting would be
meaningless if states are allowed to use
inactivity as one reason, even among many,
to strike their names. “In more concrete
terms, a state cannot avoid the conclusion
that its process results in removal ‘solely by
reason of a failure to vote,’ by providing that
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mechanism” of voter suppression that
violates federal law. “We are confident that
the Supreme Court will uphold the correct
decision from the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and will ultimately ensure that
eligible Ohio voters may not be stricken from
the rolls,” she said in a statement.

the confirmation notice procedure is
triggered by a registrant’s failure either to
vote or to climb Mt. Everest or to hit a holein-one,” the court wrote.
A ruling in Ohio’s favor would broaden
states’ powers to remove otherwise-eligible
voters from their lists.

A ruling in Ohio’s favor would broaden
states’ powers to remove otherwise-eligible
voters from their lists. It would also come as
multiple states have pursued tougher
measures to constrain voter registration and
participation. President Trump frequently
invokes the specter of voter fraud and has
ordered a commission to tackle its perceived
threat. His remarks aside, virtually all
election experts have concluded the United
States’ highly decentralized electoral system
makes systemic voter fraud all but
impossible.

Husted appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court in February and applauded the justices
for agreeing to hear it. “Maintaining the
integrity of the voter rolls is essential to
conducting an election with efficiency and
integrity,” he said in a statement. “The
decision by the Court to hear this case is
encouraging. I remain confident that once the
justices review this case they will rule to
uphold the decades-old process that both
Republicans and Democrats have used in
Ohio to maintain our voter rolls as consistent
with federal law.”

Laws purportedly targeting voter fraud often
face uphill battles in the judiciary. Earlier this
month, the Supreme Court declined to review
a Fourth Circuit ruling that found North
Carolina’s voter ID law targeted black voters
with “surgical precision,” thus ensuring
lower participation. Even lesser restrictions
can have a significant effect on the electorate:
A recent study found voter ID laws in general
double the turnout gap between white and
black voters in general elections.

The organizations that brought the lawsuit,
for their part, reiterated their view that the
purge wrongly targeted disadvantaged
Ohioans for disenfranchisement. “In
Cuyahoga County alone, approximately
40,000 individuals were unlawfully purged
merely for choosing not to vote, and a
disproportionate number of those people
came from low-income neighborhoods and
communities of color,” Andre Washington,
the president of APRI’s Ohio chapter, said in
a statement. “The Supreme Court must
uphold the Sixth Circuit’s decision to ensure
that all Ohio citizens have the opportunity to
exercise their right to vote.”

Whether the Supreme Court will obstruct or
uphold those efforts remains to be seen.
Husted v. AFRI will be the first major
election-law case at the high court since
Gorsuch joined it in April. He is expected to
be a reliably conservative jurist, potentially
giving Chief Justice John Roberts and his

Freda Levenson, the director of the ACLU of
Ohio, went even further, describing the
supplemental process as “a powerful
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right-leaning colleagues a fifth vote in
upholding Ohio’s supplementary process.
But it’s unclear if he’ll match the intensity of
his predecessor. Antonin Scalia, who held
Gorsuch’s seat before his death in February
2016, generally favored more restrictive
electoral practices. In 2013, he mused aloud
during oral arguments in Shelby County v.
Holder that “racial entitlements” like the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 are difficult to
remove “through the normal political
process.” His fifth vote to curb the VRA’s
protections in that case helped usher in the
restrictive era on which his successor will
soon weigh in.
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“Federal appeals court rules against Ohio voter-roll purges”
The Washington Post
Sean Sullivan and Sari Horwitz
September 23, 2016

Mt. Everest or to hit a hole-in-one,” said the
ruling.

A federal appeals court ruled Friday against
Ohio’s procedure for removing voters from
state rolls, dealing a blow to Republican
Secretary of State Jon Husted and handing a
victory to voting rights advocates in a key
presidential swing state.

In a statement, Husted said the court’s
decision “will effectively force us to put
voters back on the voter rolls who have died
or long since moved to another address.” He
said that if “the final resolution requires us to
reinstate voting eligibility to individuals who
have died or moved out of Ohio, we will
appeal.”

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 6th Circuit overruled a U.S.
district court judge’s decision that Husted
was not violating any laws with the process
he was using to take inactive voters off the
rolls if they did not confirm their status. By a
-2-to-1 vote, the court of appeals sent the case
back to the district court.

Ohio Democratic Party Chairman David
Pepper called Friday’s decision a “huge win
for Ohio voters.”
“The court’s decision reaffirms a basic
principle: voters shouldn’t lose their right to
vote simply because they vote infrequently,”
he said in a statement.

The dispute centers on Ohio’s removal of
possibly tens of thousands of voters from
registration lists because they did not respond
to letters seeking to confirm their addresses
and have not cast a ballot since 2008, in what
is being criticized as a “use it or lose it” rule
for voting.

Both Democrat Hillary Clinton and
Republican Donald Trump are heavily
contesting Ohio. Polls show a close contest in
the state, where 18 electoral votes are up for
grabs. Trump campaigned in the state this
week.

The appeals court ruled that Ohio’s practices
could unjustifiably remove some eligible
voters and are not in compliance with the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993.

The current policy of mandating that inactive
voters effectively prove that they still belong
on the voter rolls appears to be aiding
Republicans in Ohio’s largest metropolitan
areas, according to a recent Reuters study.
The study found that in Cleveland, Cincinnati

“A state cannot avoid the conclusion that its
process results in removal ‘solely by reason
of a failure to vote’ . . . by providing that the
confirmation notice procedure is triggered by
a registrant’s failure either to vote or to climb
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and Columbus, voters have been taken off the
rolls in -Democratic-leaning areas at about
twice the rate as in GOP-heavy areas.

overturned by an appeals court, and the
Supreme Court declined to intervene.
Judge Eric L. Clay, who was appointed by
President Bill Clinton, delivered the Friday
opinion. He was joined by Judge Julia Smith
Gibbons, an appointee of President George
W. Bush.

The Ohio chapter of the A. Philip Randolph
Institute and the Northeast Ohio Coalition for
the Homeless, represented by the American
Civil Liberties Union of Ohio and Demos,
filed suit challenging the law in federal court.

Judge Eugene E. Siler Jr. dissented in part
and concurred in part. He was appointed by
President George H.W. Bush.

In July, the Justice Department joined the
court fight when it and the groups appealed
the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
6th Circuit after the district court upheld
Husted’s decision.
Voting rights advocates have expressed deep
concern about the policy. Some cite the 2000
election in Florida, when the state incorrectly
stated that about 12,000 registered voters
were -ex-cons and then purged them from the
rolls.
Republicans have expressed concern that
changing the policy could lead to voter fraud.
However, documented instances of fraud are
rare. A 2014 study by Loyola Law School
professor Justin -Levitt found 31 incidents of
voter impersonation out of more than a
billion ballots cast.
Along with the dispute over the voter rolls,
the Supreme Court this month rejected a
request from Democrats in Ohio to restore an
extra week of early voting. After voters faced
long lines in 2004, the state had added the
additional week, known as the Golden Week,
because the days overlapped with the period
for voter registration.
In 2013, a Republican-controlled legislature
repealed the law. A federal judge found that
action unconstitutional, but his decision was
469

“Ohio Can't Purge Infrequent Voters From Its Rolls”
The Atlantic
David A. Graham
September 23, 2016

Ohio can’t summarily kick tens of thousands
of voters off its rolls simply for not having
voted recently and not returning a postcard,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals said on
Friday.

areas, who are more likely to move
frequently. That in turns means a
disproportionate impact on poorer and
blacker voters—who happen to be more
likely to vote Democratic. Homeless
advocates said the purges unfairly targeted
those without a stable address.

The decision comes just 46 days before the
election day, and as tens of thousands of
Buckeye State voters have already requested
early ballots. But the decision could still be
appealed, as one judge noted in his partial
dissent.

Voting advocates sued Husted, saying the
purge violated the National Voting Rights
Act and asking for either an injunction to
block the removal or else a requirement to
count provisional ballots from people who
were removed. They lost in federal district
court, but the appeals court decision today
concluded that the lower court was mistaken.
By a 2-1 ruling, the three-judge panel said
that the plaintiff’s claims were not made
irrelevant when Husted mailed out a second
notice with more information, and it ruled
that Ohio had to inform people moving out of
state about how to register in their new
residence.

Ohio has seen a couple high-profile fights
over voting laws this year, disputes that have
particular importance because the state is a
crucial swing state in every presidential
election. In this case, Secretary of State Jon
Husted, a Republican, decided to remove
voters from the state’s rolls if they had not
voted for six years. The state sent a mailing
to these voters asking them to reply if they
were still living in their locations and voting,
but the mailers neither stated that a reply was
mandatory nor made it clear that failing to
reply could result in removal from rolls. “If
this is [a] really important thing to you in
your life, voting, you probably would have
done so within a six-year period,” Husted
said.

Judge Eric Clay, a Bill Clinton appointee, and
Judge Julia Gibbons, a George W. Bush
appointee, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
Judge Eugene Siler, a George H.W. Bush
appointee, dissented in part and concurred in
part.

Moves
such
as
these
tend
to
disproportionately affect voters in urban

Assuming the ruling is not overturned by a
higher court, it’s hard to know what effect it
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might have on the election. As a Cincinnati
Enquirer investigation found, no one really
knows how many voters have actually been
purged.
In a separate case, Husted was sued for
eliminating “Golden Week,” a stretch in
which Ohioans could both register to vote
and cast an early ballot. A district court ruled
against Husted in that case, but in August a
different Sixth Circuit panel ruled that
Husted was within his rights to eliminate it.
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